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WOMEN'S STANDPOINTS AND INTERNALISM IN SPORT

Michael Burke

David Fairchild explains that sport is an evocative symbolic system that demonstrates the apparently 'natural' division of humans into two separate and dichotomous genders, and also demonstrates the apparently 'genetically based' hierarchy between the genders in terms of sporting results. Additionally, this hierarchy of performance translates into a hierarchy of authority, such that men occupy the most powerful positions in coaching, administration and the sports media. The initial section of this paper will follow on from Fairchild to suggest some changes that are necessary before women will gain semantic authority over their participation in sport. The paper will then suggest that the expansion of the discursive space in sport to include alternate standpoints produced by women [and other marginalised groups] can follow tactics employed by feminist standpoint theorists to expand discursive space in other fields. The final section of the paper will look at how a feminist politics in discursive sport will need to challenge what William Morgan has suggested is the recently acquired dominant position of 'interpretative broad internalism' in sport philosophy, as one of the foundational underpinnings of internalism explains sport as a perfect practice. This underpinning has been used in substantive practice to undermine the knowledges of women athletes and commentators. This final section will look at some examples of translating private authorship into political authority for women in sport.

KEYWORDS Standpoint feminism; authority; women; sport

Introduction

I'm pretty certain that my pro-feminist epiphany occurred after a few years of coaching junior girls' basketball. I had grown up the youngest in my family, with parents who had a strong Roman Catholic commitment to human rights, and three older sisters who were powerfully independent. So I never

suffered from one form of common socialisation that produces in some people a belief that women should somehow be considered second-class citizens, unworthy of a voice in conversations. At the same time, my orientation was decidedly liberal feminist.

Then the 'event' occurred – the moment in many pro-feminist lives when feminism suddenly has personal meaning. One year, I was fortunate to coach a team of extremely talented and athletic young adolescent females. For purely performance-based reasons, I requested that the local committee allowed these girls to participate in the junior boy's competition of the same age group category. I was informed by the committee that my team of female players would not be allowed to play as 'the boys might be upset and embarrassed if a team of girls beat them'. It was this event that forced me to see gender oppressions where I had previously seen none and to confront my own and others anti-feminist positions and (in)actions.

Sport and athletes have symbolised and practiced the dominance over women by men (Edwards and Jones 2007, 348, 350; Messner 2011, 151–170). Disrespectful ignorance of women's standpoints in sports remains evident in many ways; the disproportionate media coverage of women's sport, the links between media coverage and stereotypical versions of appropriate and deferential femininity, the sexual objectification of female athletes, the different labour roles in the media, coaching and organisation that are available to, and occupied by, women and men at all levels of elite and sub-elite sport, the differences in prizemoney, length and timing of sporting events for the two genders, and the legislated support for the exclusion of female athletes from male sporting competitions are just some examples of where benchmark male discourse limits female opportunities in sport (Burke 2010; Messner 2011; Teetzel 2011; Thorpe 2005).

How can women gain the authority in sport that is necessary to have personally produced commentaries listened to with respect by the public? This paper will suggest, following from David Fairchild (1994), that a large shift in the dominant discourse surrounding sport will be necessary for women to gain semantic authority over their own sporting participation. The initial section of this paper will explain Fairchild's position on expanding the discursive space in sport to include alternate standpoints and apply these ideas to a specific legal case involving females playing football. The initial section will explain the philosophical framework that females can use to get private authorship over their experiences in sport. The final section of the paper will look at how a feminist politics in sport will need to challenge the recently acquired dominant position of 'interpretative broad internalism' in sport philosophy (Morgan 2012, 65). This final section will look at translating private authorship into political authority for women in sport.

Feminist Standpoint Positions and Sporting Authorship

The second-wave feminists opposed the claims by liberals about the neutrality of both institutional structures and discourses in the modern state. In Iris Marion-Young's terms, where a certain group controls the 'power, resources, access to publicity' and positions of authority, neutral decision-making procedures that impartially allow all people to state their cases will merely perpetuate the interests of the powerful (1990, 114). MacKinnon (1987, 166) explains that the problem with universal rights to freedom of speech, an abstract liberal philosophy, is that in substantive practice, one person's right to speak may silence another person, or another group of people. In the world of most practices, men's freedom of speech silences women's words, and the so-called universal rights granted to women give them no protection from disrespectful ignorance of their stories (Grasswick and Webb 2002, 190; MacKinnon 1987, 164, 169, 195). And, in a society of presumptive equality, the inability to have your words listened to is taken as a silence that is chosen by, rather than forced on, the speaker (Laden 2003, 135; MacKinnon 1987, 168, 170).

According to David Fairchild (1994), sport is an evocative symbolic system that demonstrates the apparently 'natural' division of humans into two separate and dichotomous genders, and also demonstrates the apparently 'genetically based' hierarchy between the genders. Additionally, this hierarchy of performance translates into a hierarchy of authority, such that men occupy the most powerful positions in coaching, administration and the sports media. A shift in the underpinning dominant value system of sporting discourse would need to take place so that sport could become a site where women can challenge this commonsensical discourse, and the hierarchy it supports. To demonstrate the shift that would be necessary in sport, Fairchild utilises Peggy McIntosh's interactive five phase theory to exemplify the discursive production of gender in society, and applies these phases to the production of gender in sport. To further explain Fairchild's position, I will investigate a specific case judgement (Taylor v Moorabbin Saints 2004). The complainants in the case were three female Australian Rules Footballers, aged between 14 and 16, who were excluded from playing in a local football competition by the organising body, *Football Victoria*, under a regulation labelled the *Female Participation Regulation* in 2003. The girls appealed to the *Human Rights Division* of the *Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal*, and the judgment was handed down in November, 2003, by Justice Morris.

Within a phase one orientation to gender relations, women are both systematically and symbolically excluded from sport without any recognition by them or the excluders that this is unfair (Fairchild 1994, 371). For example, suggestions such as 'women aren't interested in football' or 'the market says women's sport is not interesting' are both examples of phase one thinking.

The value system in sport is uncritically vertical and hierarchical where men are believed to know sport better because they perform best in objective comparisons, and this belief further influences the distribution of coaching, media and administration jobs (Fairchild 1994, 373). The *Female Participation Regulation* was defended as both protecting the safety of females and avoiding the possibility that male players would change their playing behaviours if females were allowed to continue playing past the age of 12. Both of these motivations demonstrate phase one thinking. The first suggests that women, unlike men, are incapable of making rational decisions regarding the safety of their own sporting participation. The second suggests that the desires and interests of male players are more important than the desires, interests and participation of female players.

Phase two thinking allows exceptional women athletes, journalists or coaches to be permitted to be included as sporting participants but they are included as exceptions to the norm of femaleness. The initial exclusion of the female footballers from the junior football competition is based on the belief that humans are made up of two mutually exclusive and separate genders, which can be determined biologically/genetically. The skills, characteristics and abilities of these genders are also mutually exclusive, such that it is believed that the strongest and best woman requires protection from the weakest and worst man. So elite women footballers are not even allowed the benefits of phase two thinking, a position in a male football competition as a 'freak' of womanhood.

In phase three, all women are defined as 'deficient' athletes (Fairchild 1994, 374), who must be protected from competition with all men. The problem of accommodating women participants is solved by inclusion of female athletes in a way that maintains the underpinning foundations of masculine sport. Equal Opportunity Laws in many countries have a clause that denies the opportunity for integrated competition. New sports or sports with modified rules may be created to also give women an athletic experience that does not challenge the dominance of men. Within the existing legislation, Justice Morris had to rule that *Football Victoria* did have the legal right to not register female players; in other words Justice Morris was limited to a phase three orientation by the legislation that he was required to make a judgement with. *Football Victoria* now champions junior women's football as having the fastest growth rate of any sport in Australia. That these competitions are marketed as safer forms of football by the organising body, shows how female resistance to phases one and two has been successfully incorporated using separate competitions with modified rules.

In order to produce alternative descriptions, standpoint feminists recreate the 'data of moral theory' by telling their stories in their own words (Laden

2003, 141, FN19). Such telling forces women to step outside of the protective solidarity of normal/rational discourse.

Prior to the development of such abnormal discourse by feminists as marital rape, date rape, workplace sexual harassment, the revelation of the politics involved in pornography, men opening doors for women, the meaning of pronouns, the sexual division of childcare and housework (Marion-Young 1990, 120, 121), the female oppressed by these ideas or actions felt either abnormal or impotent.¹ The continued revelation of stories about such oppressions eventually forced some changes in some communities.

It is during phases four and five that women challenge for a position of authorship over their own performances and bodies, and this challenge requires a debunking of the link between objective performance measures and useful understandings of sport. Normally, it will be up to women to produce a non-vertical system of authority in sport which becomes a model for listening to any marginal groups (Fairchild 1994, 376), and for understanding something about the variety of goods that are achieved in sport, by people who are not peak performers. The question, 'How have women used sports?' is answered by women, and the answers may be different to those previously provided by men.

As an example of this thinking, Fairchild (1994, 377) looks at Gwen Torrence's response to a journalist who asked her what she was thinking about when up on the Olympic dais to receive a gold medal. Torrence responded from her specific and gendered position as a mother and said that she was thinking of the various people that helped her care for her child whilst she was training. She responded in a way that foregrounded parenthood over sporting excellence or personal achievement. This response demonstrates a sense of female responsibility for children that most male athletes do not have to worry about. The policy response to Torrence's story, if it is listened to with respect, may be to introduce crèches to elite training programs, to assist mothers in continuing to be athletes.

In these two phases, sport is reconstituted as providing a variety of meanings/perspectives, many of which make the familiar ideas strange. Different groups of people play sport for different reasons, and some of their reasons may be more useful to other groups or individuals than the peak value system that dominates the first three phases (Fairchild 1994, 378). Morris suggested that *Football Victoria* should try to think of better categories of participation that would support personally valuable goals set by all people. It may be better to use weight or height categories, although organisationally more difficult for the League. Phase five thinking may progress so that previously male-dominated competitions recognise that changes in the orientations and practices of feminist standpoint football may also suit their own contexts. Such discourses may be better suited to rural competitions where the number of

male participants in certain age groups has dwindled, making it difficult to sustain 18-a-side football on large football grounds.

The politics of standpoint feminism requires that the competitions played by women footballers, and the underpinning reasons for playing these competitions, have to be presented as alternative, and not deficient, competitions. Nancy Theberge (1998, 184, 185) suggests that the inclusion of women in ice-hockey has produced some challenges to the benchmark male game of ice-hockey. Women's ice-hockey does not include intentional body checking. Yet the hierarchy supported by this difference is currently being undermined by the increasing concern about injuries and violence in the men's game. Many junior and recreational leagues in Canada have taken up the 'women's rules' for their games.²

The possibility of the authority of a newly created language by females in certain sports may still be achieved by participation by females in these sports, even when they retain an existing male discourse. Tolich (1996) describes the success of female jockeys in New Zealand as resulting from a decrease in prizemoney which made the profession unattractive for male jockeys. Resistance to this intrusion still occurred in many ways; male jockeys actively tried to dismount females in races and the male training fraternity maintained stereotypical notions of female jockeys which precluded their success. However, females now dominate the jockey's premiership in New Zealand, and these female jockeys have produced a new style of riding. The female jockey is less likely to use the whip, using balance to ride out their horses. This 'quietness' or 'passivity' on the horse is now positively valued as it permits the horse to maintain its galloping rhythm (Tolich 1996, 53).

Resistance to the characteristics of one phase will result in an incorporation of that resistance via the next phase. Even with both of these sporting examples, the possibility for male incorporation is obvious. Lenskyj remarks that 'The illusion of effortlessness in female aesthetic activities is central to their entertainment quotient...' (1994, 360). This illusion maintains the perspective that females do not challenge themselves in sport as fully as males. A quiet riding style can easily be translated by supporters of male dominance to a passive and reluctant riding style. A free-flowing game of ice-hockey, free of body checking, can easily be redescribed as less intense and less serious than 'normal' ice-hockey.

A Feminist Standpoint Political Challenge to Internalism:

Elizabeth Grosz argues that philosophy has been oppressive for women at a number of interrelated levels. Grosz explains three types of oppression in the practice of philosophy, each reinforcing the effects of the others; sexism,

patriarchy and phallocentrism. Sexism is understood as 'the *unwarranted* differential treatment of the two sexes, to the benefit of one at the expense of the other' (Grosz 1988, 93). Sexism refers to explicit empirical acts, which exclude women from practicing philosophy, or any other form of knowledge production, through openly hostile remarks or practices toward them, or which consign women to practice philosophy in the same way as men (Grosz, 1988, 93).

It is not difficult to find the odd example within the early history of philosophy of sport that appeared as openly hostile towards females participating in sport. John Carroll makes numerous suggestions about the importance of football to men, including that 'the team becomes the band of blood brothers, men who assemble together to undertake dangerous exploits under conditions of duress and threat' (1986, 94). For women in sport, Carroll offers:

Women should once again be prohibited from sport: they are the true defenders of the humanist values that emanate from the household, the values of tenderness, nurture and compassion, and this most important role must not be confused by the military and political values inherent in sport. Likewise sport should not be muzzled by humanist values: it is the living arena for the great virtue of manliness. (1986, 98)

Fortunately, this type of writing is the exception rather than the norm in the field of philosophy of sport

Patriarchal forms of knowledge support the oppression of women by systematically evaluating their actions and knowledges in negative ways and men's actions and knowledges in positive ways. The elevation of certain terms in philosophy which are implicitly linked with masculinity (objectivity, reason, mind) to the exclusion of other terms linked to femininity (subjectivity, emotion, body) serves to ground the overt forms of sexism in philosophy (Grosz, 1988, 94; Plumwood 1993, 442). Phallocentric discursive systems build on patriarchal and sexist discourses by operating to collapse the two sexes and their characteristics into a single, universal subject (Edwards and Jones 2007, 352). The maleness of the human symbol goes largely unrecognised but leaves no conceptual space for the woman to develop an autonomous set of discourses for opposing sexism from her subjective set of experiences. Each possibility for the woman confirms the primacy of the male standard as she may become the same as, the opposite of, or the complement to that standard (Grosz, 1988, 95).

The more common patriarchal and phallocentric tactics/events in the philosophy of sport literature define sport from the perspective of a single and unified human subject, and make the human subject 'congruent only with the masculine' (Grosz, 1988, 94). To again give a dated example, Paul Weiss (1969, 14) in a chapter entitled 'Concern for Excellence' argued the following:

The excellence that the athlete wants to attain is an excellence greater than that attained before. *He* wants to do better than *he* did; *he* would like to do better than anyone ever did... This is a truth that will surely hold as long as *men* compete with one another [my emphases].

There are some other rare examples from within sport philosophy that ascribe different values and meanings to men's and women's sport, where men's interests and desires are more highly valued women's interests and desires. I would suggest that much of the applied ethics work in the areas of drugs and gender verification in sport, public financing of sport stadia and events, virtues developed through sporting participation and other areas enunciate a masculine vision of normativity in sport.

For Marion-Young, the critique of the phallogocentric paradigm of knowledge production begins with the recognition that it is incapable of sustaining itself. The ideal of impartiality 'expresses a logic of identity that seeks to reduce difference to unity' (1990, 97). Its goal, whether in scientific, moral or philosophical theory, is to generate a dualism between universal ideas and the particular and idiosyncratic passions of individuals. To do so, the impartial observer must abstract from the particularities of each situation. That which is expelled must be treated as the deviant, bad, irrational, sentimental, unmethodical, accidental 'other' to the impartial and universal claim (Marion-Young 1990, 97–99). What makes this a particularly dangerous fiction for oppressed people's situation is that the ideal of impartiality reifies the judgements of privileged groups (Plumwood 1993, 453). If the oppressed group's judgements are not the same as the 'universal' then the difference is constructed as individual deviance and inferiority (Marion-Young 1990, 116), rather than as the result of oppressive structures and discourses in patriarchal societies.

What is achieved in feminist standpoints is the two part removal of patriarchal and phallogocentric knowledge systems; the deconstruction of the 'objectivity' of such systems, and the redescription of knowledge systems to include as relevant the particular and collective perspective of the sexed knower.³ Aspects of social reality, previously seen as normal, are now perceived as contradictory by the woman. Whereas once her descriptions of her experiences were trivialised, ignored, or described as neurotic and self-centred, she now grabs back the authority of her first-person accounts of that experience. The woman, who can make such a move away from patriarchal reality, experiences the contradictions between the patriarchal reality and the newly developed feminist consciousness as anguish.⁴

Sherwin states: 'Feminist methodology directs us to look for the political significance of personal experience' (1989, 23, 24). Feminist standpoints break down the dualisms that are structural in phallogocentric knowledge (Plumwood 1993).⁵ Whereas phallogocentric theory cannot admit its own masculine interests

without threatening its status and rationality, feminist standpoints openly acknowledge their context-dependent interests and uses. Feminist standpoints necessarily connect epistemology with politics (Grosz 1988, 100, 102; Grasswick and Webb 2002, 186, 187).

I am not as certain that phallogocentric versions of sport are a thing of the past in the field of philosophy of sport. To demonstrate, I will look briefly at the recent works about internalism and sport. I will commence with an idea from Anthony Laden:

A theory may be short-sighted in that it fails to attend to a form of oppression. Such mere short-sightedness can be corrected by pointing out this failure of attention. A theory is blind, however, if it is not theoretically equipped to respond to such a point, if there is nothing within its theoretical machinery that will allow it to see the oppression it is shown as oppression. (2003, 134)

Unfortunately for its supporters, I am hoping to demonstrate that internalism is a perspective that is not just short-sighted, but blind.⁶ My argument in this paper, following from feminist standpoint theory, is that it is this internalist principle that leads to differences in authority for men and women in the sporting practice community.

My critics could respond by suggesting that this is simply an issue of short-sightedness; that is, that the existing practice community is not the ideal discursive community that Simon (2004, 129, 132) talks about because its disrespectful and intransigent attachment to its masculine history means that it is unable to listen to many of its female members. Similarly, Morgan could respond that the practice community is not ideal because it fails to listen to all participants, regardless of their capacities to perfect their craft.⁷ But in the sporting world, we do not have ideal communities; excellence is normally embodied male and this limits participation in the discourse by females. So, extolling the principle of perfection as '*the point and purpose that underlies sport 'in its best light'*' (Russell 1999 35 my emphases) does not leave the conceptual space necessary for discussions about which groups benefit from this principle as the important normative one.

Excellence in sports has been narrowly defined in terms that generally suit male authority (Watson 1993, 514; Messner 1994, 201). Scott Watson presents this in logical argument form in the following way:

Premise A: If some action results in a person or group of people being in a position of disadvantage in relationship to another person or group of people, then that action is discriminatory.

Premise B: Emphasizing or valuing the pursuit of excellence in sport results in one group of people, women, being in a position of disadvantage in relationship to another group, men.⁸

Conclusion: Therefore, emphasizing or valuing the pursuit of excellence in sport is discriminatory against women. (1993, 511)

Within the current set of sports there are few in which elite women outperform elite men in terms of the quantifiable criteria of measurement, or of the conventional understanding of bodily or sporting excellence, that dominate the contemporary sporting discourse. Hence, regardless of the reasons for producing these differences in results or excellences (and knowledge), females are denied access to the institutional positions in the sports media, administration and coaching that control public morality and knowledge, because of these results.

How are those women who wish to be listened to with respect going to respond? They must create imaginative ways of talking which replace the current dominant discourse about sporting excellence. Because authority in sport is related to excellence in performance, and excellence has been narrowly understood as measured performance, women must find ways of challenging this relationship if they are to gain greater authority. I will begin with a most evocative example from Mike Messner (1992, 381, 382) to conclude this section of the paper, and the example comes from a man:

Most satisfying were his weekly racquetball games with his wife. She had never been very athletic, he said, so they decided to adjust the situation in order to make the game more "fair": "I enjoy playing racquetball with her. I play with my left hand and with an eye-patch on...

Bill and his wife have broken with the dominant masculine athletic value system... Most importantly, the foundation of their game is a value-system that elevates the quality of their relationship to a position of prominence over winning.

From a feminist political perspective, this is neither a debased version of sport that does not pursue the internal principle of excellence, nor a condescending reinforcement of the athletic superiority of men, but a significant shift in consciousness that could produce a move to an externalist or instrumentalist (Loland 2004) normative system of sport. It recognises the social construction of sport and also the opportunity to reconstruct sport in ways that promote values other than perfection. Feminist standpoint positions take these private normative systems, and judge their utility in terms of satisfying feminist political goals of promoting authority for women.⁹ The internal principle of perfection does not seem to be a good starting point to make such judgments about political authority.

Conclusion

Feminist theory offers a number of challenges to the epistemological and ethical claims, and the relationships between these claims, made in both

philosophy and philosophy of sport. Beliefs about expertise and knowledge are deconstructed by feminists as political claims that solidify the position of males in society. Questions of fairness are reframed by feminists as questions about whose desires take precedence in contesting and deciding normative claims. And the relationships between the gendered author and claims of justice, claims of knowledge and claims of value are also placed at the forefront of the feminist imagination.

The position of this paper has been that the discourse of sport that naturalises narrow and phallogentric definitions of sporting excellence and ties those definitions to authoritative positions permits men the opportunity to embody excellence and occupy authoritative positions. And from these positions, men are able to make moral and legislative judgements about the athlete and the sport as if both are ungendered, that further limits the opportunity for women to speak authoritatively about sport. At the same time, it is women's presence in sport that makes sport an example of 'leaky hegemony' (Cole and Birrell 1986 as quoted in Theberge 1998, 184). These leaks occur when women participate at sites, in competitions, with voices and in bodies that have historically been the exclusive domain of men.

Notes

1. MacKinnon explains that 'if you *are* the tree falling in the epistemological forest, your demise doesn't make a sound if no-one is listening' (1987, 169).
2. Leslie Francis' views on the reconstruction of basketball by women athletes to foreground passing and player movement (1993–94, 43) may also make the women's game in college or the WNBA a more appropriate model for junior and recreational participants than the men's game of dunks and isolation plays. My feeling in watching the NCAA final four basketball competitions for 2013 was that the best *team* to observe for such participants was UConn women's team. I apologise for sinking back into the discourse of perfection, but they were pretty close to perfection.
3. Translating these experience-based perspectives into dominant discourses is not fully discussed or developed in this paper, and it would involve devising new strategies for the female to assume epistemic authority. Marianne Janack suggests that the important and pragmatic question for feminists to address is to work out how to have their experiences included in theory making; in other words, how can their experiences be given epistemic authority? (1997, 130). Once authority is granted, privilege and justification will follow automatically.
4. I would suggest that elements of Iris Marion-Young (1980) convey this anger. Marion-Young, in describing the source of women being physically

handicapped, points accusingly at patriarchal culture which trains women to be 'physically inhibited, confined, positioned, and objectified' (1980, 152). Mar-ion-Young's hours spent practicing a feminine walk (1980, 154) implies anger towards their oppressors.

5. As an example, Ruth Hubbard looks at the way that evolutionary theory starts and ends with the 'Man the Hunter' evolutionary story, a story that was dominated by the development of male skills and abilities. As these types of deconstructive ideas were developed in a variety of areas of the natural and social sciences, there developed a 'more general criticism... of how gender bias was itself shaping the norms and standards of those disciplines' (Grasswick and Webb 2002, 188).
6. I am going to ignore the realist/antirealist debate in this paper, although I concur with Morgan's response to Dixon's support for realism that the 'view from nowhere' leaves us with a complete absence of values (2004, 165–170). My feminist response to realism is that for groups who do not have epistemic authority, realism has often been a terrible starting position.
7. Morgan's antirealist position is much more able to accommodate changes in normative judgements that would suit feminist goals for two reasons. Firstly, he acknowledges that the internalist position that success in sport should correlate with excellent performance exists because 'people like us go in for sports that feature this kind of excellence' (2004, 171). If other people don't go in for this form of excellence, then they are free to produce an alternate vision of sport. Secondly, Morgan also points to the work of moral entrepreneurs who can change the deep conventions that produce current support for this internalist principle (2012). I would presume that feminist standpoint theorists could be considered moral entrepreneurs who could produce a rival conception of sport that would support externalist feminist goals and could generate a different community of practitioners. Finally, Morgan is acutely aware of the 'social and historical forces that shape so much of our sporting lives' (2012, 66). I have no doubt that the dominance of men and male interests in the social and historical context of sport has a lot to do with the current normative evaluations that are made.
8. Watson (1993, 513) and others have noted that the pursuit of excellence also results in disadvantage for certain categories of men. The difference is that the pursuit of excellence discriminates [in most sports] against all women.
9. I think an excellent model for this liberatory externalist perspective actually comes from John Russell's (2004) example of James 'Cool Papa' Bell, inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame in 1974 for his outstanding achievements playing in the Negro Leagues. Russell demonstrates that Bell's moral qualities were also excellent by giving a couple of stories which show Bell's generosity in promoting the careers of other Black baseballers players, Jackie Robinson and Monte Irvine. Russell notes that it was Bell's recognition of the external

contingencies of his time, the need for Black baseball players to push through and eliminate the barrier on Black players in the Major Leagues, which elevated Bell's actions from privately generous to politically important, and contributed to the normative judgment that Bell was a good sport. From a standpoint position, the important point is that Bell was able to recognise, not just the boundaries between sport and other parts of life, but the significant overlaps. Breaking the Black barrier in Major League Baseball was a significant turning point in broader race relations in the United States. I'm not sure that Bell's pursuit of private perfection in baseball would have allowed for such vision.

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