Explaining Gender-Based Language Use: Effects of Gender Identity Salience on References to Emotion and Tentative Language in Intra- and Intergroup Contexts

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An experiment tested hypotheses derived from self-categorization theory’s explanation for gender-based language use. Under high or low conditions of gender salience, men and women sent e-mail to an ostensible male or female recipient yielding either an intra- or an intergroup setting. Gender salience was manipulated so that the stereotypically feminine characteristic of supportiveness was the sole attribute that defined the prototype of intergender relations. Messages were examined for references to emotion and tentative language. Women referenced emotion significantly more than men in the high gender salience condition, but this gender difference was reduced when salience was low. Moreover, women with high gender salience in an intergroup context referenced emotion more than women with high salience in an intragroup setting or men with high salience in either an intra- or an intergroup context. Tentative language use, however, was similar across all conditions as anticipated.


Significant scholarly attention in the area of language and gender emerged in the mid-1970s (e.g., Lakoff, 1975). Since then, numerous empirical investigations on the topic have been published, along with several books directed at both academic and popular audiences. Most extant publications on language and gender, however, highlight dichotomous differences between men and women (e.g., Gray, 1992; Tannen, 1990). These accounts focus on main effect differences whereby men tend to use certain language features more than women and vice versa (e.g., Mulac, 2006). Notwithstanding that research, such differences are more dynamic and inconsistent than they are static and stable (Aries, 1996; Hyde, 2005, 2006a). In fact, scholars increasingly have underlined linguistic similarities and differences and assert that many contextual factors over and above gender can determine the language of men

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and women (Leaper & Ayres, 2007). For example, status (O’Neill & Colley, 2006), topic (Janssen & Murachver, 2004; Thomson, 2006), age (O’Kearney & Dadds, 2004), setting/situation (Goldshmidt & Weller, 2000), and sex composition of groups (Savicki & Kelley, 2000) impacted language just as much as, if not more than, gender; moreover, some of these extragender variables seem to exacerbate, diminish, erase, or even flip language differences between men and women.

Focusing on extragender variables is significant; yet, missing from much of this research is a theoretical account of what particular language differences, if any, will emerge, when, and why. To answer these questions, some scholars recently have approached gender-based language use from a self-categorization theoretical perspective to focus on the context and its role in enhancing and defining the salience of gender identity (Palomares, 2004; Palomares, Reid, & Bradac, 2004; Reid, Keerie, & Palomares, 2003). How men and women communicate is explainable and predictable by determining the contextually relevant social dimensions of gender. This rationale accounts for the particular differences and similarities in language that emerge and the circumstances of and reasons for their manifestation.

Rooted in this rationale, the current experiment analyzed two language forms—tentative language and references to emotion—that previous research has found men and women to use differently at times (Mulac, Bradac, & Gibbons, 2001). Research has yet to focus directly on how men and women might use these two language forms distinctly as a function of their gender salience. The first objective, thus, was to compare tentative language and references to emotion. Specifically, this research sought to explain, predict, and demonstrate how manipulating the level of gender salience in particular ways can bring about differences and similarities in the extent to which men and women reference emotions, but these same alterations can have virtually no effect on tentative language. A second objective of this research was to account for how men’s and women’s language is not only a function of gender salience but also a product of whether they communicate in an intra- or intergroup context. Research has not explicitly addressed this objective to date even though the literature suggests its significance (e.g., Palomares, 2004). Research has shown the importance of dyadic sex composition (e.g., Carli, 1990) but not in relation to gender salience. A third objective was to examine the language of men and women in the computer-mediated context of e-mail. Due in part to the increased expansion and adoption of electronic communication media (cf. Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2006), some scholars have expanded their interest in language and gender beyond face-to-face interactions to computer-mediated ones (e.g., Herring, 1994). The current research was along the same vein.

To meet these objectives, the following section justifies the focus on references to emotion and tentative language by describing the two language features and how they are consequential. Next, self-categorization theory is elaborated to explain when, how, and why men and women use references to emotion and tentative language, and hypotheses are forwarded. An experiment that tested the hypotheses is reported, and finally, implications and future research are considered.
References to emotion, tentative language, and attendant consequences

Research has focused on how men and women reference emotions, as well as how tentative they are, in their language use. References to emotion are defined as a linguistic form that occurs when someone’s language includes “any mention of an emotion or feeling” (Mulac, Bradac, et al., 2001, p. 148). Tentative language is a linguistic variable that indicates relatively low power or status when used (Lakoff, 1975). Consistent with gender stereotypes, research has shown at times that women use references to emotion and tentative language more than men. Men and women, however, do not consistently use these language features differently across all, or even most, contexts (cf. Leaper & Ayres, 2007). For example, in some settings, women used references to emotion more than men (Colley et al., 2004), but in other situations, men referenced emotion more than women (Mulac, Seibold, & Farris, 2000). The same is true for tentative language: Women were more tentative than men in some contexts (Carli, 1990), but under different conditions, they were tentative to a similar extent (Brouwer, Gerritsen, & De Haan, 1979). Men and women may tend to diverge stereotypically in using these linguistic forms; yet, research has been inconsistent in how and when such language transpires across many contexts. In fact, previous research on language and gender suggests that men and women may use tentative language differently than how they use references to emotion (Palomares, 2004). Being able to explain how such use can independently emerge in a unique way for each language form is a worthwhile endeavor, especially considering that these language variables are consequential.

References to emotion have evaluative effects for people who use them. The gender-linked language effect is the finding that individuals who use certain language features typically associated with women are judged relatively high in aesthetic quality and sociointellectual status, whereas people using language features commonly associated with men are judged relatively high in dynamism (Mulac, 2006). In particular, references to emotion are positively correlated with ratings of aesthetic quality and sociointellectual status even when the raters are unaware of communicators’ sex (Mulac & Lundell, 1994). Unlike references to emotion, tentative language results in raters judging communicators as less competent, intelligent, confident, and powerful than direct individuals (Ng & Bradac, 1993). On the other hand, research has found that tentative language can be functional for women attempting to influence men (Carli, 1990; Reid et al., 2003): Under certain conditions, tentative women are more likely to persuade men on certain issues than are direct women. These two language forms, thus, have meaningful, yet distinct, outcomes.

Tentative language and references to emotion are consequential for communicators who use them particularly when other cues are limited. A person evaluates others, makes inferences about others, and responds to others as a function of their linguistic behaviors (Cargile & Bradac, 2001). These outcomes can be particularly pronounced in computer-mediated communication (CMC) due to the reduced
social cues available (Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & Sethna, 1991). In CMC, people primarily rely on others’ language to pass judgment on and form impressions of them (Walther, 1996). In fact, because language was the sole form of communication in CMC, the velocity of impression formation was slower in CMC than in face-to-face interactions even though the number of ideas exchanged was similar (Walther, 1993). Another cause to examine consequential gender-based language in CMC is its pervasiveness. Internet saturation in the United States is 73% (as of April 2006; Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2006), and nearly all Internet users have sent and received e-mail at some point, and about half typically use it every day (Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2003). Explaining how, when, and why men and women use references to emotion and tentative language is advantageous, particularly in the oft-used form of CMC, e-mail.

Self-categorization theory and gender-based language use

Self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) provides an effective means to explain and predict the gender-based use of references to emotion and tentative language (Palomares et al., 2004). Emanating from a social identity framework (Tajfel, 1978), the theory underscores the social-cognitive basis of collective self-definition and how people can self-define in either interindividual or intergroup terms. When self-categorized in interindividual terms, people define themselves as unique individuals and focus on idiosyncratic differences. For intergroup self-categorizations, however, people view themselves as a member of a certain group having a shared social identity. A social identity, thus, becomes salient—activated and operating cognitively—when someone self-defines as a group member. For example, gender salience is a cognitive state wherein someone self-categorizes in terms of being a man or a woman that results in an activated gender identity. The theory emphasizes the intergroup nature of social interaction and explains what social identity people are most likely to internalize in any given context and the ensuing attitudes, beliefs, and behavior.

The particular self-categorization that someone invokes and, therefore, the associated social identity that becomes salient depends on an interaction between accessibility, comparative fit, and normative fit (Oakes, 1987). Accessibility or perceiver readiness is the extent to which individuals have a propensity to self-define in terms of certain social categories and can manifest in the form of individuals’ past experiences, motivation, task at hand, or other personal factors. Comparative fit is the extent to which perceived intragroup differences are minimized and intergroup differences are maximized. Normative fit is the component that provides the theory with social traction and states that a particular social identity likely becomes salient when the perceived intragroup similarities and intergroup differences are socially meaningful and correspond to group norms. When any given accessible social category comparatively and normatively fits the current context, the associated social identity will likely become salient.
When a particular social identity is salient, the self is viewed as a prototypical group member—a process termed *depersonalization*. When depersonalized, people cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally assimilate to the in-group prototype (Hogg & Reid, 2006). *Prototypes* are contextually dependent fuzzy sets of attributes that provide a basis to compare social groups. These attributes can include attitudes, personal characteristics, clothing, behaviors, and other elements. A prototype’s specification depends on the attribute(s) that enhances intergroup differences and intragroup similarities. For example, under certain conditions, two attributes—one relevant for references to emotion (e.g., *supportiveness*: women are supportive, caring, empathic, etc.) and another for tentative language (e.g., *submissiveness*: women are submissive, timid, docile, etc.)—may define the prototype of gender salience, but in other contexts, only one or neither can define the prototype. Consequently, an array of predictions emerge depending on the attribute(s) that specifies the prototype of a salient social category. Specifically, if gender is salient, then alterations in its prototype can affect the type and extent of any differences that manifest in men’s and women’s language.

To make precise predictions about how men and women use references to emotion and tentative language when gender is salient, information about the prototype of gender salience must be known (Palomares et al., 2004). If supportiveness and submissiveness stereotypically define the prototype of gender salience, then women likely would use references to emotion and tentative language more than men because each attribute is relevant to one of the two language forms. Previous research is consistent with this particular composition of the prototype of gender salience. In a study of CMC groups, for example, women used more references to emotion and tentative language than men (Mulac, Flanagin, Tiyaamornwong, Palomares, & Hallett, 2001). This research did not take gender salience or its prototype into account; nonetheless, these results likely emerged because gender is a chronically accessible category that can become salient with little or no induction (Palomares, 2004). A prototype including both supportiveness and submissiveness is not the only possible manifestation. If the prototype of gender salience includes attributes irrelevant to references to emotion and tentative language, then one can expect men and women to use equally low amounts of these two language forms. For example, in a heated discussion on a topic that generates a difference of opinion between men and women, gender salience would increase, thereby creating a competitive intergender context. The relevant attribute that defines the prototype of gender salience would be the divergent opinions on the topic that are unrelated to the two language forms. Men and women, thus, would be equally direct and unemotional in this context, as other research suggests (Hogg, 1985).

When either supportiveness or submissiveness is the sole attribute that stereotypically characterizes the prototype of gender salience, men and women will differ in the language feature that is relevant to the defining attribute. Specifically, if submissiveness is the single attribute that defines the prototype, then women would be more tentative than men because gender salience would encourage women’s passivity.
In CMC groups, for example, when men and women were depersonalized and their traditional gender stereotypes were accessible, men linguistically dominated women because the context privileged men via a masculine topic (Postmes & Spears, 2002). Alternatively, if gender is salient and supportiveness is the only attribute, then women would use references to emotion more than men, but they would be equally tentative/direct because the supportiveness prototype promotes references to emotion but is irrelevant to tentative language. No known research demonstrates that men and women stereotypically differ in references to emotion, but not tentative language, as a function of the prototype of gender salience. Research, however, has found that men tend to think independently and objectively, whereas women are inclined to think considerately and compassionately when gender is salient (Ryan, 2003; Ryan & David, 2003). Self-categorization theory, thus, predicts that:

H₁: (a) Women use references to emotion more than men when gender salience with a supportiveness prototype is high but not when gender salience is low and (b) men and women use tentative language similarly when gender salience with a supportiveness prototype is either high or low.

The previous hypothesis neglects the potential impact of a message recipient even though e-mail typically involves a receiver. In fact, communication accommodation research shows that addressees matter and that two interlocutors can converge or diverge their communication styles based on social identities (Shepard, Giles, & Le Poire, 2001). People can accommodate their gender-based communication depending on their own sex, the sex of their message recipient, and their gender identity (Hajek, Abrams, & Murachver, 2004). Although self-categorization research has examined the effects of gender salience on language in e-mail (Palomares, 2004), it has yet to manipulate the sex of the recipient to examine language differences across intra- and intergroup contexts. Meta-analyses even reveal sex composition as an important moderator in gender-based language use (Leaper & Ayres, 2007). Other research examined how a recipient’s sex affects gender-based language in e-mail, which is beneficial; yet, these studies ignored gender salience, have been relatively atheoretical, and thus yielded significant inconsistencies. For example, men and women used language in e-mail differently across intra- and intergroup contexts in one study (Colley et al., 2004), whereas e-mail recipients’ sex did not impact gender-based language in another study (Thomson, Murachver, & Green, 2001). A likely reason for unreliable findings is the lack of conceptual attention given to gender salience. Self-categorization theory can account for references to emotion not only based on the gender salience and sex of an e-mail sender but also as a function of the context’s intra- or intergroup character, as detailed next.

If gender is salient in an intergroup (i.e., mixed-sex) dyadic interaction, the prototypical differences between men and women are more obvious than in an intragroup (i.e., same-sex) setting (Hogg & Turner, 1987). Intergroup contexts foster a well-defined prototype of gender salience more than intragroup ones because comparative differences have better fit in intergroup settings. Thus, when gender
is salient in an intergroup context, people likely adhere to the prototype of gender salience more than if they are in an intragroup context. Specifically, a woman for whom gender is salient with a supportiveness prototype will use more references to emotion (i.e., language consistent with the prototype) if she sends an e-mail to a man (i.e., intergroup) than if the e-mail recipient is a woman (i.e., intragroup). This outcome is predicted because the intergroup context enhances the prototypical differences in supportiveness, whereas the intragroup context does not.

One might expect men for whom gender is salient with a supportiveness prototype to use references to emotion differently across intra- and intergroup contexts as well. This outcome is unlikely, however, because a supportiveness attribute is stereotypically feminine and not masculine. References to emotion vary across intra- and intergroup settings for women because the supportiveness prototype explicitly focuses on a stereotypically female quality. On the other hand, intra/intergroup interactions do not affect men’s use of references to emotion because the prototype does not specify men’s level of supportiveness or lack thereof. Consistent with this prediction is the research finding that women used a stereotypically feminine language feature differently in high and low levels of gender salience, but men did not (Reid et al., 2003). Thus, men with a high gender salience will use references to emotion similarly across intra- and intergroup contexts.

Self-categorization theory also aids in understanding how men and women use references to emotion when gender salience is low. Because there is no comparative basis distinguishing men and women when gender salience is low, men and women will use language similarly. Gender-based differences do not manifest in language when gender salience is low because a gender-based prototype is irrelevant. Other research, for example, showed that men and women used language similarly when gender salience was low (Reid et al., 2003). Likewise, the sex composition of a dyad has no impact on language when gender salience is low because an intergender distinction is immaterial. Thus, men and women will use similar amounts of references to emotion when gender salience is low, regardless of sex composition. A counterargument for this prediction is that gender-based language differences should emerge in mixed-sex but not in same-sex dyads even in a low gender salience condition because mixed-sex interactions tend to generate gender differences in language. This counterargument is rejected, however, because the low gender salience manipulation obfuscates any comparative differences between men and women that could be perceived in mixed-sex interactions, and so sex composition is of little consequence. Low gender salience, in other words, prevents gender from becoming salient even in mixed-sex interactions, and as a result, gender-based language differences will not emerge. Thus, synthesizing the previous predictions:

H2: (a) When gender salience with a supportiveness prototype is high, women use references to emotion in an intergroup context (i.e., with a male e-mail recipient) more than in an intragroup context (i.e., with a female e-mail recipient), but men use references to emotion similarly across intra- and intergroup contexts (i.e., with either
a male or a female recipient) and (b) when gender salience is low, men and women use similar amounts of references to emotion, regardless of the message recipient’s sex.

Method
An experiment tested the hypotheses in a 2 (sex of participant) × 2 (gender salience of participant: high vs. low) × 2 (sex of message recipient: intra- vs. intergroup context) design with references to emotion and tentative language as dependent variables.

Participants
Students at a large university on the west coast of the United States received course credit for their participation (N = 144; 65.9% women; age: M = 21.15 years, SD = 1.85 years).

Gender salience manipulation
A gender salience manipulation that defined the prototype as supportiveness was developed. The gender salience manipulation was modeled after previous research (Palomares, 2004; Reid et al., 2003). Participants identified with and thought about themselves in terms of their gender for the high gender salience condition but their student status for the low gender salience condition. Paragraphs manipulated gender salience; they were as parallel as possible and focused on factual, personally relevant, and praising information. So that the paragraphs were realistically applicable to most members of each group, generalized descriptions were employed rather than judgmental characteristics. Two paragraphs for the high gender salience condition were constructed, one for men and another for women. Supportiveness was the sole attribute that defined the gender prototype. In particular, the high female gender salience paragraph emphasized supportiveness as a female characteristic (implicitly distinguishing women from men along this attribute) and focused on how women offer emotional support, are empathic, comfort, nurture, care, are humanitarian, and have other characteristics consistent with a supportiveness prototype. The high male gender salience paragraph, on the other hand, mentioned nothing regarding men’s level of emotional support, empathy, comforting, and nurturing behavior, or other descriptions in the female paragraph. In fact, the male gender salience paragraph did not refer to men’s level of supportiveness or lack thereof. A third paragraph enhanced student salience, was the same for men and women, and avoided gender issues. Table 1 contains the three paragraphs.

Manipulation check measures
Multiple items ensured an effective manipulation. All items were phrased in a way so that participants would focus on their mental state after reading the salience paragraph (e.g., “After reading the passage, how much are you thinking about being a male or a female?”). Three items assessed gender salience and focused on the extent
Table 1 Gender Salience Manipulation Paragraphs

High female gender salience
Think about being a female. As a female, women can be proud of who they are and what they do. Women extensively help others by doing everything from reading young children stories, getting things from the store, organizing social events, watching after their siblings, mending and repairing stuff, and offering friends emotional support to helping those in need, giving advice, comforting family members, providing clothing/fashion tips, and handling touchy situations. Studies show that young adult females score in the top 90% on tests of generosity and dependability. American females are routinely looked up to as the most empathic and judged as the most caring. Sociologists find that the experiences women have cause them to develop strong character and good judgment skills (in the upper 90th percentile). Adult females are the reason for 93% of all humanitarian ideas and are responsible for some of our greatest moments as a country. For example, Amelia Earhart set standards for all pilots for years to come by completing the first solo flight across the Pacific Ocean. Today’s females are carrying this great tradition of women into the future and setting an example that today’s young girls, one day, will follow. Enjoy the fact that women have been, are, and will continue to be a credit to their gender. Be proud and pleased of women and the definition of who they are.

High male gender salience
Think about being a male. As a male, men can be proud of who they are and what they do. Men extensively help others by doing everything from lifting heavy objects, carrying big boxes, getting hard-to-reach items, disposing of unwanted pests, fixing and repairing stuff, and climbing into obscure locations to doing difficult tasks, giving advice, taking charge of situations, protecting family members, and standing up for themselves and others. Studies show that young adult males score in the top 90% on tests of industriousness and dependability. American males are routinely looked up to as the most capable and judged as the most independent. Sociologists find that the experiences men have cause them to develop strong character and good judgment skills (in the upper 90th percentile). Adult males are the reason for 93% of all innovative ideas and are responsible for some of our greatest moments as a country. For example, Charles Lindbergh set standards for all pilots for years to come by completing the first solo flight across the Atlantic Ocean. Today’s males are carrying this great tradition of men into the future and setting an example that today’s young boys, one day, will follow. Enjoy the fact that men have been, are, and will continue to be a credit to their gender. Be proud and pleased of men and the definition of who they are.

Low gender salience (high student salience)
Think about being a [name of university] student. [Name of university] undergraduates are what make [name of university] a premier university. [Name of university] is the 14th best public university where 95% of students are in the top 10% of their high school graduating classes. [Name of university] students have an average high school GPA of 3.8 and routinely receive public recognition. [Name of university] students are the reason [name of university] is a member of the Association of American Universities which comprises the top 2% of all universities in America. [Name of university] students pursue more than 100 different majors, the most popular and challenging of which are
to which participants: (a) thought about being male or female, (b) evaluated them-
selves in terms of gender, and (c) thought gender was central to their identity (1 = not
at all; 7 = very). Three additional items measured student salience on a similar scale
and asked the extent to which: (a) participants assessed themselves as a student,
(b) being a student was foremost in their thoughts, and (c) they focused on being a
student. Four filler items (not used in the analyses) were meant to draw participants’
attention away from the gender and student focus of the research. A principal com-
ponent analysis of the gender and student salience items revealed the two anticipated
components. Each set of items, when averaged, formed a reliable measure (self-
reported gender salience: $M = 3.97$, $SD = 2.03$, $\alpha = .91$; self-reported student salience:
$M = 4.18$, $SD = 1.85$, $\alpha = .91$). Finally, to ensure that gender salience was manipulated
in a positive manner for men and women equally, two items were included to measure
the positive affect of participants (7 = high; $M = 5.08$, $SD = 1.16$, $r = .58$, $p < .001$).

Procedure
Participants arrived at a laboratory and took a seat in front of a computer. A research
assistant then told participants that the research focused on the e-mail messages
people send to each other and that they would engage in an e-mail exchange with
someone else using a researcher-provided e-mail account. Next, participants were
told that everyone who participates takes on one of the two roles—Message Initiator
or Message Respondent. Participants learned that Initiators composed a new e-mail
to someone who would participate in the study at a future time, and Respondents
replied to an e-mail from an Initiator who already participated on a previous day.
Participants learned that if they were an Initiator, then they would come back in
a few days to read the Respondent’s reply to their e-mail. Participants then had an
opportunity to ask questions. Next, participants drew one of two dozen mixed,
folded slips of paper to determine if they would take the role of an Initiator or
Respondent. So that everyone would be a Respondent, unbeknownst to participants,
all slips indicated a Respondent role. After drawing a slip, participants read it and
gave it to the research assistant, who passed a handout to them and told them it was tailored for their role and had instructions for the remainder of the study.

The handout that was entitled “E-mail Study Questionnaire (Message Respondent Version)” informed participants that they had been randomly selected to be a Respondent and summarized the task associated with that role. The handout then stated: “In order to start the e-mail exchange, we asked the Message Initiator to read a passage on a particular topic. The passage is intended to give the Message Initiator and you (as the Message Respondent) something to talk about. We told the Message Initiator to send you an e-mail message based on their reaction to the passage. The passage is presented below so that you understand what the Message Initiator is referring to in their e-mail. Please read the passage carefully and then continue with the study.”

Participants read one of the salience manipulation paragraphs, which was randomly assigned. The research assistant was blind to the salience condition. After reading a paragraph, participants were directed to reply to the e-mail using Mozilla Thunderbird version 1.1. To associate e-mail messages to questionnaires at a later time, participants wrote their randomly assigned numerical e-mail account on the handout. Then, the handout instructed participants how to open, read, and respond to the Initiator’s e-mail via verbal directions and computer screen shots of each step.

Each e-mail from an ostensible Initiator was sent from a numerical e-mail account. To increase the Initiator’s realism, each e-mail had a date of 1–5 days prior to a participant reading it (excluding Saturdays and Sundays) and a time between 1 and 5 in the afternoon. The e-mail message was broad and general so that it was a reasonably applicable and appropriate reaction to all three salience paragraphs. A typographical error was included, and the language style was informal to increase the realism and make participants feel casual, relaxed, and familiar with the Initiator. Ten students who did not participate in the experiment confirmed these intentions. The e-mail deliberately excluded tentative language and references to emotion to avoid confounds. The Initiator’s sex, operationalized as John or Jennifer, was randomly assigned, and the research assistant was unaware of it. All e-mail messages had the subject of “society’s future?” and, with the exception of the Initiator’s name and the bracketed word, read as follows:

Hi! My name’s John/Jennifer. How’s your day going? Mine’s been good. I just wentt [sic] to work and then am now doing this.

Anyhow, we should talk about that passage. Reading the passage got me really thinking about what the future will be like. I imagine things 10 years from now will be different, but just how different is the question. I wonder how society will be and what I’ll be doing then. Will I be okay with the current status of society and with my life? Hmm . . . here’s a question for you to answer in your reply to me . . . based on the passage we read, what do you think society will be like in the year 2016?

Looking forward to hearing from you and reading your response.

John/Jennifer
After typing and sending their replies, participants completed the gender and student salience measures intermingled with the positive affect and filler items. Next, participants wrote on the handout what they thought the study was trying to learn and their sex and age. Finally, the research assistant probed for any suspicions participants may have had, debriefed them, and thanked them. The entire procedure lasted approximately 25 minutes.

Dependent measures

Language transcripts
The body of the e-mail from each participant was printed as a transcript identified by a number. Transcripts were randomly ordered and formed a booklet.

Language coding
Research assistants formed coding teams consisting of two people per team. All team members had identical transcript booklets and were blind to the design and hypotheses. Coding teams analyzed the transcripts for references to emotion and tentative language. Coding schemes were adapted from Palomares (2004) and Reid et al. (2003).

References to emotion were defined as any mention of an emotion (e.g., compassionate, fear, love, you seem happy). One coding team was responsible for references to emotion. The two members independently counted the variable for all transcripts, agreed 90% of the time, and settled disagreements to reach a final count during a postcoding discussion (Krippendorff’s $\alpha = .96$).

Tentative language was defined as three specific features of language that indicate uncertainty, a diminished level of assuredness, or a lack of confidence for a communicator. The three features were as follows: (a) hedges (e.g., probably, might, kinda, sort of, maybe, pretty much), (b) disclaimers (e.g., I may be wrong, I’m not sure, don’t trust me), and (c) tag questions (e.g., isn’t it?, don’t you think?, right?). Instances of hedges, tag questions, and disclaimers that did not indicate uncertainty for a communicator were not counted as tentative language. Each of the three coding teams worked independently to analyze one of the tentative language features. Each member of a coding team counted the assigned language feature individually. Team members within each team agreed at a rate of at least 88% and resolved disagreements via discussion (Krippendorff’s $\alpha_s > .90$). Hedges, disclaimers, and tag questions were summed to form tentative language, which is consistent with past research (Reid et al., 2003).

Power
A power analysis, with a two-tailed alpha of .05 and a small-medium effect size (i.e., $d = .35$), indicated that all tests had sufficient power (power > .80; Cohen, 1988).
Results

Manipulation checks
The paragraphs effectively manipulated gender salience. As expected, participants in the high gender salience condition reported higher gender salience ($M = 5.54, SD = 1.24$), $t(142) = 17.64, p < .001, \eta^2 = .69$, and lower student salience ($M = 3.01, SD = 1.52$), $t(142) = -11.38, p < .001, \eta^2 = .48$, than those in the low gender salience condition (gender salience: $M = 2.30, SD = 1.21$; student salience: $M = 5.41, SD = 1.28$). Moreover, the mean self-reported gender salience in the high gender salience condition was higher than the midpoint (i.e., 4) of the 7-point scale, $t(75) = 11.92, p < .001, \eta^2 = .65$, and self-reported student salience was lower than the midpoint of the 7-point student salience scale, $t(75) = -6.25, p < .001, \eta^2 = .34$. Likewise, the self-reported gender salience in the low salience condition was lower, $t(67) = -13.04, p < .001, \eta^2 = .72$, and student salience was higher, $t(67) = 10.25, p < .001, \eta^2 = .61$, than the respective midpoints. Participants’ sex and the intra/intergroup variable had no direct or interactive effects on either of the self-reported salience measures, and these two independent variables did not interact with the gender salience independent variable.

Gender salience was manipulated in a positive manner as intended. Participants in the high gender salience condition indicated positive affect upon reading the paragraph at a level higher than the midpoint (i.e., 4) of the 7-point scale ($M = 5.11, SD = 1.23$), $t(75) = 9.44, p < .001, \eta^2 = .54$, as did participants in the low salience condition ($M = 5.05, SD = 1.21$), $t(67) = 8.14, p < .001, \eta^2 = .50$. In fact, participants in the two conditions reported similar levels of positive affect, $t(142) = 0.33, p = .74$.

To reduce the threat of demand characteristics and to ensure a realistic Initiator and e-mail exchange, participants’ responses to the research assistant’s probing and the what-was-the-study-trying-to-learn question were examined. Fourteen participants (or 9.7%) either indicated suspicion regarding the e-mail exchange or stated accurate knowledge of the purpose and hypotheses of the research. These participants were dropped from further analyses. Also, a technical error prevented one e-mail from being included in the analyses. The 129 participants who remained in all subsequent analyses found the Initiator and e-mail exchange credible and were unaware of the experiment’s purpose and hypotheses.

Omnibus tests
A 2 (sex) × 2 (salience) × 2 (intra/intergroup) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with references to emotion as the dependent variable revealed a sex main effect, $F(1, 121) = 13.13, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .10$. However, a salience × intra/intergroup interaction subsumed this main effect, $F(1, 121) = 4.77, p = .03, \eta^2_p = .04$. All other effects were not statistically significant, $Fs < 1.05$. A similar ANOVA examined tentative language and yielded no significant effects, $Fs < 2.80$. 
Hypotheses tests
Because the results in the previous section did not directly assess the hypotheses, the current section reports tests that directly evaluate them. Statisticians recommend a priori, one-tailed contrasts to test hypotheses when a theory is sophisticated enough to generate focused predictions because omnibus tests can be ambiguous in factorial designs and so are ineffective; omnibus tests, however, are suitable to examine any portion of a design where specific differences are not predicted (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Wilkinson & Task Force on Statistical Inference, 1999). Hypotheses, therefore, were analyzed using one-tailed contrasts when appropriate as noted.

H1a predicted that women would use more references to emotion than men in the high gender salience condition but not in the low salience condition. When gender salience was high, women referenced emotion \((M = 5.21, SD = 3.69)\) more than men \((M = 2.64, SD = 3.20)\), \(t(125) = 3.07, p = .0015, \eta^2 = .07\). On the other hand, men \((M = 2.90, SD = 2.90)\) and women \((M = 4.63, SD = 2.85)\) did not statistically significantly differ in the low salience condition although the effect approached significance, \(t(125) = 1.94, p = .055, \eta^2 = .03\). H1a generally received support, but the marginally significant difference between men and women in the low salience condition should be noted as inconsistent with H1a, and so support for that hypothesis was not as strong as it could have been.

Consistent with H1b, men and women used tentative language similarly across the high \((M = 1.14, SD = 1.08)\) and low \((M = 1.57, SD = 1.44)\) gender salience conditions, as a nonsignificant sex \(\times\) salience interaction indicated, \(F(1, 125) = 0.01, p = .93\).

H2a focused on the high gender salience condition only and predicted that references to emotion would differ across the intra- and intergroup settings for women but not for men. The top half of Figure 1 illustrates the relevant results. Women used references to emotion in the intergroup context \((M = 5.92, SD = 4.51)\) more than in the intragroup context \((M = 4.33, SD = 2.11)\), \(t(121) = 1.68, \eta^2 = .02\). In contrast, men’s use of references to emotion did not statistically significantly differ across the intra- \((M = 2.09, SD = 1.38)\) and intergroup \((M = 3.18, SD = 4.35)\) contexts, \(t(121) = 0.79, p = .43\). In fact, when gender salience was high, women in the intergroup context used more references to emotion than the average of the other three conditions (the contrast was 3 –1 –1 –1), \(F(1, 121) = 11.16, p = .001, \eta^2 = .08\). H2a received support.

H2b focused on the low gender salience condition and predicted no differences. H2b received partial support (see bottom half of Figure 1). Women’s use of references to emotion in the low salience condition did not differ across the intra- \((M = 4.77, SD = 2.98)\) and intergroup \((M = 4.44, SD = 2.77)\) contexts, \(t(121) = 0.32, p = .75\). Likewise, the difference between men across the intra- \((M = 3.83, SD = 3.35)\) and intergroup \((M = 1.50, SD = 1.20)\) contexts was not statistically significantly different although it approached significance, \(t(121) = 1.59, p = .12, \eta^2 = .02\). In fact, men in the intergroup context used less references to emotion than the average
of the other three low gender salience conditions (the contrast was $3 \times (-1) - 1 - 1$), $F(1, 121) = 5.38, p = .02, \eta^2_p = .04$. H$_{2b}$ received mixed support.

Table 2 reports the mean levels of references to emotion for the relevant conditions of the design.

Supplementary moderated mediation analysis
The previous analyses demonstrated some support for the hypotheses; yet, due to inherent confounds in the gender salience manipulation alternative explanations
possibly can account for the process underlying the observed effects. For example, although all three gender salience manipulation paragraphs had some emotional content, the female gender salience paragraph contained more emotional content than the other two paragraphs. This confound was included to obtain a supportive-ness prototype, as emotionality is a part of the feminine characteristic of supportiveness (Eagly & Koenig, 2006). An emotion prime, however, may have generated the pattern of results independent of gender salience. The paragraphs also varied in collective self-esteem and in-group stereotypes. These confounds were included to produce an effective gender salience manipulation (cf. Palomares, 2004); nonetheless, they still present difficulty in determining whether gender salience was actually the mechanism that explains the predicted and demonstrated linguistic variation.

To provide additional support that gender salience, and not a confounded variable, explains the results, the current section reports a conditional indirect effect (or moderated mediation) analysis (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005). Specifically, this analysis exploited the bootstrapping technique of Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007; i.e., MODMED macro v1.1, Model 3). This analysis employed the gender salience manipulation as the independent variable ($X$), self-reported gender salience as the mediator ($W$), the intra/intergroup variable as the moderator ($M$), and references to emotion as the dependent variable ($Y$). The analysis used 5,000 bootstrap resamples and a bias-corrected and -accelerated 95% confidence interval (CI) as Preacher et al. recommend. Results revealed a significant conditional indirect effect of the gender salience manipulation on references to emotion in the intergroup context (3.98; CI: 0.35–10.58), whereas the conditional indirect effect in the intra-group context was not significant (1.51; CI: −2.75 to 5.72). Preacher et al. state that the “null hypothesis of no conditional indirect effect can be rejected if the CI does not contain 0” (p. 199). Thus, the moderated mediation analysis indicated that self-reported gender salience mediated the effect of manipulated gender salience on references to emotion in the intergroup context only. The conclusion that gender salience was the explanatory mechanism for the hypothesized and obtained language use—but the confounded variables were not—received support. This outcome is consistent with self-categorization theory because it suggests that gender salience is the cognitive process that is responsible for references to emotion in intergroup contexts wherein male–female prototypical differences in supportiveness are most

<table>
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<th>Gender Salience</th>
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<td>Marginals</td>
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relevant; in intragroup contexts, however, the supportiveness prototype is less applicable, and so gender salience is unrelated to the use of references to emotion.

**Discussion**

The results produced implications for the effects of gender salience on language, extant language and gender research, and gender-based language in CMC as discussed in this section.

**Gender salience and language**

*Gender prototypes*

Consistent with self-categorization theory, the particular attribute of the prototype of gender salience affected the type of language differences observed. Because of the supportiveness prototype, men and women varied in their use of the language feature relevant to the prototype (i.e., references to emotion) but not in the language feature irrelevant to the prototype (i.e., tentative language), which suggests that gender-based language depends not only on whether gender is salient but how gender is salient. The current experiment extended research by directly examining how gender salience and its prototype (i.e., supportiveness) affect language.

Focusing on the prototype was a step in the right direction, but the experiment did not directly compare multiple attributes. Future research, thus, could orthogonally manipulate two prototypical attributes. When submissiveness is the sole attribute, self-categorization theory predicts that women will use tentative language more than men but similar amounts of references to emotion. When supportiveness is the sole attribute, women will reference emotion more than men but be similarly tentative. Yet, when both supportiveness and submissiveness are attributes, women will be more emotional and tentative than men. These predictions, however, assume that the attributes are consistent with stereotypes, which suggests that if a prototype was counterstereotypical, then language differences also would be counterstereotypical (Palomares et al., 2004) as research suggests (Postmes & Spears, 2002). One, therefore, should not expect stereotypical language differences ipso facto. More accurately, gender-based language is dynamic, and taking into account the level of gender salience and its prototype is paramount.

*Intra- versus intergroup contexts*

The contention that gender-based language is not static, but rather depends on the context, received additional support because whether the context was intra- or intergroup moderated the relationship between gender salience and references to emotion. When gender salience was high, women referenced emotion in the intergroup context more than in the intragroup one because the intergroup setting underscored the supportiveness prototype. In other words, message recipients matter too as accommodation research has suggested (Hajek et al., 2004). Noteworthy is that intergroup (or mixed-sex) interactions, together with gender salience,
impacted language. In fact, the moderated mediation analysis suggests that gender salience impacts gender-based language particularly in intergroup contexts. Moreover, the relevance of the inter/intragroup variable in this experiment coupled with other research emphasizing the role of gender schematicity (Palomares, 2004) and stereotype accessibility (Postmes & Spears, 2002) reinforces the evidence for the claim that gender-based language use is contextually sensitive. Specifically, many contextual factors moderate the extent to which language differences and similarities emerge (Leaper & Ayres, 2007).

Future research might serve well to specify other contextual features that increase, decrease, flip, or erase gender-based language. Examining the sex compositions of conversing groups is one way to achieve this goal. For example, what is the extent and prototype of gender salience in three-person interactions when men or women are the minority and what gender-based language emerges? Also, what is the trajectory of language differences and similarities as relationships progress from strangers to intimates? Research shows that relational closeness moderates the extent of gender differences in more molar forms of communication (Canary & Emmers-Sommer, 1997); perhaps the same holds true in the molecular domain of language.

Men’s use of references to emotion

Important to note is the unexpected outcome for H2b (see the lower portion of Figure 1). The hypothesis predicted no effects within the low gender salience condition, which was confirmed only to an extent. Thus, the unexpected deviation of men’s language in the intergroup context warrants discussion. This effect is particularly worthwhile to consider because men’s references to emotion seemed to vary across the intra/intergroup contexts in the low salience condition but not in the high condition, which indicates that self-categorization theory did not entirely account for the data and, therefore, an additional process might have functioned as well. Ultimately, the question is what accounts for this discrepancy in men’s use of references to emotion? One explanation focuses on a potential difference in men’s need to differentiate from women across the high and low gender salience conditions. Perhaps men’s desire to distinguish themselves from women was greater in the low than in the high gender salience conditions because the high condition already served as a means for differentiation (at least implicitly), whereas the low condition did not. As a result, men’s language did not vary across the intra/intergroup contexts in the high salience condition as much as it did in the low condition.

Communication accommodation processes (Shepard et al., 2001) are applicable for this differentiation explanation because they focus on individuals’ motivation to linguistically express oneself according to group memberships. Thus, for example, maybe men’s desire to distance themselves from women in the intergroup context manifested in language only when the salience manipulation did not already do so. Incorporating aspects of communication accommodation theory into self-categorization theory’s explanation for gender-based language might be fruitful. In fact, both theories are within the social identity purview (cf. Harwood & Giles, 2005),
and so conceptual borrowing would be relatively smooth. Whatever the explanation, self-categorization theory (as currently applied) does not seem to offer the sole mechanism needed to account for men’s use of references to emotion, and future research should address this possibility accordingly.

Implications for extant language and gender research

Post hoc accounts of discrepant findings

Extant research shows that men and women can simultaneously use certain language features differently and other features similarly. For example, in one study of same-sex dyadic e-mails with participant-determined topics, women referenced emotion more than men, but similar levels of questions and oppositions emerged (Thomson & Murachver, 2001). Another study that examined men and women criticizing in a face-to-face organizational setting showed a markedly different pattern: Men used more reference to emotion, oppositions, and questions than women, but they used similar levels of “I” references (Mulac et al., 2000). In a third study of mixed- and same-sex electronic discussion groups trying to reach consensus on the moral values in a “lovers scenario,” women used more “I” references than men, but they used questions similarly (Savicki & Kelley, 2000).

Reasons for myriad discrepancies seem elusive, but the explanatory mechanism in self-categorization theory might shed light on why differences and/or similarities will emerge across a variety of language forms in particular contexts. For example, a post hoc explanation for the inconsistencies across the previous three studies is that they may have inadvertently altered gender salience each with a unique prototype. Evidence that is consistent with this post hoc explanation is not available in the Thomson and Murachver (2001) study because it does not contain details of the e-mail exchanges. Yet, the circumstances for the Mulac et al. (2000) study likely prevented gender from becoming salient because the participants held superordinate positions in organizations. As the authors state, apparently “both women and men understand that their positions of leadership in the organization require that they offset [gender] stereotypical expectations in their criticism of coworkers” (p. 409).

In other words, traditional gender-based language did not materialize because of the organizational roles and context. Furthermore, because the “lovers scenario” that Savicki and Kelley (2000) used “emphasized emotional and relational aspects of the characters and had a ‘soap opera’ quality that might be more appealing to women” (p. 821), gender salience may have been heightened with a prototype that encouraged women to use more “I” references than men. That is, women may have found the “lovers scenario” more personally relevant than men, which was reflected in their language.

Clearly, at least two of the studies contained exceptionally different circumstances for participants, which may have led to disparate levels of gender salience. In fact, theoretical work suggests that certain aspects of an interaction can have significantly different impacts on gender salience and its normative character and prototype
(Palomares et al., 2004). The explanation of the current research for how men and women can use references to emotion differently, but tentative language similarly, suggests why previous results may have been inconsistent (albeit the current experiment is not without unexpected findings).

**Gender similarities hypothesis**
The results also address a recent call to focus on gender similarities just as much as, if not more than, any differences. The gender similarities hypothesis is that men and women are mostly similar and gender differences are relatively small and few (Dindia, 2006). Meta-analyses justify this assertion (Hyde, 2005); yet, research should begin to advance this hypothesis with the goal of formulating a theory to explain it, as advocates of this hypothesis acknowledge (Hyde, 2006b) and others recommend when critiquing it (Archer, 2006). The current theory and research suggest a means to explain the similarities hypothesis in terms of language use. Focusing on gender salience and its associated prototype(s) might explain why language similarities would be more frequent than differences and why differences would be particularly small. For example, a prototype may be unidimensional (e.g., supportiveness only), causing men and women to use language only slightly differently. The current data demonstrated gender similarities and differences. In fact, the similarities arguably outweighed the differences. The effect sizes in the current experiment (all $< .10$) also are consistent with the similarities hypothesis, which predicts small effect sizes for most gender differences.

**Implications for gender-based language in CMC**
The current experiment’s use of e-mail as a form of CMC is limited in two ways. First, the study’s ecological validity is debatable. The paradigm specified the sex of a credible e-mail recipient in a relatively scripted and task-oriented manner to obtain a controlled environment that would allow for the precise manipulation of gender salience with a supportiveness prototype. As a result, the current use of e-mail may have been unusual for an e-mail exchange between friends or acquaintances; yet, it was relatively common in institutional settings (e.g., educational and organizational settings; Murphy & Beggs, 2003; O’Neill & Colley, 2006; Savicki & Kelley, 2000). Moreover, most participants greeted and introduced themselves to the ostensible Initiator, and they also included some “small talk” on topics unrelated to the salience paragraphs before they addressed the Initiator’s question about society’s future. Each e-mail, therefore, was task- and social-oriented to an extent, and this lends well to the study’s ecological validity and makes it a less severe problem.

Second, the experiment was limited in understanding how the features of e-mail play a role in determining gender-based language. The current research manipulated e-mail recipients’ sex via the names John and Jennifer; yet, other characteristics of e-mail might have served the same function. For example, account names or handles can reveal social information like sex (Utz, 2004); thus, feminine or masculine (as opposed to gender-neutral) account names might produce results similar to those currently found. Research also has shown that e-mail readers were able to use topics
and other content to accurately determine e-mail authors’ sex (Thomson & Murachver, 2001), which suggests that the substance of e-mail messages might impact language use in replies. Also, people tend to select avatars (i.e., graphical images to portray the self) for gender-based reasons, and these avatars lead to nonlinguistic outcomes (Spears, Postmes, Lea, & Wolbert, 2002). In a similar vein, avatars might affect gender-based language.

These characteristics of e-mail might not impact language directly, but they could influence whether gender is salient as well as its prototype. For example, addressees’ sex-revealing language or account names could impact gender salience while reading and responding to e-mail. In fact, although demand characteristics were an unlikely threat to validity because the experiment was double blind and suspicious participants were removed from the main analyses, the current gender salience manipulation had the potential to threaten validity in that respect. Future research, thus, should induce gender salience in more subtle ways.

**Conclusion**

Self-categorization theory provides a sophisticated account of how men and women use language. The theory received support for the most part although there were a couple of unexpected findings that deserve attention in future investigations. Nonetheless, this research adds to the literature by focusing on the prototype of gender salience, as well as the intra/intergroup nature of an interaction. This experiment, along with other gender and language research that reaches similar conclusions, provides evidence that makes it problematic to accept a planetary portrayal of gender-based language, and so one should reject the metaphor that men and women are from different planets (cf. Gray, 1992). Instead, a more accurate metaphor should be adopted: Men and women are merely from different blocks in the same neighborhood and they move frequently, which is to say that gender-based language differences tend to be relatively small and contextually responsive. Following potential avenues that stem from this line of inquiry will continue to advance the understanding of when, how, and why men and women communicate similarly and differently.

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Expliquer la parole différenciée selon le sexe : les effets de la saillance de l’identité de genre sur les références à l’émotion et le langage approximatif dans des contextes intragroupes et intergroupes
Nicholas A. Palomares

Résumé
Une expérience a testé des hypothèses dérivées de l’explication que fait la théorie de l’auto-catégorisation de la parole différenciée selon le sexe. Dans des conditions de saillance de genre élevée ou basse, des hommes et des femmes ont envoyé des courriels à un destinataire clairement défini comme homme ou femme, dans des contextes intragroupes ou intergroupes. La saillance de genre fut manipulée de façon à ce que la caractéristique stéréotypée féminine de soutien était le seul attribut définissant le prototype des relations intergenre. Les messages furent examinés quant aux références à l’émotion et à un langage approximatif. Les femmes ont significativement plus que les hommes fait référence à l’émotion dans des conditions de haute saillance de genre, mais cette différence de sexe était réduite lorsque la saillance était faible. De plus, les femmes à haute saillance de genre dans un contexte intergroupe ont fait plus référence à l’émotion que les femmes à haute saillance dans un contexte intragroupe ou que les hommes à haute saillance dans un contexte intragroupe ou intergroupe. Le langage approximatif, cependant, était semblable dans toutes les conditions, tel que prévu.
Erklärungen für geschlechtsbasierten Sprachgebrauch: Die Folgen von Geschlechtsidentitätssalienz auf Referenzen zu Emotionen und zögerlicher Sprache in Intra- und Intergruppenkontext

Explicando el Uso del Lenguaje Basado en el Género: Los Efectos de la Identidad de Género Notable en las Referencias a la Emoción y el Lenguaje Tentativo en los Contextos de Intra e Inter-grupos

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Resumen

Un experimento puso a prueba las hipótesis derivadas de la teoría de la explicación del uso del lenguaje basado en el género de la teoría de categorización de un mismo. Bajo condiciones de alta y baja notabilidad de género, hombres y mujeres enviaron correos electrónicos a receptores hombres ó mujeres aparentes produciendo un marco de intra grupo ó de inter-grupo. La notabilidad de género fue manipulada de manera tal que las características estereotípicas femeninas de apoyo fueran el único atributo que definiera el prototipo de las relaciones entre géneros. Los mensajes fueron examinados por sus referencias a la emoción y al lenguaje tentativo. Las mujeres, en la condición de alta notabilidad de género, hicieron referencia a la emoción más significativamente que los hombres, pero esta diferencia de género fue reducida cuando la notabilidad era menor. Más aún, las mujeres con alto grado de notabilidad de género en el contexto de inter-grupo hicieron referencia a la emoción más que las mujeres con alta notabilidad en contextos de intra-grupo ó que los hombres con gran notabilidad en el contexto de intra e inter-grupos. No obstante, como se anticipara, el uso de lenguaje tentativo fue similar a través de todas las condiciones.
解释基于性别的语言使用:

性别身份显著性对群体内及群体间情绪性及试探性语言运用的影响

Nicholas A. Palomares
加州大学戴维斯分校

通过实验我们检测了一个由自我归类理论发展而来的有关基于性别之语言使用的假设。在高度及低度性别显著性情况下，男性和女性给看似男性或女性接受者发送电子邮件，制造一种群体内或群体间情景。我们控制性别显著性，使女性典型的支持性特征成为界定性别间关系模式的唯一因素。我们检测信息中情绪性及试探性语言的运用。在性别显著性明显情境下，女性比男性更多地使用情绪性的语言。但当性别显著性处于低程度时，上述性别间差异则相对减少。此外，性别显著性程度高的女性，在群体间比之在群体内更多地使用情绪性语言。该倾向与群体间或群体内性别显著性程度高的男性相比也一样成立。但我们所期待的，试探性语言的使用在所有条件下都是相似的。
젠더에 근거한 언어사용의 설명: 집단내 그리고 집단상호간 상황에서 감정과 임시적인 언어에 대한 참조로서 젠더일치 특이성 효과에 관한 연구

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요약

젠더에 근거한 언어사용을 위한 자기범주화 이론의 설명으로부터 이끌어 낸 가정들을 검증하기 위해 한 실험이 단행되었다. 젠더 특이성이 높거나 낮은 정도의 상황에서 남성들과 여성들은 집단내, 또는 집단간 상황을 나타내는 가상적인 남성 또는 여성 수신인에게 이메일을 보내게 하였다. 젠더 특이성이 연출되었는바, 그렇게 함으로써 전형적으로 여성들의 특징으로 여겨지는 지지성이 젠더간 관계의 전형을 정의하는 유일한 속성이 되도록 하였다. 메시지들은 감정과 임시적 언어에 대한 관련성을 위하여 조사되었다. 여성들은 젠더 특이성이 높은 상황에서는 중요한 정도로 남성들보다 더욱 감정적인 것으로 나타났으나, 젠더 특이성이 낮을 경우에는 이러한 젠더 차이가 줄어들었다. 더욱이, 집단상호간 상황에서 높은 젠더 특이성을 지닌 여성들이 집단내 상황에서의 높은 젠더 특이성을 지닌 여성들 또는 집단간이나 집단내 상황에서 높은 젠더 특이성을 지닌 남성들에 비해 훨씬 높은 정도로 감정을 표출하는 것으로 나타났다. 임시적인 언어사용은 그러나 기대된바대로 모든 상황에서 비슷한 것으로 나타났다.