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A Gender Gap in Policy Representation in the U.S. Congress?

In the first article to evaluate the equality of dyadic policy representation experienced by women, we assess the congruence between U.S. House members' roll-call votes and the policy preferences of their female and male constituents. Employing two measures of policy representation, we do not find a gender gap in dyadic policy representation. However, we uncover a sizeable gender gap favoring men in districts represented by Republicans, and a similarly sizeable gap favoring women in districts represented by Democrats. A Democratic majority further improves women's dyadic representation relative to men, but having a female representative (descriptive representation) does not.

Are women equally represented in Congress? Although there are roughly equal numbers of men and women in the electorate and women tend to vote at higher rates than men, women's policy preferences may not be reflected in their elected leaders' actions to the same extent that men's policy preferences are. In a democratic system in which equality is a fundamental value (e.g., Dahl 2006; Verba 2003), a gender gap in representation would raise significant normative concerns.[1] In this article, we assess whether women's preferences are less well-represented in the roll-call voting behavior of their own members of Congress (MCs) and the factors that improve or undermine the quality of women's policy representation relative to that of men.

A large literature has been concerned with the representation of women's interests and the factors—especially the election of Democratic and female MCs—that might mediate against the expected lesser quality of that representation. However, most previous research has asked whether female or Democratic MCs *as a group* are different from male and Republican MCs as a group; whether, for example, female and

Democratic MCs are more liberal and/or more likely to support women's issues. The consensus of previous research is that the answer to both is yes (e.g., Swers 2002; see Reingold 2008 for an extensive review; but see Simon and Palmer 2010). Because women in the mass electorate are, on average, more liberal than men (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997) and women are assumed to have an innate interest in women's rights policies, these findings are taken as evidence that female and Democratic MCs, as a group, improve the representation of women as a group. These studies examine the "collective representation" of women, the degree to which all female and Democratic MCs represent all women in the electorate (Weissberg 1978).

Our study proceeds in three new directions. First, we ask a different question, one common in the representation literature: how well do MCs represent the policy preferences of their own female constituents? An expectation that MCs represent their own constituents' substantive policy preferences—what legislative scholars term "dyadic representation" (Weissberg 1978)—has been a normative value and empirical assumption since the Founding (Miller and Stokes 1963). Although there are important reasons to consider the representation MCs as a group offer to all women, the district-based electoral system puts a premium on the relationship between constituents and their own representatives. A particular benefit of the dyadic approach is that it recognizes and incorporates the substantial variation in women's (and men's) attitudes across legislative districts. Given that the types of districts that elect female and Democratic MCs vary systematically from those that do not (Palmer and Simon 2006), we might expect that both men and women in those districts differ in their policy preferences from constituents in districts which elect male and Republican MCs. Therefore, we must take variation in preferences across districts into account.

The degree to which constituents' preferences, including those of women, are given equal weight by their own legislators is a particular normative concern. Yet, previous research has not examined how well women, relative to men, are represented by *their own MCs*, and whether having a particular type of MC—female or male, Democrat or Republican—improves the relative representation of women's policy preferences by their own MCs.

This brings us to our second contribution, our focus on the foundational issue of equality. We directly assess whether and to what degree men are better represented than women. Much of the extant study of women's representation is at least partly and implicitly motivated by a perception that women are not as well represented and a search for mechanisms like descriptive representation (when women in Congress

represent women in the electorate) or the election of Democrats to improve women's representation. The improvement expected to come from electing women and Democrats is not always specified but can take two potential forms. One is what we term an improvement in an *absolute* sense: women with a female or Democratic representative may enjoy better policy representation than women with a male or Republican representative. This is the approach adopted in most prior studies of the representation of women's interests.

The other form has been less extensively examined and is the focus of this research. Members of any group presumably want to get more of what they want from government, that is, to improve their absolute representation. However, from a normative perspective, we might also want to know whether two groups of relatively equal size are represented equally. As Sidney Verba argues, "the equal consideration of the preferences and interests of all citizens" is "one of the bedrock principles in a democracy" (2003, 663). Thus, we examine the impact female and Democratic MCs (as well as which party controls the chamber) have on women's representation *relative to men*, asking whether women are less well represented than men overall, and whether female and Democratic MCs improve women's representation relative to men's. In doing so, we join a number of recent studies that assess the relative representation of different groups in American society (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005; Griffin and Newman 2008; Jacobs and Page 2005).

Finally, our research employs measures of policy representation that have not, to our knowledge, been employed in previous work on the representation of women. Specifically, we measure policy representation in two ways: First, we examine how often women's and men's preferences (on specific issues where men and women disagree) are congruent with the specific roll-call votes of their MCs, and second, we compare the ideological proximity of female and male constituents to their MCs' overall pattern of voting. These approaches enable us to assess the impact female and Democratic MCs have on the gender gap in policy representation while controlling for other factors that influence the quality of constituents' dyadic policy representation.

Our two measures generate remarkably consistent findings. The gender gap varies by the political party of the MC. When represented by Republicans, men's policy views are represented better than women's and this gender gap rivals previously recognized gaps in policy representation based on income, race, and ethnicity (e.g., Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005; Griffin and Newman 2008). However, when represented by a Democrat, the gender gap is reversed: women are better represented than men and to about the same degree. Moreover, women's relative

representation gets a boost when Democrats hold a majority of the chamber. Finally, contrary to conventional wisdom, women do not experience an improvement in dyadic representation, relative to men, when their MC is a woman.

Expectations

Do men and women have differing policy preferences to represent? Overall, gender gaps in policy preferences tend to be small, with men and women agreeing more than they disagree (Sapiro 2002).[2] Yet, on some issues, gender gaps are of considerable magnitude, equaling differences between, for example, blacks and whites (Schlesinger and Heldman 2001).[3] In those cases, unequal representation is both possible and likely: MCs cannot represent men and women equally well on any given roll-call vote if men and women in their districts want government to do different things.

In terms of broad ideological preferences, men are more likely to consider themselves conservative than are women (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). This ideological gender gap is reflected in the tendency of women to fall on the liberal side of a number of policy issues. For example, women are more likely to support various social welfare programs, including health care, welfare, education, and Social Security (Andersen 1997; Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Howell and Day 2000; Page and Shapiro 1992; Sapiro 2002; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997; Schlesinger and Heldman 2001; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Women also are less likely to favor the use of force and violence, particularly in foreign affairs (Eichenberg 2003; Page and Shapiro 1992; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).

Note that we are focusing here on issues about which men and women, in the main, disagree, because those are the issues on which differences in representation—as conceived of in this article—are possible; men and women cannot experience unequal policy representation if both groups want government to do the same things. It is important to note that this approach thus distinguishes our work from other research on women's representation that focuses on issues of particular relevance to women, such as women's rights issues (e.g., abortion, sexual harassment; see Wolbrecht 2002) or issues such as health care and education, where women are often expected to have particular concern (e.g., Hawkesworth et al. 2001; Swers 1998, 2002). There is some overlap between the sets of issues—men and women in our sample disagree on, among other things, social welfare and health care policies, and so those

issues are included here, as they would be in many conceptions of women's issues. Other issues included in our analysis (e.g., Patriot Act, Iraq War, free trade) would be less likely to appear in most definitions of women's issues. We make no claim, however, to be examining women's issues per se. Rather, we are identifying a set of issues on which women and men in our survey disagree and on which MCs have taken policy positions via roll-call votes.

Gender differences in attitudes allow for but do not ensure differences in representation. On the one hand, reelection-motivated representatives have an incentive to represent equally the interests of their female and male constituents. Unlike other traditionally disadvantaged groups, women typically comprise half of the electorate and more than half of the voters, providing considerable electoral incentive for MCs to be attentive to women's preferences (Bartels 1998). On the other hand, there are reasons to expect women and men to be unequally represented.[4] Women tend to reside in poorer households than men (Ford 2006), and the wealthy generally are better represented than the poor (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005). Women also continue to lag behind men in many nonvoting forms of political participation, including donating to political campaigns, encouraging others to vote for a particular candidate, and contacting a public official (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). Women are less well represented among economic and political elites—business leaders, lobbyists, and others—who communicate directly with and provide financial support to representatives (e.g., Heinz et al. 1993). Finally, an overwhelmingly male political elite may not share or understand the perspectives or preferences of women. Thus, we are ambivalent about whether we expect to find that, on the whole, men are better represented than women in terms of policy representation.

We have reason to expect that gender differences in representation may be smaller or even advantage women where women are represented by Democratic MCs. Partisanship is the main division in Congress, and the issue area in which the largest mass-level gender differences are observed—social welfare issues—is also the primary issue divide between the Democratic and Republican parties (Sanbonmatsu 2008). Simply put, Democratic MCs are more likely than Republicans to be on the same side—ideologically and on many specific issues—as most women (see Reingold 2008). For that reason, we expect Democratic MCs to be closer ideologically to, and more likely to share the policy preferences of, their female constituents than are Republican MCs.

Given our expectation that MC partisanship will alter the gender gap, we might also expect that party control of the chamber will be

consequential. If Democratic MCs, on average, provide better representation to their female constituents than do Republican MCs, then a chamber controlled by Democrats ought to be associated with more equal representation for women in general than one controlled by Republicans. Such an effect may result not only from the simple fact that more women will be represented by Democrats in a majority Democratic chamber, but also from the procedural tools (especially agenda control) at the majority party's disposal. For example, the new Democratic majority in 2007 immediately voted to raise the minimum wage after earlier Republican majorities largely avoided the issue. In the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study (NAES), our source for opinion data, 73% of women strongly supported an increase in the minimum wage, compared to 58% of men, a difference significant at the .01 level.

Finally, MC gender may matter for the equality of women's policy representation. Descriptive representation has long been advocated as a means to improve the substantive representation of women's interests (see Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). Why might female MCs provide better dyadic representation of the policy preferences of female citizens? As women themselves, female MCs may be more prone to know and share their female constituents' perspectives and preferences; in other words, female MCs are bound to be more "like-minded" (Miller and Stokes 1963; Swers 2002). Having shared "gendered" experiences (experiences particularly unique or salient to women, such as motherhood), female MCs may be better attuned to the specific policy needs and preferences of other women. Indeed, female MCs often refer to gendered experiences when explaining their policy positions and priorities (see Carroll 2002; Kedrowski and Sarow 2002; Walsh 2002). In addition, many female MCs express a commitment to intentionally represent the interests of women as a group (Carroll 2002; Hawkesworth et al. 2001).

Previous research finds that descriptive representation improves women's absolute representation, meaning that women as a whole are better represented by a chamber comprised of more women than they are by a chamber with fewer women (Swers 1998, 2002). However, descriptive representation may not lead women to experience representation by their own MC which is equal to that experienced by men. The extant findings that both female MCs and women in the electorate tend to be more liberal than their male counterparts do not necessarily imply that the presence of female MCs leads to better dyadic representation of women relative to men. Some kinds of districts—e.g., wealthy, urban, and racially diverse—are more likely to elect women than are others (Palmer and Simon 2006). Both men and women in those districts differ

in their policy preferences from constituents in districts which elect male MCs. In our data (described below), for example, both men and women represented by female MCs are about 3.4 points more liberal than men and women represented by male MCs (100-point scale). Given that men who are represented by female MCs tend to be more liberal in their attitudes, and to about the same degree that women represented by female MCs are more liberal, liberal voting by female MCs in those districts likely improves the representation of their male constituents as well as their female constituents, and thus perhaps does not serve to close or reverse the dyadic representation gender gap.

Despite expectations that descriptive representation of women may yield substantive representation gains, little research has considered the dyadic relationship between female citizens and female MCs. As noted above, a large literature has examined collective representation, finding that female MCs are more likely than male MCs to take liberal positions overall and on specific issues, including those characterized by mass-level gender gaps such as social welfare (e.g., Burrell 1994; Clark 1998; Dodson 2006; Evans 2005; Swers 2002; Welch 1985; see Reingold 2008).[5] Other research confirms that female MCs are more likely to support women's rights policies (e.g., Burrell 1994; Dodson 2006; Swers 2002). However, no previous research, to our knowledge, asks whether female MCs improve the representation experienced by their own female constituents.

Data and Method

Members of Congress can represent the substantive interests of their constituents in a number of ways: the issues they champion, roll-call voting, committee work, bill sponsorship, or constituent casework, to name only a few possibilities (e.g., Canon 1999; Hall 1996; Tate 2003; Thomas 1994; see Reingold 2008). We analyze one important facet of substantive representation—policy representation in roll-call voting—by examining the degree of congruence between citizens' expressed ideo-logical and policy preferences and their own MC's roll-call voting behav-ior. We acknowledge that roll-call voting has a number of limitations, including the fact that gate-keeping by the majority party limits the alternatives from which MCs have to choose, and thus truncates the measurement of MC behavior. Moreover, we recognize that this approach captures but one of many aspects of representation (perhaps not always the most important one) and does not reflect important elements like forms of symbolic representation, altering the nature of deliberation, and working to place issues on the government's agenda.[6] However,

roll-call voting is a crucial stage of the policymaking process and the most public venue in which MCs represent their constituents' preferences. Policy representation is certainly a critical aspect of representation, and one that is fundamental to democratic politics (e.g., Key 1961).

We analyze policy representation in House roll-call voting in two ways. First, we examine a number of specific roll-call votes, comparing constituent preferences on the issue at hand to their MCs' votes on that particular issue to classify respondents as "winners" or "losers" on each vote (e.g., Hajnal, Gerber, and Louch 2002). Second, we measure what Achen (1978) termed "proximity": the "distance" between constituent ideology and legislators' ideology as reflected in their overall roll-call behavior (e.g., Burden 2004; Miller 1964; Powell 1982; Wright 1978). The underlying assumption is that constituents are better represented when their MCs' roll-call votes are "closer" to constituents' preferences than when MCs' votes are "farther" from constituents' preferences.

These measures nicely complement one another. The strength of our analysis of specific roll-call votes is its precision. We are able to compare legislator action and citizen preference for action on a specific issue where there is a strong nexus between them. The weakness of this approach is its lack of breadth—we are only able to map legislator action onto citizens' preferences on a limited number of roll calls. The strength of the proximity measure is its comprehensiveness as a gauge of policy preference and action. Its weakness is its relative imprecision, given that legislator action and citizen preference are measured on different scales. Given that the strengths of each approach offset the weakness of the other, finding that both approaches lead to similar substantive conclusions gives us more confidence in the reliability of those conclusions.

Measuring Policy "Winners"

Our first approach examines the connection between constituent preferences and MCs' specific roll-call votes. To identify important legislative votes on major policy questions, we began with lists of "key votes" from the 107th (2001–02), 109th (2005–06), and 110th (2007–08) Congresses compiled by Congressional Quarterly (CQ), supplemented by key votes identified by the American Association of University Women[7] (we cannot include the 108th Congress because redistricting between the 2000 and 2002 elections renders the district codes for respondents in the NAES obsolete). Our measures of constituency preferences come from the 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES).[8] The main advantage of the NAES is that the survey sample is of sufficient size (36,819 women and 29,772 men in 2000 and

45,036 women and 36,386 men in 2004) to enable analyses within specific contexts (e.g., the 2000 sample includes 3,598 men and 4,652 women represented by female MCs). From the CQ (and AAUW) lists, we identified votes (1) for which the NAES includes a comparable question tapping constituent preference on the issue and (2) for which significant and relatively large gender differences in mass preferences are observed. In all, 19 votes in 11 issue domains (defense spending, school vouchers, environmental protection, social welfare, stem cell research, free trade, abortion, Patriot Act, minimum wage, health insurance, and withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq) met our criteria.[9] The appendix notes the roll-call votes and the opinion item matched to each vote.[10]

For each issue, as well as for ideological orientation, we scaled the related NAES measure to a 0–100 scale for the sake of comparability, with liberal positions coded higher. The bars in Figure 1 represent the

FIGURE 1
Gender Differences in Political Attitudes, 2000 and 2004 NAES

differences between women's and men's mean responses such that posi-
tive values indicate that women are more liberal, on average, than men.
As Figure 1 indicates, in most domains, women are more liberal, and
often much more liberal, than men (difference in means all $p < .01$),
consistent with what previous research has shown.[11] Gender differences
on specific policies are somewhat starker than overall ideological divi-
sions.[12] There are, however, several areas in which women's mean policy
preference is more conservative than that of men. Namely, women are
more supportive of free trade agreements and the Patriot Act and less in
favor of stem cell research.

For each vote, we classified respondents as "winners" based on the
congruence between their preference and their MC's vote. For example,
respondents were asked "should the federal government spend more
money on [maintaining a strong military defense], the same as now, less,
or no money at all?" For roll-call votes on measures that would signifi-
cantly increase military spending, respondents who wanted more spend-
ing and whose MC voted to increase spending were classified as
"winners". Respondents who wanted the same amount of spending or
less spending were coded "winners" if their MC voted against increased
spending. Respondents who wanted increased spending but whose MCs
voted against increased spending, or who wanted the same amount or less
spending but whose MCs voted to raise spending, were classified as
"losers" (winners = 1, losers = 0). We then created a *win ratio*, defined as
the proportion of votes on which the respondent's MC voted in the policy
direction that the respondent favored, multiplied by 100 to create a 0–100
scale. Once again, by this measure, higher values indicate better policy
representation.

Measuring Ideological Proximity

We measure *ideological proximity* by comparing MCs' roll-call
votes to their constituents' ideological positions. We do this in a broad
context, relying on measures of MCs' overall patterns of voting, specifi-
cally, their W-NOMINATE scores from, again, the 107th, 109th, and
110th Congresses. These scores are based on all nonunanimous roll-call
votes and range from −1 to 1, originally arraying MCs along a liberal-
conservative continuum that we have recoded so that higher values indi-
cate more liberal roll-call behavior (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
1997). The average male Democrat has a W-NOMINATE score of −.39,
while the average female Democrat's score is −.47. In contrast, the
average male Republican's score is .48, compared to the average female
Republican score of .35. We note that the intraparty gender gap is much

smaller than the differences between parties, which highlights the importance of MCs' partisanship. Small differences between men's and women's voting patterns within parties likely limit the extent to which female MCs alter the substantive representation of their female constituents—at least in terms of ideological proximity—once party is taken into account.

We pair the broad (in a policy sense) W-NOMINATE roll-call measure with the similarly broad NAES ideological self-placement question, which allows respondents to place themselves on a 5-point scale ranging from "very conservative" to "very liberal." Although we have good measures of constituent ideology and patterns of MCs' votes, these measures are on different scales, a common problem when measuring proximity (e.g., Achen 1978; Burden 2004; Miller 1964; Powell 1982; Wright 1978). To generate comparable scales, we follow Wright (1978) and standardize the distribution of citizen ideology using the distribution of partisan ideology, while standardizing the distribution of legislator roll-call voting to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Analyses using an alternative approach (transforming the scales to the same range following Miller (1964), Achen (1978), and Burden (2004)) produce similar results. Once we have measures of constituent preference and MC behavior on the same scale, we take the absolute value of one minus the other, such that smaller values indicate a closer pairing between constituent preference and MC behavior. We then multiply this value by negative one to give our dependent variable a more intuitive meaning; once transformed, higher values indicate better policy representation.

Fortunately, our main approach here is to compare the quality of representation between male and female constituents and between different groups of MCs. Even if our measures of proximity are somewhat flawed, they are likely *equally* flawed across gender groups and types of MCs. Therefore, if we observe change in the degree of representation across different contexts (e.g., that the proximity between women and their female MCs is less than that between women and their male MCs), we can be fairly confident that women really have made a proximity gain.

Independent Variables

Our theoretical expectations are examined via four key variables: constituent gender, whether there is a Democratic majority in the House, whether a constituent's MC is a Democrat, and whether a constituent's MC is female. A negative sign on the female constituent variable would indicate that male constituents are better represented than female constituents. We expect individual Democrats in the House to provide policy

representation to women and men in a more balanced way than Republican MCs. Thus, we expect an interaction term between female constituent and Democratic MC to be positive. We also expect that a chamber controlled by Democrats will boost women's representation relative to men, so an interaction term between female and Democratic majority should be positive. Finally, we expect female MCs to represent their female constituents in such a way as to close the representation gender gap. If so, we will see a positive interaction between female constituent and female MC.

Extant theoretical and empirical work points to several additional factors that shape dyadic representation and are thus included as controls. First, women in the electorate are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than with the GOP (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999), and most female MCs are Democrats (Swers 2002). Thus, we expect that women in the electorate are more likely to share the partisanship of their representatives (that is, be "copartisans") when their MC is a woman. That expectation is borne out by our data: 40% of female respondents represented by a female MC are copartisans, compared to just 35% of female respondents with a male MC.[13] Since MCs tend to represent their copartisans better in terms of policy congruence (e.g., Bullock and Brady 1983), this heightened copartisanship between female constituents and MCs may make it easier for female MCs to represent the preferences of their female constituents. Without controlling for copartisanship, we may attribute to shared gender (i.e., descriptive representation) what is actually the effect of shared partisanship. Thus, we control for the match between citizens' party identification and their member's party affiliation (coded 1 for copartisans and 0 for others).

In addition, we include controls in our models for a number of individual-level factors that are related to dyadic policy representation, including household income (e.g., Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005), age (Campbell 2003), education, turnout (Griffin and Newman 2005), and indicators for African Americans and Latinos (Griffin and Newman 2008). We also control for MC race (Amer 2004). All of these characteristics may be related to the extent to which a constituent's interests are reflected in their MC's roll-call voting and also may relate to constituent gender, so we account for them to avoid omitted variable bias.

Finally, we account for district political homogeneity.[14] If a district is home to mostly Republicans (Democrats), it may be relatively easy for a Republican (Democratic) member to represent the policy preferences of a majority of the district's residents. However, a district that is more heterogeneous politically will be more difficult for a member to represent, and those constituents may be less well represented, on average, as

a result. In our data, female MCs tend to represent less competitive congressional districts: districts represented by Democratic women supported Al Gore in 2000 at a rate of about two to one (66%), compared to only 57% in districts represented by Democratic men. See Appendix B for details on measurement.

Results

Table 1 reports the results from our analysis of the determinants of roll-call win ratios for the 107th, 109th, and 110th Congresses (pooled). Table 2 reports the same analysis for our measure of ideological proximity. For both dependent variables, the results for the controls tend to mirror extant research: higher income earners, voters, and copartisans enjoy better policy representation, while constituents residing in relatively homogeneous districts tend to have higher win ratios and are ideologically "closer" to their MCs (Bartels 2008; Bullock and Brady 1983; Fiorina 1974; Griffin and Newman 2005).[15] The consistency of these patterns with prior studies further increases our confidence in the somewhat novel measurement of our dependent variables.

Our results indicate that women do not experience unequal dyadic policy representation in the House of Representatives as a general rule. Instead, the gender gap in dyadic representation shifts considerably based on which party is in the majority and the characteristics of the specific representative in question. Turning first to our variables of greatest interest, we find, as expected, that majority control in the House has important consequences for the relative policy representation of women by their own MCs. In the win ratio model (Table 1), when Republicans are in the majority, women have a win ratio about 1.45 points less than men (the coefficient for female constituent). However, the interaction between female constituent and Democratic majority indicates that when the Democrats held majority status (110th House), women enjoyed roughly equal (or slightly better) policy representation compared to men. Specifically, when Democrats were in the majority, women's win ratios were about .8 points higher than men's on average (coefficient for female constituent plus the coefficient for female constituent × Democratic majority, $-1.45 + 2.26 = .81$; see Table 1, column 1). Thus, the gender gap moved from 1.45 points in men's favor under a Republican majority to .8 points in women's favor under the Democrats' control, a shift of 2.25 points. This shift is about the same size as the representation gap between the highest and lowest income earners (income is coded 1–9, making the income gap 2.5 points, see Table 1, column 1).

TABLE 1
Constituent Win Ratios as a Function of MC Type and Majority Party
Control, 107th, 109th, and 110th House (Pooled)

	(1)	(2)
Female	−1.449***	−3.731***
	[0.231]	[0.277]
Female MC	0.302	0.133
	[0.259]	[0.372]
Democrat MC	−1.757***	−4.588***
	[0.186]	[0.263]
African American MC	0.378	0.301
	[0.421]	[0.421]
Household Income	0.309***	0.313***
	[0.049]	[0.049]
Turnout	0.892***	0.874***
	[0.240]	[0.240]
Age	0.009	0.009
	[0.006]	[0.006]
Education	0.038	0.033
	[0.044]	[0.044]
African American	−0.757	−0.263
	[0.497]	[0.498]
Latino	0.327	0.339
	[0.364]	[0.364]
African American Female	−0.899	−1.913***
	[0.633]	[0.636]
Copartisan	11.103***	10.891***
	[0.184]	[0.184]
District Homogeneity	3.307***	3.693***
	[1.214]	[1.213]
Democratic Majority	0.801***	1.006***
	[0.261]	[0.261]
Democratic Majority × Female	2.262***	1.855***
	[0.360]	[0.360]
Democratic MC × Female		5.441***
		[0.358]
Female MC × Female		0.389
		[0.515]
Constant	46.013***	47.269***
	[0.448]	[0.455]
N	163,395	163,395
R^2	0.03	0.03

Note: Standard errors in brackets.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.

TABLE 2
Constituent Ideological Proximity as a Function of MC Type and
Majority Party Control, 107th, 109th, and 110th House (Pooled)

	(1)	(2)
Female	−0.011**	−0.083***
	[0.005]	[0.006]
Female MC	0.007	0.007
	[0.005]	[0.008]
Democrat MC	0.036***	−0.055***
	[0.004]	[0.005]
African American MC	−0.080***	−0.082***
	[0.009]	[0.009]
Household Income	0.007***	0.007***
	[0.001]	[0.001]
Turnout	0.023***	0.021***
	[0.005]	[0.005]
Age	0.001***	0.001***
	[0.000]	[0.000]
Education	−0.001	−0.001
	[0.001]	[0.001]
African American	−0.012	0.004
	[0.010]	[0.010]
Latino	−0.021***	−0.020***
	[0.008]	[0.008]
African American Female	0.019	−0.014
	[0.013]	[0.013]
Copartisan	0.365***	0.365***
	[0.004]	[0.004]
District Homogeneity	−0.213***	−0.205***
	[0.025]	[0.025]
Democratic Majority	−0.007	−0.001
	[0.005]	[0.005]
Democratic Majority × Female	0.021***	0.008
	[0.007]	[0.007]
Democrat MC × Female		0.174***
		[0.007]
Female MC × Female		0.001
		[0.011]
Constant	−1.272***	−1.233***
	[0.009]	[0.010]
N	170,267	170,267
R^2	0.05	0.06

Note: Standard errors in brackets.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.

In the proximity models (see Table 2, column 1), the combination of female constituent and the interaction between female constituent and Democratic majority show that under Republican control (when the interaction term takes on a zero value), women were about .012 points farther from their MCs than were men. Under the Democratic majority, women were .009 points closer than men to their MCs. The .021 swing in the gender gap due to the party of the majority is just over a third of the size of the income gap (.056 points, see Table 2, column 1). In short, which party controls the House has a significant impact on the relative policy representation of women and men.

The impact of majority control may stem from the procedural tools at the majority party's disposal or from the simple fact that a Democratic majority means there are more Democrats representing women. Turning then to the party affiliations of specific MCs, we first note that, not surprisingly, the biggest impact in both the win ratio and proximity models relates to copartisanship. Regardless of other conditions, if a constituent identifies with the MC's party, that constituent tends to have a win ratio roughly 11 points higher than constituents who do not identify with the MC's party. In the same way, Table 2 shows that copartisans are .37 points closer to their MCs than are noncopartisans, again the biggest impact in the model. Clearly, copartisanship plays a powerful role in dyadic policy representation.

Beyond this copartisan effect, representation by a Democratic MC shifts the gender gap in women's favor in both Table 1 and Table 2. In column 2 of these tables, we assess whether, regardless of majority party, Democrats and women in the House provide a relative representation boost by adding two more interactions: female constituent × Democratic MC and female constituent × female MC. The female constituent × Democratic MC interaction is powerfully significant in both substantive and statistical terms. Taking the coefficients for female constituent and the interaction from Table 1, we find that women represented by Republicans have win ratios 3.7 points *lower* than men. This 3.7 point gender gap is on par with representation gaps associated with race and ethnicity. Among constituents represented by Republican MCs, win ratios for whites are 4.7 points higher than win ratios for African Americans and 2.1 points higher than Latinos' average win ratios (results not reported). Moreover, the 3.7 point gap is larger than the 2.5 point gap in win ratio between the highest and lowest income earners (see Table 1, column 2). In districts with Republican MCs, the income gap is 7.2 points, meaning the gender gap is about half the size of the income gap under Republicans.

Although women have lower win ratios than men in districts represented by Republicans, the female × Democratic MC interaction shows that the average win ratio for women is 1.7 points *higher* than that for men in districts represented by Democrats (−3.7 + 5.4). Thus, if we take the difference in the gender gap in districts represented by Republicans (3.7 points in favor of men) and the gap in districts that elected a Democrat (1.7 points in favor of women), we see a total impact of MC party of 5.4 points, an impact greater than income, racial, and ethnic gaps in representation.

To sum up the party effects in the win ratio models, we take the combined effect of majority party control and each MC's partisanship on the relative representation of women. All else equal, under Republican control, a woman represented by a Republican MC is estimated to have a win ratio 3.7 points lower than a similarly situated man. If these two constituents continued to have a Republican representative, but the Democrats gained control of the House, the woman's win ratio would be 1.8 points lower than the man's (−3.7 + 1.9). In contrast, if the Republicans hold the majority, a woman represented by a Democrat would have a win ratio 1.7 points higher than a man (−3.7 + 5.4), while the woman represented by a Democrat would have a 3.6 point advantage over the man if Democrats were in the majority (−3.7 + 5.4 + 1.9).[16]

We uncover a similar pattern of results when examining ideological proximity. When we add interactions for female constituents represented by Democrats and women in the House (see Table 2, column 2), we find that women make big gains in representation relative to men when represented by a Democrat. When represented by a Republican, women are .083 points farther from their MC than are men. Here again, this gap is larger than the income gap (.056 points). However, women represented by a Democrat are .091 points closer to their MC than are men (−.083 + .174). As was true in the win ratio models, this effect is substantively sizeable. The impact of MC party (.174 points) is almost half the size of the impact of being represented by a copartisan, which is by far the biggest effect in the models. Moreover, the .17 point difference MC party makes is roughly three times the difference between the proximity of the lowest and highest income earners to their MCs.

Note that once we control for the sizeable effect of MC party, the majority party variable shrinks to substantive and statistical insignificance in the proximity model (Table 2, column 2). We take this as suggestive evidence that the main reason a Democratic majority brings women relative representation gains is because a Democratic majority,

almost by definition, means that more women will be represented by Democrats. The win ratio models suggest the same conclusion, even though we still see an effect for Democratic majority once we control for individual Democratic MCs' propensity to represent their female constituents' policy preferences more than their male constituents' preferences (see Table 1, column 2). Even there, the impact of representation by a Democratic MC is almost three times the effect of a Democratic majority. Thus, although there is some evidence that the agenda control and other procedural powers that come with majority status in the House can boost women's relative representation, the biggest impact on women's relative policy representation stems from more women being represented by Democrats.

Having found that party exerts powerful effects on the representation of women relative to men, we now turn to the impact of descriptive representation—having a female, rather than a male, MC—on women's representation. Contrary to expectation, the analyses of both dependent variables uncover no impact of descriptive representation on the relative representation of women and men (see the female constituent × female MC interaction in Tables 1 and 2). Once we control for copartisanship, MC party affiliation, majority party, and the other MC, district, and constituent traits, descriptive representation appears to make no difference to the relative representation of women.

In sum, our analyses suggest that there is no overall gender gap in dyadic policy representation in the House of Representatives. However, this conclusion changes considerably based on which party is in the majority and the specific representative in question. Generally speaking, the gender gap in policy representation favors men in districts represented by Republicans. In districts represented by Democrats, however, the gender gap favors women. This effect goes above and beyond the important fact that women tend to identify with Democrats more than Republicans and the copartisan effect that fact creates. We did not find evidence of a descriptive representation effect. Although women represented by women are usually better represented than their male neighbors,[17] this appears to be a function of the frequent affiliation of female MCs with the Democratic Party. Indeed, in terms of overall impact, the gender gap is altered in favor of women most dramatically when women are represented by Democrats in the House. Finally, women's relative policy representation appears to get an additional boost when Democrats control the procedural levers of the House, although the evidence is somewhat less definitive on this point.

Conclusion

Our findings contribute to theoretical and normative debates about the degree to which women experience unequal policy representation, and the extent to which the election of certain types of legislators might affect the gender gap in policy representation. Our work is the first to consider the quality of substantive representation women receive from their own member of Congress. The relationship between a citizen and the representative she has a hand in choosing—dyadic representation—is clearly central to our system of representative democracy.

Do women experience less equal dyadic representation? Across two dependent variables—win ratio on key votes and ideological proximity—our results are strikingly consistent. In general, women appear to experience policy representation that is on par with that of men. In some ways, this finding runs counter to a general expectation that women tend to experience a lesser quality of representation than do men. The finding that women are not consistently underrepresented in terms of dyadic policy representation may be a function of their numbers—women comprise more than half of the nation's population and are more likely to vote than are men. As a result, women are not, unlike racial minorities, numerically disadvantaged in a system that relies heavily on majority rule.[18]

While women do not experience less equal dyadic representation as a general rule, the equality of dyadic representation women experience is strongly affected by the party of their MC. Even controlling for the impact of copartisanship, women represented by Republicans face a sizeable gender gap in dyadic policy representation. When women are represented by a Democratic MC, however, the gender gap in dyadic representation favors women over men. The size of the MC party effect is considerable, equaling or exceeding representation gaps based on race and ethnicity and approaching the income gap in representation.

Advocates of descriptive representation have long promoted the election of women to political office as one means to improve the responsiveness of policy makers to women's preferences. Again running counter to expectations, our findings uncover little support for that expectation in the case of dyadic representation. Across three Congresses and two dependent variables, having a female, rather than a male, MC does not improve the quality of representation women, relative to men, receive from their own member of Congress once other factors—most notably copartisanship—are controlled for. The improvement in relative representation that women experience when their MC is a woman can be attributed to the fact that women, both in the general public and in

Congress, are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party. Once we control for shared partisanship—the single biggest factor shaping the degree of dyadic policy representation—MC gender no longer affects the gender gap in dyadic representation.

In addition to the overwhelming impact of partisanship, it may be that descriptive representation is not consequential for the equality of representation that women experience from their own MCs due to the unique characteristics of the districts which elect women to the U.S. House. As we note in the introduction, the districts which elect women differ in important ways from those which do not (Palmer and Simon 2006); in particular, both women *and* men in those districts appear to be more liberal in their policy preferences. As a result, even if female MCs do differ in their representational styles and positions from their male colleagues (as a great deal of research suggests they do; see Reingold 2008), the result may be that female MCs improve the dyadic representation experienced by *both* their male and female constituents, and thus do not contribute to an improvement or reversal in the gender gap in relative representation.

Moreover, we fully recognize that descriptive representation may well have an important impact on women's representation in domains other than roll-call voting. Our research captures only one aspect of substantive representation. Scholars have long recognized that the final vote on legislation—a simple yes-no choice on an agenda set by the majority party—offers limited opportunities for distinguishing between MCs' preferences and positions (Hall 1996). There are many other ways (including shaping political deliberation, framing of policy problems, and agenda-setting) in which female legislators, Democrats and Republicans alike, can and do improve the substantive representation of women (see Reingold 2008). It is possible, even likely, that in the earlier stages of the legislative process—characterized by agenda setting, issue framing, and prioritizing—female MCs offer distinctive representation in general and to their own constituents. Future research might consider the equality of dyadic representation at other stages of the legislative process, such as bill introduction and cosponsorship.

Future investigations also might examine the impact that female MCs have on the equality of dyadic representation women experience for particular sets of issues. For this analysis, we have focused on broad ideological differences and a diverse set of issues on which men and women disagree. Other scholars have focused on a different set of issues—women's rights or a broader definition of women's issues—where female MCs often articulate a sense of responsibility to particularly speak for women in general and their female constituents

specifically (e.g., Hawkesworth et al. 2001). Perhaps female MCs are particularly responsive to their female constituents' preferences on those sets of issues. We also acknowledge that our measure of policy representation does not take intensity of preference into account. It is possible that MCs represent their female constituents well on the issues to which women give the greatest priority, while representing men well on the issues about which they are most concerned. Future research might consider the different ways in which men and women prioritize policy concerns and the degree to which MCs do a better or worse job of representing those preferences.

For those interested in the equality of representation men and women experience, our results are encouraging: Women are not consistently less well represented by their own MC than are men. Rather, party mediates the relationship between women and their MCs, as we might expect, so that the gender gap in policy representation benefits women when their MC is a Democrat, and disadvantages them with their MC is a Republican. However, the representational inequality that women experience when their MC is a Republican is substantively significant—indeed, it is larger than the income or racial representation gaps (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005; Griffin and Newman 2008). For the measures of representation examined in this article, the gender of an MC does not make an impact on the equality of representation women experience, once party and copartisanship are taken into account. In the context of roll-call voting, our results suggest that the election of Democrats generates the biggest dividends for those who seek to advance the equality of women's dyadic policy representation.

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APPENDIX A

Roll-Call Votes and NAES Items

Roll calls are in bold with the relevant NAES question number and wording listed below the roll call. For more information about roll calls and coding of winners and losers, see the online appendix.

2001

Roll Call 135: School Vouchers Program
Q38a: Give tax credits or vouchers to help parents send their children to private schools—should the federal government do this or not?

Roll Call 136: School Vouchers Demonstration Project
Q38a: Give tax credits or vouchers to help parents send their children to private schools—should the federal government do this or not?

Roll Call 317: HR 4. Energy Plan/ANWR Drilling Ban
Q11of: Protecting the environment and natural resources—should the federal government do more about this, the same as now, less or nothing at all?

2002

Roll Call 158: HR 4546. Fiscal 2003 Defense Authorization/Passage
Q111a: Maintaining a strong military defense—should the federal government spend more money on this, the same as now, less or no money at all?

Roll Call 170: HR 4737. Welfare Renewal/Passage
Q136e: Try to reduce the income differences between rich and poor Americans—should the federal government do this or not?

Roll Call 194: HR 4775. Fiscal 2002 Supplemental Appropriations/Rule
Q111a: Maintaining a strong military defense—should the federal government spend more money on this, the same as now, less or no money at all?

2005

Roll Call 204: HR 810. Embryonic Stem Cell Research/Passage
Q65: Federal funding of research on diseases like Alzheimer's using stem cells taken from human embryos—do you favor or oppose this?

Roll Call 443: HR 3045. Central American Free Trade Agreement/Passage.
Q24: The federal government negotiating more free trade agreements like NAFTA—do you favor or oppose the federal government doing this?

2006

Roll Call 288: H Res 861. Iraq War Resolution/Adoption.
Q696: Do you think the U.S. should keep military troops in Iraq until a stable government is established there, or do you think the U.S. should bring its troops home as soon as possible?

Roll Call 388: HR 810. Embryonic Stem Cell Research/Veto Override.
Q65: Federal funding of research on diseases like Alzheimer's using stem cells taken from human embryos—do you favor or oppose this?

Roll Call 479: S 403. Parental Notification/Passage.
Q85: Laws making it more difficult for a woman to get an abortion—do you favor or oppose this? If favor/oppose: Do you strongly (favor/oppose) or somewhat (favor/oppose)?

Roll Call 502: HR 5825. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance/Passage.
Q42: After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act, which gives federal officials wider authority to use wiretaps and other surveillance techniques. Some people say the Patriot Act is a good thing because it provides necessary new and effective tools for preventing terrorist attacks, while others say the act is a bad thing because it gives the Justice Department and the FBI too much power to spy on ordinary Americans. Which comes closer to your view—would you say the Patriot Act is a good thing for America or a bad thing for America?

2007

Roll Call 18: HR 2. Minimum Wage Increase/Passage.
Q8: Do you favor or oppose increasing the $5.15 minimum wage employers now must pay their workers?

Roll Call 265: HR 1591. Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Conference Report.
Q696: Do you think the U.S. should keep military troops in Iraq until a stable government is established there, or do you think the U.S. should bring its troops home as soon as possible?

Roll Call 836: S 1927. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Revisions/Passage.
Q42: [see 2006 Roll Call 502 for lead in] Which comes closer to your view—would you say the Patriot Act is a good thing for America or a bad thing for America?

Roll Call 982: HR 976. Children's Health Insurance/Veto Override.
Q62: The federal government helping to pay for health insurance for all children—do you favor or oppose this? If favor/oppose: Do you strongly (favor/oppose) or somewhat (favor/oppose)?

Roll Call 1060: HR 3688. U.S.-Peru Free-Trade Agreement/Passage.
Q24: The federal government negotiating more free trade agreements like NAFTA—do you favor or oppose the federal government doing this?

2008

Roll Call 181: H Res 1092. Colombia Trade 'Fast Track' Requirements/Adoption.
Q24: The federal government negotiating more free trade agreements like NAFTA—do you favor or oppose the federal government doing this?

Roll Call 437: HR 6304. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance/Passage.
Q42: [see 2006 Roll Call 502 for lead in] Which comes closer to your view—would you say the Patriot Act is a good thing for America or a bad thing for America?

APPENDIX B
Measurement

Dependent Variables

Ideological Proximity

This item is based on two measures. First, constituent ideology is measured by the following NAES item (Q51 in 2000, Q263 in 2004): "Generally speaking, would you describe your political views as very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal or very liberal?" We coded these answers 1 to 5. Second, MC roll-call behavior is measured using W-NOMINATE scores, ranging from −1 to 1, most liberal to most conservative. We then used the mean and variance of strong partisans' ideologies to standardize the distribution of all respondents, while standardizing the distribution of legislators to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Finally, we calculated the absolute value of the two measures.

Win Ratio

We first coded each respondent as a winner or loser for each roll-call vote listed in the table in this appendix. We then calculated the ratio of number of times the respondent was a winner to the total number of votes, then transformed the variable to a 0–100 scale.

Independent Variables
Age

(2000: Q441; 2004: Q789) Respondent age in years.

Black

(2000: Q451; 2004; Q805) Coded each respondent 1 black, 0 not black.

Black MC

Coded each MC 1 black, 0 not black based on Amer (2004).

Copartisan

Coded each respondent 1 if party identification (independent leaners coded as nonpartisans) and member party affiliation were the same, 0 otherwise. All independents, including leaners, are thus not copartisans, regardless of their MC's party affiliation.

District Homogeneity

For each House district, absolute value of the percentage of the two-party vote won by Bush in 2000 minus 50.

Education

(2000: Q465; 2004: Q833): "What is the last grade or class you completed in school? (1) Grade eight or lower; (2) Some high school, no diploma; (3) High school diploma or equivalent; (4) Technical or vocational school after high school; (5) Some college, no degree; (6) Associate's or two-year college degree; (7) Four-year college degree; (8) Graduate or professional school after college, no degree; (9) Graduate or professional degree."

Female MC
    Coded each MC 0 male, 1 female.

Gender
    (2000: Q440; 2004: cWA01): Coded each respondent 0 male, 1 female.

Household Income
    (2000: Q466; 2004: Q834)"Last year, what was your total household income before taxes? Just stop me when I get to the right category. Less than $10,000; $10,000 to less than $15,000; $15,000 to less than $25,000; $25,000 to less than $35,000; $35,000 to less than $50,000; $50,000 to less than $75,000; $75,000 to less than $100,000; $100,000 to less than $150,000; or $150,000 or more?"

Latino
    (2000: Q449; 2004: Q803): Coded each respondent 1 Hispanic, 0 not Hispanic.

MC Party
    Coded each MC 0 Republican, 1 Democrat.

Seniority
    Number of years each MC has served in the House of Representatives.

Turnout
    In 2000, only NAES respondents who were surveyed from December 1999 to September 2000 were asked if they had voted in 1996 (Q366); post-election respondents were asked if they voted in the 2000 election (Q346). We consider reported voters in both groups as voters for our purposes. In 2004, we adopted the same strategy, employing a question about turnout in the 2000 election for respondents interviewed before the 2004 election (Q651) and a question about turnout in the 2004 election for those interviewed after the election (Q307).

NOTES

    An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2006 American Political Science Association annual meeting. The authors thank Cindy Simon Rosenthal, David Canon, and anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback on earlier drafts. Authors' names are listed alphabetically to reflect equal contributions to the research.
    1. Many scholars distinguish between sex (the biological distinction between men and women) and gender, which is traditionally taken to signify the social meaning given to sex distinctions. At one level, our research focuses on sex differences (male versus female members of Congress, and female versus male constituents). However, we employ the term gender, rather than sex, because the term gender encompasses the discussion of men and women as social, rather than merely biological, groups (see Sanbonmatsu 2008). The term gender has entered into both popular and scholarly usage when discussing political differences between men and women; e.g., the ubiquitous use of the term "gender gap" to describe attitudinal and behavioral differences between men and women. We recognize that a large literature examines the role of gender in legislative

institutions—that is, the ways in which gender informs the structure, power relations, and other features of political institutions; see, e.g., Hawkesworth (2003); Johnson, Duerst-Lahti, and Norton (2006)—in a way that differs from our work here.

2. Contrary to conventional wisdom, men and women generally do not diverge substantially on policies pertaining directly to women, such as abortion, child care, or parental leave, although women's opinions may be more intensely held (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Andersen 1997; Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Mansbridge 1985; Page and Shapiro 1992; Sapiro 2002; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Our data include roll-call votes on three abortion-related bills—two on embryonic stem cell research and one on parental notification—on which we observed a substantively modest but statistically significant difference in opinion between men and women.

3. Moreover, even small gender differences in policy preferences may be significant since men and women comprise equal portions of the voting age population. In a period of close competition, even small differences can have large consequences.

4. MCs may not perceive or weigh the interests of all members of their constituency equally (Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1974). Factors such as shared partisanship, electoral participation, race, and wealth appear to affect the equality of citizens' representation (e.g., Bartels 2008; Clinton 2006; Gerber and Lewis 2004; Griffin and Newman 2005, 2008).

5. The expectation that descriptive representation will translate into better substantive representation also can be conceived in terms of shaping deliberation and agenda setting to better reflect the perspectives and interests of traditionally underrepresented groups (e.g., Mansbridge 1999). Previous research confirms, for example, that female MCs are more likely to place women's issues on the political agenda (Swers 2002; Wolbrecht 2002) and to frame policies in terms of women's perspectives (Walsh 2002). Other ways women in office may benefit their female constituents include casework on behalf of women, encouraging the political engagement of women (the "role model" effect; e.g., Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006), enhancing the political legitimacy of democratic institutions, and compensating for past injustices (see Phillips 1995).

6. The assumption that simply mirroring the preferences of constituents (delegate rather than trustee representation) is the "best" form of representation is, of course, also contentious (Eulau et al. 1959; Pitkin 1967, esp. chap. 7). For the purposes of this research, however, we have defined better representation as MC action that is closer to and more consistent with constituent preferences.

7. We supplement CQ Key Votes with AAUW votes in order to identify additional prominent votes on which men and women in the electorate may disagree. It is worth noting that there are a large number of roll-call votes on the AAUW lists that we did not include in our analysis, either because we did not have matching NAES data or because men and women in the electorate did not disagree on the issue at question.

8. Our 2000 data are a combination of the NAES national cross-section data obtained between December 1999 and January 2001, the Super Tuesday cross-section, and the Second Tuesday cross-section, for a total of 57,197 respondents (Romer et al. 2004).

9. We analyze two House votes on significant defense spending increases. We are somewhat hesitant to include these votes because the questions were asked prior to September 11, 2001, after which preferences may have changed. Moreover, vote 194 presents the added complication that it was a procedural vote. Such votes may be more partisan than substantive, meaning MCs may have voted as they did for reasons unrelated to the amount of spending on defense. Since they meet our criteria for inclusion, we have included them in our analysis. Results are similar if these votes are excluded.

10. Unfortunately, the NAES did not include questions about the use of force, an issue over which men and women consistently and significantly differ (e.g., Eichenberg 2003; Page and Shapiro 1992; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).

11. Early work suggested that men and women differed in their support of environmental regulation, but more recent studies have not tended to find large differences, as men moved in the proenvironment direction of women (Page and Shapiro 1992; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997).

12. These differences do not disappear and in some cases increase in magnitude after accounting for respondents' household incomes and level of educational attainment (results available upon request).

13. The degree to which men are copartisans with their own MC does not vary by the gender of the MC: 32% of men who are represented by a female MC are copartisan, as are 32% of men represented by a male MC.

14. To tap district political heterogeneity in our models, we include a "folded" measure of the district/state's vote in the 2000 presidential election. This measure is equal to the absolute value of the percentage of the vote cast for George W. Bush minus 50. Districts that voted overwhelmingly for Gore or Bush (more homogeneous districts) will then have a high score, while evenly divided districts will have scores closer to zero. We reestimated our models using another measure of political heterogeneity—one that distinguishes districts that lean Republican in the presidential race and are represented by a Republican MC from those that lean Republican and are represented by a Democratic MC. Using this alternative measure does not alter our conclusions below.

15. We also ran the models with a dummy variable for the 107th Congress. Since the Democratic majority dummy is the same as a dummy for the 110th Congress, this model controls for any differences in overall win ratios from Congress to Congress. The model shows that on average, everyone's win ratios were 3.8 points lower in the 107th Congress than in the 108th Congress. However, including the dummy did not appreciably alter any of the key results discussed below. The same is true for the proximity analyses.

16. Women who identify as Republicans had the highest win ratios in all three Congresses under study, controlling for the factors in Tables 1 and 2. Republican women had win ratios 1.5 to 2.5 points higher than independent women and 3 to 5 points higher than female Democrats. We suspect that much of this difference is due to more Republican women being represented by copartisans than Democratic women (Republican men are also more likely to be copartisans than Democratic men). In the 107th and 109th Congresses, roughly two-thirds of Republican women in the public were represented by a Republican MC, while roughly half of female Democrats were represented by a Democrat in the House. In the 110th Congress, there was very little difference between

rates of copartisan representation (59% for Republican women and 58% for Democratic women). Breaking the results out by party identifiers in the public generates results fairly similar to those in Table 1, column 2. The coefficient for female respondents is −2.8 for Republican identifiers, −3.0 for Democratic identifiers, and −4.1 for independents, compared to −3.7 in Table 1, column 2.

      17. For instance, the mean win ratio of women represented by women is about 1.2 points higher than the mean win ratio of men represented by women.

      18. We do not mean to suggest any hierarchy of ascriptive status, only to note that women's underrepresentation cannot be explained away by numerical minority status in a majority-rule system.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:

Web Appendix: Roll Calls and Survey Items.