Still a ‘Male Business’?
Explaining Women’s Presence in Executive Office
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Still a ‘Male Business’? Explaining Women’s Presence in Executive Office

SILVIA CLAVERIA

This article aims to account for cross-national and over-time variation in women’s participation in cabinets. Specifically, it focuses on some key political factors which have not been tested yet, such as the effectiveness of party gender quotas. Previous literature has mainly centred on structural variables, such as the degree of democratisation and economic development. Using an original longitudinal cross-sectional sample of 23 advanced industrial democracies, this article provides new evidence that some important political factors should be considered. It finds that countries with a specialist system have a higher percentage of women in cabinet than generalist systems, left-wing parties in government appoint more women, women are more likely to receive a ministerial post when the governing party has adopted gender quotas, and an increasing number of women in parliament boosts women in cabinet. Furthermore, the article shows that these political variables perform differently through time, and that political factors have become more relevant in recent decades.

Women have traditionally been under-represented in political institutions. One of the most unexplored and important gender gaps is found in executive office. Nowadays, the proportion of women in political cabinets is still remarkably low, although women constitute over half the population and their participation in the labour market and their levels of educational attainment have greatly increased over the last 30 years. While some improvements have been made in this regard, we find a mixed picture when comparing women’s presence in executive office across countries. For instance, in Spain, 50 per cent of the cabinet members of the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004–08) were women, and the Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates significantly increased the proportion of women appointed to his cabinet from 13 per cent in 2005 to 29 per cent in 2009. However, in 2010, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, only filled 17 per cent of his cabinet posts with women. Likewise, in Italy, Silvio Berlusconi’s cabinet, formed in 2008, contained only 13 per cent women. Berlusconi even noted that Zapatero’s government was ‘too pink’ (i.e. it included too many women) and that Italy was not ready for parity as ‘it isn’t easy to find women who are

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Thus, significant cross-national variation leads us to ask: which factors explain the presence of women in executive office?

Whereas the literature on women’s political representation in national parliaments is now well established, comparative analyses of women in cabinets are rather limited. The most obvious reason for this gap is that women have historically been absent from cabinets, leaving researchers with a very small sample to examine cross-national variation. This lack of research on executive power is especially remarkable when one considers that cabinets are the locus of power. In other words, the government is the leading actor in setting the political agenda and introducing new legislation. Particularly in parliamentary democracies, most policy initiatives are put forward by governments rather than by party parliamentary groups.

Although the literature on women in parliaments has developed diverse explanations, women’s presence in cabinet requires other models to account for cross-nationally dissimilar levels, since these institutions have different natures. Firstly, regarding access to these bodies, cabinets are appointed by a single individual, while deputies are elected by voters. As Franceschet and Thomas (2011: 3) point out, ‘ministers, even when appointed from the ranks of sitting members of parliament, have not “_campaigned” for their job in the same public way as elected legislators’. Secondly, cabinets have implications that differ from those of parliament. That is, governments might be more effective in bringing new issues to the political agenda and creating new legislation due to the greater power and higher media attention received. Furthermore, the greater visibility and prominence of cabinets means that substantive and symbolic representation is more relevant in executive power (see Annesley and Gains 2010; Franceschet and Thomas 2011: 4). These different features make cabinets a distinct institution to analyse gendered dynamics, and may demonstrate that previous explanatory factors related to women’s representation in parliament might not be applicable, while other new factors may become relevant to account for women’s representation in the executive. For instance, electoral systems have an important role in determining women’s presence in parliament (Darcy et al. 1994; Paxton 1997; Galligan and Tremblay 2005; Rudein 2012) but they may not play a role in explaining the presence of women in cabinet. Conversely, the type of ministerial recruitment may only affect the presence of women in cabinet but not their numerical representation in parliaments.

Hitherto, the burgeoning literature on gender and cabinets still presents some important deficits that require further attention. Firstly, most analyses have tended to emphasise cultural over political factors (Reynolds 1999; Siaroff 2000; Studlar and Moncrief 1997). For example, Reynolds (1999) found that Catholic countries perform better in women’s recruitment to executive office, which contradicts some analyses that propose that Catholicism is less sensitive to gender equality than Protestantism (Wilcox 1991). Previous studies have compared governments across different types of regimes (i.e. democracies, authoritarian and populist administrations), which might potentially veil the effect of political variables. Recent studies have concluded that...
political variables are more important than cultural variables (Krook and O’Brien 2012). However, by combining presence and portfolio allocation as the dependent variable for disentangling which factors are more relevant for boosting women’s presence in cabinets is troublesome. By exclusively focusing on advanced industrial democracies, which share similar levels of democratisation and development, this article is better suited to examine the specific impact of political factors.

In addition, most previous studies have sought to explain the relative number of women in executive power from a cross-sectional perspective (with the exception of Davis 1997, and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005), thus being unable to assess whether some factors operate differently across time (Krook and O’Brien 2012; Reynolds 1999; Siaroff 2000). This article fills this gap by adopting a longitudinal perspective which provides an opportunity to track how women’s presence in cabinet has evolved across both time and space. Specifically, the article explores cross-national and over-time variation in women’s participation in the governments of advanced industrial democracies for the period 1980–2010. This original sample allows us to examine the effect of variables hitherto omitted in the literature on women in cabinets, such as the effectiveness of party gender quotas on executives, being the first time this effect has been measured and assessed.

The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The second section reviews the literature on gender and cabinets and draws several hypotheses. The third section describes the method, variables and data employed in this study. The fourth section presents the empirical evidence. And, finally, the fifth section discusses the main findings.

Women’s Representation in Cabinets

As Figure 1 shows, there is no clear pattern of female representation in parliaments and cabinets across advanced industrial democracies in 2010. Whereas women’s representation is higher in cabinets than in parliaments in 11 countries, the opposite is true in 12 countries. Cross-national variation in women’s presence is noteworthy, although the mean of parliaments and cabinets are similar, 26.6 and 26.7 per cent respectively, the range of values is different. That is, while the proportion of women in parliament varies from 9 to 45 per cent, the percentage of women in cabinets comprises 6 to 52 per cent.

Studies on women in executive office have typically adopted most of the explanations produced by research on women in parliament. Following Krook and O’Brien (2012), I classify previous factors into three categories. The first component, ‘sociocultural factors’, refers to women’s status in society (both sociostructural and cultural variables), which affects the pool of available women. The second category, ‘political institutions’, concerns the structure of political institutions; it has been conceptualised as the degree of openness of the political system to women. The third category, ‘representation in politics’, argues that women’s presence in political elites shapes both the supply (pool
of available women) and demand (openness of the institutions) for more females in cabinets. Let us now set the theoretical expectations derived from these categories to explain the levels of women in cabinet office.

**Sociocultural Factors**

**Socioeconomic Factors**

How is the pool of women restricted by structural factors? Although no formal requisites apply for seeking cabinet appointment, there are several informal requirements for eligibility. Political elites, including ministers, are derived disproportionately from the highly educated and from certain professions (Norris 1985; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Reynolds 1999). Indeed, three-quarters of all ministers in post-war Europe have had a university degree (Thiébault 1991: 21). Traditionally, women have not had access to the same educational and professional opportunities as men. Since women are educationally and occupationally segregated (Nermo 1999; Polavieja 2008), they will be disadvantaged as regards the most valued skills and the financial capital needed to run for office. In this vein, improved access to education and greater inclusion of women in the labour market is considered to contribute to women’s inclusion in politics (Bergqvist 2011; Norris 1997; Raaum 2005). However, previous results do not confirm this relationship. For instance, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005: 85) show that the percentage of women in the workforce has a statistically irrelevant effect, and that higher enrolment in...
tertiary education actually translates into lower percentages of female ministers. It should be noted, however, that previous studies have included underdeveloped countries in their samples, where women are predominantly employed in the primary sector and have lower educational levels. As a result, they occupy low-prestige jobs, a situation which is unlikely to increase the supply of women with backgrounds similar to the men who currently serve in cabinet. Given that, this research focuses on advanced industrial democracies, where we may find a refined relation between structural factors and women in cabinet than previous analyses. Advanced industrial democracies have a higher percentage of women with tertiary educational levels, making women more likely to be appointed to cabinet positions than in underdeveloped countries. The first hypothesis is posited as follows:

H1. The higher the level of women’s education, the more women there will be in cabinets.

Cultural Factors

The second set of ‘sociocultural factors’ explanations deals with cultural factors. Attitudes and values towards gender equality have traditionally created substantial barriers to women’s political participation. An egalitarian culture and positive attitudes towards women’s participation in public life facilitates women’s access to political office (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 131). Culture affects attitudes, values and beliefs about the appropriate division of roles between women and men. Indeed, cross-sectional analyses of women in parliaments show that gender attitudes strongly affect the number of women in legislatures, and this factor is even stronger than other political variables, such as the use of a proportional electoral system (Paxton and Kunovich 2003: 99; Rudein 2012: 106). These studies have used the Gender Equality Scale (GES) as a cultural measure. However, this variable is not appropriate for longitudinal analyses, as the questions that integrate the scale have varied over time.5 Following Reynolds (1999), I will use religion as a proxy for culture, since cultural barriers to women’s representation are often drawn from individuals’ religious inclination. It has been argued that, in Western Europe, citizens of predominantly Catholic countries are markedly less supportive of gender equality than citizens of countries with Protestant majorities (Inglehart 1981; Wilcox 1991).

H2. The higher the percentage of Protestants in a country, the more women there will be in cabinets.

Political Institutions

On the political institutions side, explanatory factors refer to the characteristics of the political system as well as to the considerations of the selectors and their
environment, namely presidents and the political parties they belong to. These factors are grouped into: (i) political system effects, that is, factors related to the characteristics and practices of institutions in each country; and (ii) party organisation effects, understood as the norms and procedures of the parties in government.

Political System Factors

At the systemic level, the first factor to be considered is the type of ministerial recruitment. Davis (1997: 47) shows that women’s presence is lower in generalist ministerial systems than in specialist systems. Under specialist systems, ministers are selected on their expertise in a particular policy area rather than on their past political experience. In actual fact, many ministers are selected from outside the ranks of parliament, so cabinets present greater permeability to political outsiders thereby benefitting women. Conversely, under generalist systems, ministers tend to have long-standing political backgrounds and are usually selected from inside the ranks of parliament. One can argue that the number of women in the lower house might directly affect the supply of potential female ministers with experience in political office (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Reynolds 1999; Siaroff 2000). Nonetheless, as parliamentary committees’ chairs and other relevant positions such as party bench spokespersons, which might be stepping stones to the cabinet, are usually occupied by men (Valiente et al. 2005), women are disadvantaged in generalist systems. Thus, this hypothesis can be expressed as follows:

H3. Women’s representation is expected to be lower in generalist ministerial systems than in specialist systems.

Second, when distributing offices, the number of available positions is crucial (see Alozie and Manganaro 1993 for electoral candidacies). Therefore, the likelihood of appointing more or fewer women is related to the number of seats (ministries) that a cabinet contains. In smaller cabinets group diversity might be undermined, that is, it may be less likely that individuals from groups that have traditionally been excluded, such as women, are appointed. Given that most party leaders and top-level cadres are men, they are more likely to be selected as ministers (Niven 1998; Shedova 1997). Seemingly, coalitions follow the same logic: When the senior party trades cabinet seats to other partners for government stability, intra-party competition for the available posts sharpens, thereby increasing the likelihood of men being appointed. Under single-party governments, in contrast, the party can fill all cabinet posts, potentially enabling it to diversify the profiles of those appointed. Therefore:

H4a. The larger the number of seats in a cabinet the more women will be appointed.

H4b. Coalition governments will include fewer women than single-party cabinets.
Party Organisation Factors

Regarding party ideology, left-wing parties are more committed to gender equality than right-wing parties. Furthermore, ideology is found to be a strong predictor of women’s representation in parliament (Caul-Kittilson 2006). Nonetheless, scholars have found that the ideology of the party(ies) in government does not affect the presence of female ministers (Davis 1997; Reynolds 1999), and that centrist governments include more women than left-wing governments (Siaroff 2000). The inability to establish a clear relationship between a government’s ideology and the presence of women in executive office might be due to various reasons. On the one hand, as has already been highlighted, some studies have only examined a small sample while others have included non-democratic countries in their research, so the right–left position has not been comparable. On the other hand, previous studies have not analysed in any depth the most recent period of time, and the relationship between a government’s ideology and female representation in cabinet might be more relevant in recent years due to the role of post-modernisation. Whereas in the past the lines of ideological conflict were based upon cleavages of class conflict; in recent times the rise of post-modernist values has changed many issues, among which is the diminishing difference in gender roles (Inglehart 1977). Hence, the New Left6 may be more open to promote women’s representation than the traditional left. So, the fifth hypothesis is the following:

H5. Left-wing parties are expected to promote more women to cabinet positions than centre and right-wing parties.

Hitherto, studies of gender and cabinets have not included the variable ‘gender quotas’. Up to 1980 gender quotas were used in 10 countries around the world. By the end of the 1980s 12 new countries had also introduced them, and throughout the 1990s quotas appeared in over 50 countries. Overall, quotas are nowadays in use in over 100 countries (Krook 2009: 4). Through party quotas, political parties voluntarily assume the obligation to include a certain proportion of women in party offices and electoral lists (or a certain proportion of each sex when the quota follows a gender-neutral formulation). Alternatively, legislative quotas are imposed on all political parties competing in elections. Both legislative and party quotas are generally found to increase the presence of women in parliament (Caul 2001; Dahlerup 1998, 2006; Tripp and Kang 2008; Verge 2012; Yoon 2004). This study focuses on party quotas since legislative quotas are only applied in five countries in our sample.7 Although party quotas are not applied to governmental composition, one might expect that this mechanism would indirectly promote women’s representation in executive office too, as parties using quotas are committed to equality values. A good illustration of this relationship is the Norwegian case, as in 1983 the Norwegian Labour Party adopted a gender quota. When the party got into power, the cabinet that it formed was almost gender-balanced by applying the party
quota to the composition of the cabinet (see Inhetveen 1999). Accordingly, the last hypothesis holds that:

H6. Party quotas are expected to stimulate the incorporation of women in national governments.

Women’s Representation in Politics

Krook and O’Brien’s (2012) work suggests that political elites are the combined result of the supply of women available to run for office and the demand for female aspirants on the part of politics. That is, countries that have high rates of women in parliament may have more women in cabinet, since a seat in parliament is a stepping-stone to the cabinet and they accumulate experience in that area. In addition, women’s presence in parliament may contribute to an increase in gender equality attitudes. As Davis (1997: 64) said, increasing levels of female parliamentarians create ‘an irreversible process of change’ in attitudes and expectations about women in politics that would lead to larger numbers of women in cabinets. On the other hand, women in parliament are critical actors with a positional power and they may form strategic coalitions with other women and influence men’s behaviour regarding the selection of cabinets (Childs and Krook 2009). Thus it can be expected that:

H7. The higher the percentage of women in parliament, the more women there will be in cabinet.

Finally, this research focuses on women’s representation in government over time. In this sense, the increment of women’s representation by one party might encourage other parties within the same country to introduce them too (Matland and Studlar 1996). At the executive level, one might expect that when some parties start to promote women actively; other parties will move to emulate them. Larger parties will feel increased pressure to respond by more actively promoting women themselves. Once women are in positions of power, no matter how they got there, it will become more difficult in the future to exclude them (Caul-Kittilson 2006). Following the previous example – the Norwegian case – it also illustrates the effect of promoting within a country. As I have said previously, in 1983 the Norwegian Labour Party adopted a cabinet that was almost gender-balanced. This case was followed by the three subsequent Prime Ministers who belonged to the Conservative and Christian People parties (Inhetveen 1999). In other words, parties might feel pressured to nominate more women if one of their political rivals starts to promote women’s representation.

H8. Women’s representation in previous cabinets is expected to stimulate the incorporation of more women in subsequent governments.
Data and Methods

To test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, I rely on an original dataset of cabinet composition for 23 advanced industrial democracies from 1980 to 2010. The field still lacks an updated longitudinal database on cabinet ministers, and this collection of data fills this gap. As I said above, I am focusing exclusively on advanced industrial democracies in order to control for the most relevant structural variables, which have a strong impact on women’s rights and on egalitarian attitudes; hence, it might show clearly the effect of political factors. The analysis starts in 1980, in order to examine longitudinal evolution from governments with very few women appointed to the most recent increases. This three-decade period, with 203 observations, allows us to explore which factors have become more relevant over time. As Figure 2 shows, women’s representation in cabinets has followed an incremental trend over time – the mean during 1980–89 was 9.3 per cent, in 1990–99 it was 19.9 per cent and in 2000–2010 it was 28.3 per cent. The highest value achieved was in Finland in 2007, with women forming 60 per cent of the cabinet. In every country at least one woman has been included since 1996. The countries included in the dataset are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the USA and the United Kingdom.

Since the database is characterised by repeated observations (different years) on the same fixed political unit (country), a panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) is used. The advantage of this technique is that it allows testing of more complicated models than purely cross-sectional or time-series data (Hsiao 2001: 5). Time-Series-Cross Sectional (TSCS) data typically display

FIGURE 2
WOMEN IN CABINETS IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES (1980–2010)

Source: Own elaboration.
both contemporaneous correlations across units and unit-level heteroscedasticity, making inferences from standard errors produced by ordinary least squares incorrect. PCSE models account for these deviations from spherical errors and allow for better inferences than linear models estimated from TSCS data (Bailey and Katz 2011). This methodology is appropriate as long as it controls for the fact that the percentage of women in cabinet at time $t$ is not independent of what happened in $t-1$ – i.e. the errors are not independent from one period to the next one. In addition, this methodology takes into account cluster and pairwise effects on the country which is used to control for the correlation between $v_i$ and $x_i$ (heteroscedasticity), thus controlling for the idiosyncratic factors of each country. This is a novelty with respect to previous studies which have assumed that there is no correlation between $v_i$ and $x_i$ (Davis 1997; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005).

Following previous studies (Davis 1997, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005), the dependent variable measures the proportion of cabinet portfolios held by women (excluding the prime minister) rather than the absolute number of women in cabinets in order to account for cross-national variation in cabinet size. Data on the composition of cabinets has been collected from the Keesing’s World News Archive, which compiles information on every government formation throughout the world, including cabinet appointments, reorganisations and mid-term reshuffles. The composition of cabinets was recorded yearly but the dataset used here only contains post-electoral cabinets, since longitudinal analyses cannot be run with repeated year observations. As the distribution of values of the dependent variable is skewed to the left, the dependent variable has been logarithmically transformed to obtain a more log-normal distribution.

The main independent variables used in order to test the hypotheses, have been selected according to the different factors identified by the literature:

- **Sociostructural**: ‘Women in tertiary education’ is measured as the ratio of female to male gross enrolment rates in tertiary education. This indicator has been collected from the World Bank dataset (World Bank 2012).
- **Cultural**: To measure cultural attitudes most studies on women in parliament take the gender equality scale from the World Value Survey. As has already been stated, this variable cannot be used in longitudinal analyses as the question has varied over the years and it was not collected before 2000. For this reason, a proxy is used for culture: the percentage of Protestants (time-invariant) in each country, which has been collected from the US State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report (2004).
- **Structure of political institutions**:
  - ‘Type of ministerial recruitment’ distinguishes ‘generalist’ systems coded as 0 and ‘specialist’ systems coded as 1. This classification has been created following Davis’ (1997) and Siaroff’s (2000) indexes.9
‘Cabinet size’ has been calculated as the number of seats (ministers) of each government.

The variable ‘Coalition’ captures whether the government includes more than one party (1) or not, i.e. single-party governments (0).

‘Ideology’ captures whether the prime minister’s party is left-wing, centre, or right-wing. This variable is borrowed from the Quality of Government (Teorell et al. 2011) and Parliament and Government composition dataset (Döring and Manow 2011). In contrast to previous studies in the field, ideology can be easily compared, as it is a standardised measure among advanced industrial countries.

In order to control for time effects, I use a dummy variable for each 10-year lapse of time.10

Data on ‘party quotas’ are based on the Global Database of Quotas for Women (IDEA 2012) run by the Quota Project, and cross-checked against various other sources, including party websites, handbooks and country experts. This variable describes when the voluntary party quota was adopted by the prime minister’s party and what minimum percentage of women is required.

Women’s representation in politics:

The percentage of women in parliament has been included. This variable is based on data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU 1997, 2012).

The inclusion of ‘lag dependent variable’ in one election is motivated by theoretical and methodological reasons. This variable allows it to draw substantive conclusions testing for potential time effects. Simultaneously, the introduction of lag is useful to eliminate almost all serial correlation across time error, since it implicitly includes lagged error terms in the specification (Beck 2006: 4).

Empirical Findings

In this section, I present the empirical evidence which is displayed in Table 1 and Table 2. Table 1 shows the results of these models using panel-corrected standard errors. Model 1 exclusively includes sociocultural factors. The variable ‘women in tertiary education’ is positive and statistically significant. The cultural measure reveals the same trend. The percentage of Protestants in a country is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that countries with larger Protestant majorities have more women in cabinet. The two subsequent models also test the ‘political institutions’ and ‘women’s representation in politics’ hypotheses by including political and representational variables as well as a direct measure of time. Interestingly, Model 2 shows how the inclusion of these variables reverses the sign and the significance of some ‘sociostructural’ factors. The percentage of women enrolled in tertiary
education becomes statistically non-significant, and the percentage of Protestants shifts to a negative coefficient, showing that political institutions have higher explanatory power than sociocultural factors, thus rejecting H1 and H2.

Model 2 also presents evidence concerning the political factors. The systemic-level variable has the expected sign. Specialist ministerial recruitment has a positive effect on levels of female ministers and reaches statistical significance at the $p < 0.5$ level. As posited in H3, specialist countries tend to field more women in executive office than generalist systems. That is, in countries with a specialist system of recruitment, the proportion of women in cabinet rises by 3.4 per cent. One could argue that this effect is conditioned by the number of women in parliament, but this finding holds even when controlling for this last factor. Regarding the factors affecting the number of cabinet seats available, the sign of the coefficients takes the expected direction. On the one hand, the impact of cabinet size is positive, meaning that the greater the number of seats in a cabinet, the more women are appointed as ministers. On the other hand, the variable coalition has a negative effect thereby indicating that fewer women are appointed in coalition governments than in single-party cabinets. Nevertheless, neither of the two variables are statistically significant, thus I cannot accept H4a or H4b.11

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<td><strong>Gender equality</strong></td>
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<td>Women in tertiary education</td>
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<td>0.005 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.006)</td>
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<td>Protestants</td>
<td>0.053 (0.023)**</td>
<td>−0.009 (0.004)**</td>
<td>0.010 (0.021)</td>
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<td><strong>Political institutions</strong></td>
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<td>Specialist</td>
<td>0.811 (0.399)**</td>
<td>0.591 (0.335)*</td>
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<td>Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Centre parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party quotas</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.007 (0.003)*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Women in parliament</td>
<td>0.050 (0.015)**</td>
<td>0.048 (0.015)**</td>
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<td>Lagged dv</td>
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<td>0.004 (0.101)</td>
<td>0.013 (0.103)</td>
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<td><strong>Period</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1980–90</td>
<td>−0.536 (0.329)*</td>
<td>−0.479 (0.323)</td>
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<td>1990–2000</td>
<td>−0.231 (0.188)</td>
<td>−0.194 (0.179)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.061 (1.310)</td>
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<td>Wald</td>
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<td>8555.42</td>
<td>343.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent variable: (Log) Percentage of women in cabinet.

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
As regards the party organisation, as suggested in H5, party ideology is statistically significant at the $p < 0.5$ level. In the light of the results, left-wing parties in government appoint more women than right-wing parties. Party ideology emerges as a strong predictor for the percentage of women in cabinets. Thus, a country where the government’s ideology is left-wing is estimated to include about 2.83 more female ministers than other ideologies. The coefficient for centre parties is also positive but not significant. These results contradict previous findings that disregarded party ideology as a relevant variable (Davis 1997; Reynolds 1999; Siaroff 2000). Also, the hypothesis H7 is accepted, the variable ‘percentage of women in parliament’ is positive and significant at the $p < 0.1$ level. The marginal effects are positive, indicating that when the percentage of women in parliament increases, women’s representation in cabinets also increases. Yet this variable only becomes statistically significant when a threshold of 20 per cent of women deputies is reached. For example, whereas in a country with 20 per cent women in parliament the marginal effect over women’s representation in cabinet is an increase of 2.62 points, in countries with 40 per cent women deputies the increase is 3.61 points.
However, as previously said, the composition of each government may not be independent of the previous one in the same country, and that serial autocorrelation is likely to be present. In order to correct for this and to test for any potential within-country contagion on women’s representation in cabinets, Model 1 and Model 2 introduce a lag-dependent variable (‘lagged dv’). This variable is positive, albeit not statistically significant in any model, which indicates that previous governments within the same country do not determine the percentage of women in subsequent governments, rejecting H8. This result might be explained by the variables ‘ideology’ and ‘quotas’. That means that party ideology and party quotas have a stronger impact on the presence of women in cabinet than the ‘lagged variable’.

As party ideology is highly correlated with party quotas, the two variables cannot be included at the same time. Model 3 addresses whether the adoption of a party quota may increase women’s presence in executive office. Party quota is shown to have a strong and positive effect, enabling me to accept H6. A 1 point increase in party quotas means that the percentage of women in cabinet goes up by 2.87 points. That is, a prime minister whose party has adopted a voluntary quota will appoint more female ministers than a prime minister from a party that has not assumed a quota. This effect is slightly stronger than the ideology factor. The analysis suggests that party quotas do introduce intra-party ‘contagion’ into executive office. Regarding the remaining variables there are no relevant changes in Model 3 compared to the previous analysis; which means that the variables have similar coefficients as previous models. As occurred with the ‘women in parliament’ variable, the effect of party quotas is only statistically significant when a certain threshold is achieved. Thus, adjusted predictions indicate that party quotas only have an effect on ‘women in executive’ when a party’s quota reserves at least 20 per cent of positions for women. Specifically, the marginal effect shows that parties with a 20 per cent quota appoint 2.74 more women to the executive than those not having such a measure while parties that have assumed a 50 per cent quota select 2.96 more women than the rest.

The time variables show negative coefficients, implying that in previous decades cabinets are less likely to appoint women than nowadays (2001–10). Given the trends presented in Figure 2, these results are not surprising: over time, there are more women in executive office. During the period 2001–10, women had a greater chance to be appointed to a cabinet post. Thus, the model shows that a cabinet nominated in the 1980s or in the 1990s contained 18 and 7 points fewer women, respectively, than a cabinet formed during the 2000s.

As previously highlighted, this article also seeks to disentangle whether and how the effects of political and cultural factors have been modified over time. Table 2 splits the sample into two subsets of cases: 1980–95 for the first period, and 1996–2010 for the second period. The reason for using 1995 as the dividing point is that by the mid-1990s several international calls had been launched urging states to increase women’s presence in decision-making positions, including the United Nations Beijing Platform of Action (1995), the
European Union IV Equality Plan of Equality of Opportunities (1996), and the Council of Europe’s recommendation 96/694/EC.

Some relevant differences between the two periods are evident. Table 2 shows that time has a strong effect on the different variables. In the 1980–95 period, only one coefficient associated with ‘sociocultural factors’ variables is statistically relevant to determine the number of women in government, namely the percentage of women enrolled in tertiary education. Among political factors, the variables that achieve statistical relevance are: type of recruitment (specialist systems being more advantageous to women’s presence), cabinet size (larger cabinets appoint more women) and ideology (centrist parties tend to appoint more women). Regarding women’s representation in politics, the percentage of women in parliament in this period is not statistically relevant. Turning to the 1996–2010 subset, supply factors have a distinct impact on the dependent variable. The percentage of women in tertiary education is negative and is statistically not significant. Regarding the proportion of Protestants, this variable becomes positive and significant in the 1996–2010 period. As expected, women will fill more cabinet positions in countries with a higher percentage of Protestants. The relevance of this variable in the second term could be due to the fact that the percentage of Protestants captures the Scandinavian countries, which have a higher percentage of Protestants, and are more committed to gender equality.

In this second period (1996–2010), some political factors appear as key explanatory variables. It is worth noting that the effect of the type of ministerial recruitment becomes negative and non-statistically significant. Whereas the results reported in Models 1 and 2 showed that specialist systems recruited more women for executive office than generalist systems, in the period 1996–2010 the opposite prevails. That is, in the second period, generalist systems tend to include more women in cabinet than specialist systems. This may suggest that the increasing presence of women in parliaments in recent times can help women in obtaining access to cabinet in generalist systems. As I explained above, generalist systems tend to select ministers from inside the ranks of parliament, and women have gradually been appointed to the stepping-stone positions, such as chairs of committees, thus facilitating their access to cabinet.

There are some interesting results regarding the number of available positions. On the one hand, cabinet size has the expected positive relationship (the greater the number of seats a cabinet has the higher the percentage of women appointed in cabinet) in the first period, while in the second period cabinet size inverts the sign of its coefficient. This could be explained by the strong effect of other political variables, which may diminish the effect of ‘number of seats’. On the other hand, turning to coalitions, the analysis shows that, from 1996 to 2000, women are more likely to be appointed in single-party governments than in coalition cabinets, as suggested in the theoretical section, whereas in the previous period this variable was not significant.
Another interesting difference found in the analysis of these subsets is related to party ideology. The variable ‘left-wing party’, which was non-significant in the period 1980–95, has a strong and positive effect in the second period while the effect of centrist parties becomes much weaker. So, when a left-wing party leads the government, women’s representation rises by 16.1 per cent. This confirms our previous expectations: in recent years New Left values have become more relevant, incorporating group representation into left-wing parties’ platforms (see Caul-Kittilson 2006). Likewise, party quotas are only significant in the second period, since it is in this last term that party quotas have an effective implementation or quotas rates are higher. In this sense, governing parties that have adopted gender quotas appoint 12.9 per cent more women than those that have not embraced positive action within their organisation. Another expected effect concerns the variable ‘women in parliament’. This factor, which was statistically non-significant in the 1980–95 period, has a strong effect in the 1996–2010 period. This result might be explained by the low levels of women’s representation in all parliaments in the early 1980s.

In these models, the lag variable and the time variables are control variables. The lag variable is negative in all the periods, although it is only statistically significant in the 1980–95 period. That is, the first period is statistically relevant for women’s presence in previous governments within the same country, to determine the percentage of women in the subsequent one. It is likely that this effect is not significant in the second period, due to the relevance of other political variables. The time variable is positive and significant in all the models. This measure of time has been calculated as $\text{year}_{ui}$ minus baseline year ($\text{year}_{ui} - 1980$), since in this analysis I could not introduce the dummy variable for decades due to the fact that the dataset is split into two periods of time.

To sum up, sociocultural, political institutions and women’s representation in politics variables behave differently through time. Thus, sociocultural variables have an impact on the two periods analysed; however, in each period different sociocultural factors are relevant to account for women’s presence in cabinet. Conversely, political factors and women’s representation in politics have had more impact in recent decades. In the 1996–2010 period some of the political variables and women’s representation in politics appear as explanatory variables to account for women’s presence in cabinet, such as coalitions, party ideology, party quotas and women in parliament.

Concluding Remarks

This article has shed new light on the under-studied area of gender and cabinets. Specifically, it has sought to disentangle which factors are associated with the presence of women in cabinet in advanced industrial democracies from 1980 to 2010. While previous analyses have predominantly focused on cultural factors using cross-national analysis, this article shows that several political variables need to be taken into consideration in longitudinal perspective to improve the understanding of the appointment of women.
Empirical evidence supports most of the hypotheses drawn in this study. Concerning sociocultural factors, the analysis shows that women in tertiary education and a country’s percentage of Protestants do not achieve statistical significance or their coefficients shift sign when models control for political, representational and time factors. This means that political and representational factors are more important than sociocultural factors. Regarding political institutions, the type of ministerial recruitment affects women’s presence in cabinets, with specialist systems appointing more women to the cabinet. However, the empirical analysis does not provide enough support to conclude that the number of available seats has a significant effect on the appointment of women to cabinets – either cabinet size or coalition. Conversely, party organisation matters for the appointment of women to cabinets in advanced industrial democracies. Left-wing governments correlate positively with women’s representation in the executive. In addition, analysis confirms that parties with gender quotas increase women’s presence in cabinet. Although more refinement is needed on methodological aspects, party quotas are an even stronger factor to raise women in cabinet than other political factors such as party ideology. As regards ‘women’s representation’, women in parliament are also a relevant factor to explain women in cabinets. However, the contagion of women’s presence in executive office is not confirmed.

This article has also addressed how the impact of sociocultural, political and representational factors has evolved over time. The findings suggest that while some ‘sociocultural’ factors are important for explaining women in cabinet office, especially in the 1980–95 time period, some political variables have emerged in recent decades as strong explanatory factors to account for the presence of women in cabinet. The empirical analysis shows that as time goes by generalist systems have become more important to women’s presence in cabinets due to the gradual increment of women in parliament. Coalitions matter in the second period (1996–2010), showing that this type of cabinet includes fewer women. Seemingly, left-wing ideology, party quotas and women in parliament turn into a relevant factor to explain the incorporation of women in executive office.

So, these findings also highlight that those political and representational factors which positively affect women’s presence in executives – such as party ideology, party quotas and the percentage of women in a parliament – may be more easily modified than sociostructural variables. Thus, it may be more important to push for the empowerment of women in politics through these measures than to wait for the slow process of changing the structural variables. Although other types of quota should be taken into account by the literature on gender and cabinets, party quotas have proven an effective means for increasing the number of women in cabinets; thus the implementation of quotas would be an effective measure to guarantee gender parity in cabinets. Indeed, the adoption of party quotas may produce contagion across institutional arenas. That is, when a party assumes a gender quota this would indirectly promote women’s representation in both cabinets and parliaments.
Finally, this paper opens several avenues for further research. Firstly, research on women’s descriptive representation should go beyond counting proportions and turn its attention to the effects of women’s appointments. On the one hand, there are grounds to believe that horizontal segregation (gender-biased allocation of portfolios) affects subsequent careers. For one thing, portfolios vary in the degree of media attention they receive, the relative authority within the cabinet, and the career opportunities that they may eventually create. On the other hand, horizontal segregation might also affect duration of tenure, specifically its impact on government reshuffles. Secondly, one can argue that the prime minister’s gender may also affect the number of women appointed to ministerial posts. Provided that office-holders at the cabinet level are recruited to a large extent through personal networks (see Kopecký et al. 2012), and that these networks present an acute gender bias – they are basically composed of and by male peers who provide each other with contacts for career progression (Bochel and Bochel 2000) – female prime ministers may be expected to include more women in cabinets than male prime ministers. Unfortunately, this analysis cannot be carried out for national governments. To the best of my knowledge, I have used the largest sample examined recently by scholarly research on gender and cabinets and which has 203 observations – however, I can only find 17 observations of female prime ministers over time (which corresponds to eight female prime ministers). Yet other governments may provide the opportunity to examine whether, to what extent and under what conditions female prime ministers may ‘let the ladder down’ to other women.

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Notes

2. Although the governing party’s parliamentary group does not act as an independent actor, it will only promote policy initiatives when the government actually supports them.
3. A president or prime minister selects cabinet members, not an electoral system. An electoral system only can have an effect in determining the number of women in parliament.
4. With the exception of nationality or age requirements.
5. It is a 0–100 scale composed of five items where respondents are required to answer whether they agree or disagree with the following statements: ‘On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do’, ‘When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women’, ‘A university education is more important for a boy than a girl’, ‘A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled’, and ‘A woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn’t want to have a stable relationship with a man’.
6. Parties that value post-materialism (emphasising autonomy, environment and permissiveness in social policy) over materialism (stressing economic growth and security).
7. There are only five countries that have adopted legislative quotas: Belgium (1994), France (2002), Greece (2009), Portugal (2006) and Spain (2007). As it is a longitudinal dataset, it ultimately only counted nine observations out of 203, and this is not enough cases to establish robust conclusions.

8. Although some authors argue that attitudes affect the proportion of women in parliaments (Rudein 2012).

9. There are 10 countries are classified as are generalist systems, whereas 12 countries are included in the specialist systems. All presidential and semi-presidential systems are classified as specialist. Generalist: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand. Specialist: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, USA.

10. Three polynomial time variables were included in the model: time (year-1980), time^2 and time^3, the results with these variables were similar to obtained results.

11. It should be noted that various interaction effects have been tested in all the models reported, with no significant results. In particular, no significant interaction was observed between coalition and party ideology, type of government (minority/majority status) and coalition or type of recruitment and percentage of women in parliament.

12. In order to distinguish more accurately the effects of ideology and party quotas, which are correlated, an interaction has been introduced. This interaction term does not reach statistical significance, meaning that the effect of party quotas is not different across party ideology, although it should also be noted that very few right-wing parties have adopted quotas.

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