'68 has become a powerful cipher for the political renewal of post-war (West) Germany, but references to women and their impact on social (and political) changes are mostly absent from personal and collective memorials. Using the notion of cultural memory work as social constructivism, the paper explores how the politics of memory, femininity and gender reflecting un-negotiated gender issues, especially the lingering myth of traditional femininity, are pivotal in second-wave feminism's low visibility and esteem in spite of the movement's apparent success in promoting women's legal and social equality. Dating back to the contested relationship between
'68ers and second-wave feminism, anti-feminist discourse in the media employs strategies of displacing the social arguments of equality feminism into the erotic and personal, presenting feminist gender negotiations as ridiculous, irrational, prudish, anti-democratic, and even dangerous. Equality feminism as a social movement promoted and supported mostly by women does not easily fit into the traditional categories of German paternalistic national history and present memory culture in Germany.

Abstract


Enhanced Article Feedback

In the pervasive culture of memory in Germany, the fortieth anniversary of '68 gave rise to a flood of publications that discussed, celebrated and thus memorialised the student movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, heroicised some of its individual participants, and more often than not glorified its achievements. The politics of memory are at work, creating a powerful myth, in this instance the myth of 'a global revolt,' 'a reference point in transnational memory', that foregrounds (West) Germany's 'anti-authoritarian student revolt' and 'radical Left'. In today's Germany, '68 has become a powerful cipher for political renewal in the post-war Federal Republic that extends far beyond the events of the actual year 1968. Strangely absent from these personal and collective memorials, critical evaluations, and historical accounts are women players and references to women and their impact on social (and political) change. Women appear reduced to accidental, albeit compassionate bystanders. An emblematic photograph shows 'German student Benno Ohnesorg, dead in the arms of pedestrian Friederike Hausmann, after being shot by detective Kurras'. It shows woman in the iconographic tradition of the pietà, or mourning mother, in the midst of male-on-male violence, reflecting traditional (1960s) gender norms and creating a (male) martyr for the cause.
Occasionally there is a pallid short take. The official website of the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb), for example, in its section on the history of 1968, includes a headline ‘Ohne Frauen keine Revolution: 68er und neue Frauenbewegung’. The lead picture has the caption: ‘Der BH als Symbol der patriarchalen Unterdrückung.’ What has happened to the German memory of second-wave feminism when, in 2008, this high-profile organ for political education showcases bra-burning as the symbol for a revolt against patriarchy? Does it not trivialise second-wave feminism’s fight for equal rights for women? As the feminist historian Claudia Opitz observed recently, second-wave feminism (as well as the history of the women's movement in the nineteenth century, then called the ‘Frauenfrage’) is widely unknown in today's Germany, and major social changes brought about by the feminist movement since the 1970s are simply taken for granted.

In a recent (2008) interview the successful feminist filmmaker Helke Sander (a co-founder of the ‘Aktionsrat zur Befreiung der Frauen’ in 1968), when asked ‘How do you experience feminism today?’, replied: ‘Not at all.’

This article explores frameworks of historical reference and the politics of memory, femininity and gender. It is my thesis that media distortion, reflecting un-negotiated gender issues, especially the lingering myth of traditional femininity, is pivotal in the lack of memory in present-day Germany of second-wave feminism as a social movement (and in the low visibility and esteem of present-day feminism). First I look at the contested relationship of second-wave feminism with the '68 (student) movement as a social movement in West Germany; then I will venture some (admittedly speculative) thoughts on why it appears that feminism – more precisely second-wave feminism as a social movement in the Federal Republic of Germany from the late 1960s into the 1980s – has been largely forgotten today, and how traditional notions of femininity (and masculininity) influence the politics of memory and gender.

My vantage point here is that of cultural memory work as social constructivism, not that of individual remembering, forgetting or repression. While the currently ubiquitous term ‘cultural memory’ is understood largely as a ‘product of fragmentary personal and collective experiences articulated through technologies and media that shape even as they transmit memory’, Marianne Hirsch and Valerie Smith also point out that ‘cultural memory’ is always about ‘the distribution of power and the contested claims to power’ and that remembering and forgetting is ‘bound up with issues of power and hegemony’. In looking at '68 as a political and social movement, I will ask several questions: What paradigms are at work when remembering and recalling the history of the period? What symbols, icons, images, events of that era are invoked, moulding cultural memory? Do men (mostly) memorialise themselves, as well as other (great) men in a male collective from which women as the ‘feminine other’ are excluded and/or devalued (feminised)? Do women memorialise the personal and are thus subsumed (and forgotten in the personal) while men control and memorialise the global/political and with it themselves as well as other men? 'Most debates on public commemoration focus on the political space of the nation, and as a rule, they neglect the gender of the actors', Sylvia Paletschek and Sylvia Schraut have shown in their perceptive study of gender and memory culture in nineteenth-century Europe.

In addressing the politics of memory surrounding '68 (not the memoirs or the memorialisation of selected individuals), I am looking at the ways in which the print media have shaped the collective memory of a social movement and how media remembrances can differ markedly from actual events as they were recorded. Media politics influence and shape memory by articulation and negotiation.
across and within the public sphere; so do political and cultural forces, official government policies and regulations, as well as popular beliefs and social norms. Foregrounding the politics of memory steers away from the personalisation of memory so prevalent in memory studies today, and focuses on questions of power and structural inequalities, without reaffirming binary divisions between the public and the personal. In her prolific work on memory, Susannah Radstone points out that ‘personalisation of memory studies hinders a focus on questions of power and structural inequalities’ and calls for ‘an attention to processes of the recognition of memory and the relations between recognising authorities – processes that are at once cognitive, affective and political’.13

First, some salient points regarding ’68 that recent historiography of the movement more or less agrees on.14 The amorphous term ‘68 (‘die 68er-Bewegung’) has become the German cipher for the student movement or revolt:15 a political movement of protest and activism for civil rights in the US and in many Western countries, a youth movement (with slogans in Germany such as ‘trau keinem über 30’), a movement of the post-World War II generation that had come of age – in West Germany – in the years of the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’. These ‘angry young men’ were mostly middle-class students in (or around) the institutions of higher education. They demanded university reform (‘Unter den Talaren Muff von 1000 Jahren’), a voice in politics, more democracy, and a reckoning with Germany’s and their own fathers’ Nazi past, while also demonstrating against the war in Vietnam, against nuclear power, and in support of developing and postcolonial (‘Trikont’) nations. The movement soon became heterogeneous, factionalised and radicalised in the APO (Außerparlamentarische Opposition), ushering in the violent protests and terrorism of the 1970s.

This generational, political youth movement had not only a strong anti-fascist, anti-clerical, pro-Marxist, anti-capitalist and anti-bourgeois political thrust (in its ‘enteignet Springer!’ campaign against the Axel Springer publishing house, for example), but also a decidedly masculinist aspect. The latter is clearly conveyed in the ‘Sponti-Spruch’ or political activists’ slogan: ‘Wer zweimal mit derselben pennt, gehört schon zum Establishment.’ Women, largely viewed by their revolutionary male contemporaries in the conventional way as sexual objects and useful helpmates, started reasserting themselves in a famous incident of emblematic protest. At a meeting of the Socialist German Student Union (SDS or Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund)16 in September 1968, women of the newly established ‘Aktionsrat zur Befreiung der Frauen’ bombarded the ‘theorising’ men on the podium with tomatoes – nicely red, fleshy and harmless compared to the much more violent, though more effective, throwing of stones, rocks, and bricks – protesting against the traditional, ‘patriarchal’ discrimination of women. Yet the (all-male) SDS functionaries, who wanted to return to business as usual, simply ignored the women.17 And while the ‘angry young men’ debunked their biological fathers as Nazis and brushed away their intellectual fathers who early on had been influential critical thinkers, notably Marcuse and Adorno, powerful clashes resulted. During the boycott of Adorno’s Frankfurt ‘Institut für Sozialforschung’ in April 1969 and at the beginning of his spring lectures on social theory and practice, three female students suddenly leapt to the podium, displayed their bare breasts before Adorno and his audience and showered him with flower petals. Two male students from the SDS – clad in black leather jackets – preceded the women’s demonstration, demanding in Stalinist style that Adorno perform an act of self-criticism for calling in the police against student demonstrators. Visibly irritated by the crude, insulting demonstrations against him and deeply disturbed by the accusation of being a reactionary, Adorno left the lecture hall.18 The women’s provocation was meant to call attention to the situation of women who were left out of and ignored in political and theoretical debates as representing
'nature' versus abstract theory, and it highlighted the conflicts between the 'theory-fathers' and their 'praxis-daughters'. The press and most of the public considered the 'Tomatenwurf' and the 'Busenattentat' iconic events of provocation, shameless, immoral, and reprehensible, as they flew in the face of 'feminine' decency.

The German student movement and its leaders condescendingly declared women the (Marxist) 'Nebenwiderspruch', secondary to the political revolutionary agenda of class struggle, and largely ignored the women's protests and their demand for recognition, participation, and equality. At the same time and for several decades to come, the politically vocal women were debunked in the print media as 'Emanzen' (notably in Der Spiegel) – a wordplay on 'Wanzen' (bedbugs). I would argue that this denigration and the lack of communication and mutual negotiations were the catalyst for what later became the politics of neglected memory. And I would further argue that the lingering and at the same time unaddressed conflicts over power, privileges, social roles and traditional expectations of femininity (and masculinity) lie at the heart of second-wave feminism's memory troubles.

In view of this apparent amnesia in the general public's cultural memory, we need to recognise and remember some very tangible legal changes and noticeable social shifts that have resulted from, or were promoted by, second-wave equality feminism in Germany of the late 1960s and 1970s. The women's push for equal rights has brought about major changes in the areas of education, employment, sexuality, legal status, economic matters, and family affairs. Compared to the 1960s, women in the 2000s have gained – at least the possibility of – unrestricted access to (higher) education, to all professions and jobs including the military, more control over their own bodies and procreative functions, control of their own finances, protection against sexual and physical abuse by men, better financial support during the childbearing phase and for child-rearing for working parents, equal rights in divorce, guardianship, and a right to equal pay and pensions. While fractured into numerous 'feminisms' and conflicting political and individual agendas, second-wave feminism as a social movement, as 'equality feminism', was instrumental in this social shift vis-à-vis the post-World War II era. German feminism was, of course, influenced by the Civil Rights Movement and Anglo-American feminism. Here we should also note that in 1949 a paragraph on 'Gleichberechtigung' was inserted into the Federal Republic's Basic Law, mostly due to the efforts of the socialist Elisabeth Selbert and that of newly reconstituted women's organisations (survivors from 1920s feminism). A modification of a similar provision from the constitution of the Weimar Republic, it provided an initial framework for women's legal equality – though mostly disregarded, ineffective and toothless during the Adenauer era. In the late 1960s and 1970s second-wave equality feminism was an important, innovative phase in feminism as an ongoing social movement for women's equality with roots in the nineteenth century, a social movement that is still evolving, being transformed, and is thus still alive. Equality feminism has influenced Germany's 'Frauenpolitik', which Ursula von der Leyen successfully managed during the past decade and integrated into the Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend. While women's equality has by no means been fully realised, and while the legal and social changes are neither ideal for everyone nor unproblematic, they do represent a sea change for most women in Germany today. These changes are most dramatic for post-'68 generations, and most effective for the young, educated, middle-class German woman who takes these now obvious personal benefits mostly for granted.

Has second-wave feminism's success erased the memory of its hard work and achievements, has its
success made it obsolete? Feminism certainly has become unfashionable and is deemed outmoded in our novelty-hungry, media-controlled culture with deep-seated traditional gender role expectations. In spite of the academy’s fancy for ‘gender trouble’ and faible for multiple sexualities, in Germany’s paternalistic culture women are still squarely placed with the family and concerns for procreation, to say nothing about migrant, older, less educated, socially disadvantaged, single or transsexual women. Thus the sociologist Barbara Holland-Cunz cautions:

What happened to second-wave feminism? What might be the reasons behind a widespread amnesia of its past vis-à-vis the distinctively robust memory that ‘68 as ‘the student movement’ enjoys? Unlike the ‘68 student movement, second-wave feminism was not a one-generational movement with pivotal, identifiable and memorable political events like large-scale demonstrations, sit-ins, or teach-ins directed against the state and the existing political order. It did not have organised political associations comparable with the SDS or the APO. Nor did it have canonical, critical master-thinkers like Hegel, Marx, Marcuse or Bloch. By contrast, second-wave feminism had only a few, controversial and later relatively overlooked intellectual ‘mothers’ like the suffragettes, Simone de Beauvoir, Betty Friedan and an array of academic feminist writers. Nevertheless, second-wave feminism in the FRG touched (indeed, aroused if not angered) a wide age and class spectrum of women in the 1970s; it spawned a heterogeneous range of activities from consciousness-raising groups to extra-mural university courses, workshops, women’s bookstores and feminist publishers, among others, but it could not (or did not want to) establish party-like, permanent political organisations. To be sure, these (at times exclusively female) women’s groups and activities were in their own way effective and educational for the individual participants in their attention to practical, everyday-life experience and problems faced by women. However, they were considered to be merely ‘private’ and ‘personal’ as they differed from established political practices. They were deemed insignificant in the public arena, and often ridiculed or attacked in the media. In spite of the women’s insistence that the personal is political (‘das Private ist politisch’), without historical and intellectual genealogy or grand theory the ‘personal’ is not the stuff to enter the nation’s cultural memory.

Second-wave feminism did not have prominent martyr figures like Benno Ohnesorg and Rudi Dutschke, nor were there political leaders like Joschka Fischer (later instrumental in founding the Green Party and Foreign Minister under Chancellor Schröder) or Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Member of the European Parliament). There were many articulate feminists, mostly artists and academics, but no equally prominent ‘heroines’. Only Ulrike Meinhof and a handful of other ‘anti-heroines’ from the terrorist groups ‘have remained part of West German cultural memory […] as politically violent women’, as Clare Bielby reminds us. Violence flies in the face of any human decency, and goes counter to
notions of femininity. The press sensationalised the terrorist woman and used this to stoke anti-feminist sentiments.27 Fear of women terrorists, as played out in the press, in fact masks fear of feminism. In her study of Ulrike Meinhof, Sarah Colvin has recently shown how the public viewed both terrorism and feminism as ‘something irrational’, even though feminists distanced themselves from women terrorists and the RAF.28 When women terrorists entered Germany's cultural memory, they did so as ‘phallic women’, or worse as demonised feminists.

The mainstream German press and TV played a key role in propelling feminist debates forward and at the same time disseminating anti-feminist messages. The journalist, prolific author and prominent spokesperson for feminism Alice Schwarzer became a contested figure often satirically portrayed in the press. A 1977 television interview pitched Schwarzer against Esther Vilar, author of the anti-feminist bestseller of Der dressierte Mann (1971). Vilar had argued that it was not women who were the victims of male violence but rather men were suppressed by women’s wiles and sexual powers. The (mostly) hostile public clearly enjoyed the ‘hen-fight’. Afterwards, while feminists and most women viewers sided with Schwarzer, the male-dominated press declared Vilar the winner of the debate. It did, however, propel Schwarzer into the limelight as spokesperson for feminism in the FRG, and Schwarzer has been to this day the voice of equality for women and fairness in gender relations. Actually, the 'hen-fight' was restaged with Schwarzer and a prominent TV personality, Verona Feldbusch, in 2001: ‘Frau gegen Frau’, the intellectual feminist against the sexy talk-show hostess. The duel showed, according to Die Zeit,29 that feminism was no longer not even ‘talkshowfähig’, and Spiegel headlined: ‘Punktsieg für Pumps’. Feldbusch's performance with suggestive body language, low-cut neckline, and flippant irony carried the day. But such events rate at best as funny anecdotes, not as serious contributions to the memory book of history. They feed a condescending, patronising tone in media reports on feminism, thus helping to relegate feminism to the ephemeral, an oddity that is better forgotten. As the TV journalist Klaudia Brunst, a former editor of taz from 1996–9, summed it up in 2005:

Der Vergleich zeigt, wie der Feminismus im Fernsehen siegte und verlor. […] Feldbusch ist ein Kind der Postmoderne […]. Das Geheimnis ihres Erfolgs besteht gerade darin, in ihrer öffentlichen Rolle rein gar nichts ernst zu nehmen […] Für Alice Schwarzer wiederum ist der Feminismus aber nicht ironiefähig. Ihr gesamtes Lebenswerk steht dagegen.30

Klaudia Brunst (born in 1961), like the TV personality Feldbusch (born in 1968),31 represents women in the German pop culture generation whose successful career was greatly enabled by the social reforms Schwarzer and equality feminists fought for. Brunst critically shows how media reporting twisted Schwarzer's words, pitching an aging, jealous Schwarzer against the young, successful businesswoman Feldbusch as ‘brain meets body’, denigrating both women. Such politics of marginalisation through condescending and sexist coverage in the German media reinforces the notion of male dominance over ‘the second sex’ while at the same time creating and re-establishing pervasive anti-feminist discourse and backlash.32

Anti-feminist discourse in major German press organs like Die Zeit, Frankfurter Allgemeine or Der Spiegel employs strategies of displacing the social arguments of equality feminism into the sphere of
the erotic, intimately private, ephemeral, or personal and thus insignificant. It downplays gender hierarchy and accuses feminist positions of sexism, undue domination, and censorship. Feminist gender negotiations are thus presented as ridiculous, trite, irrational, hysterical, prudish, anti-democratic, and dangerous. Issues like sexual violence against women in pornography are presented as special forms of erotic games, and feminist discussions of such games are labelled prudish attempts to curb freedom of speech and censorship of sexual enjoyment, as the response to Schwarzer's campaign against pornography has shown. Schwarzer began in 1987 with her ‘PorNO’ campaign in her outspokenly feminist journal *Emma* and has continued it to this day in her reasoned arguments against Germany's legislative reform in 2002, which legalised prostitution in a way that has enabled sex tourism and arguably exacerbated human trafficking, sexual violence, and pimping.

Who of the younger generation would want to be associated with such uncool prudishness and/or censorship? Journalist Kay Sokolowsky (born in 1963) put down Schwarzer with *Who the fuck is Alice? Was man wissen muss, um Alice Schwarzer vergessen zu können* (2002), and the bestseller author Katja Kullmann (born in 1971) wrote in *Generation Ally. Warum es heute so kompliziert ist eine Frau zu sein* (2002): 'Wenn wir Worte wie Emanzipation, Geschlechterkampf und Feminismus laut aussprechen, dann kommen wir uns vor, als ob wir einen dicken Döner mit ordentlich Tsatsiki gegessen hätten. Es müßelt übel, abgestanden, unappetitlich, peinlich.'

While academic gender theorists in the 1990s in Germany buried the concept of equality feminism in favour of gender performance and ‘trouble’, the younger generation of the ‘Pop- und Lachkultur’ enjoyed their freedom, youth, and affluence, before life’s responsibilities and complications set in. When it comes to the '68 student movement and second-wave feminism's contribution, women today seem to refuse to do much remembering of their own history, while men are the ones who do most of the remembering and who are being remembered.

Making women visible in history was a relatively successful project of 1970s feminist historians, but making women visible in Germany's memory culture seems to be fraught with problems, although it is generally understood that ‘memory and musealization together are called upon to provide a bulwark against obsolescence and disappearance.’ Social movements defy easy memorisation, while male-centred political actions and movements easily occupy the terrain available for memory. Equality feminism as a social movement promoted and supported mostly by women does not readily fit into the traditional categories of German national history and present memorial culture in Germany. The traditional, phallic metaphor for memory in paternalistic German historiography ‘the pen and the sword’ – the great male-authored text commemorating male ‘deeds with the sword’, or violence, aggression and war – can still offer a place for the memorisation of the student movement of '68, but it cannot as easily accommodate a social equality movement authored by women and one seemingly going against the grain of traditional notions of femininity in a patriarchal society.

Yet the new transparency and accessibility of electronic media as well as shifts in gender negotiations and in the perception of women may be changing the collective memory of second-wave feminism into remembering it as part of a larger social movement. The fiftieth anniversary of '68 is just around the corner in 2018, but will it bring another round of memorials without women? The strong presence of women among Germany's political leaders today (Angela Merkel, Ursula von der Leyen, Andrea Nahles, Claudia Roth, Sahra Wagenknecht, among others) may have been variously greeted in the press with such sexist stereotypes as ‘Mutti-Politik’ (Merkel), ‘Flintenweib’ and ‘Mutter der Kompanie’ (von der Leyen), ‘Königsmörderin’ (Nahles), and ‘Geisha’ (Wagenknecht), but these women are a living
I would like to thank the participants at the conference, ‘The Feminine in German Culture’, especially Clare Bielby, Sarah Colvin, Ute Frevert, and Charlotte Woodford, for questions and suggestions that helped greatly in the revision of this paper.


I use ‘second-wave feminism’ as the term current among social historians today for feminist social and political activism from the 1960s to the 1980s.


The interview was published in English on the Goethe Institut cultural website; it has since been removed from the net: http://www.goethe.de/ges/pok/dos/dos/wdp/fem/en3011387.htm (accessed 14 April 2010).
Jenny Onyx and Jennie Small, ‘Memory – Work: The Method’, *Qualitative Inquiry*, 7/6 (2007), 1–19 (2). It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to engage with the ‘feminist research method’ propagated here.


The SDS had been expelled from the SPD in 1961.


Stefan Müller-Dohm, Adorno. Eine Biografie, Walden, MA 2005, describes the incident as an ‘erotic pantomime’ and an ‘almost physical attack’, p. 475. Adorno died a few months later of a heart attack.


One of the women protagonists looked back ashamed and ruefully some thirty years later in a *Tagesspiegel* interview: it was not a political act but suggested by her boyfriend as a satirical allusion to Adorno’s love life: see Tanja Stelzer, ‘Die Zumutung des Fleisches’, Der Tagesspiegel, 7 December 2003: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/zeitung/die-zumutung-des-

The legal equality provision in the constitution of the FRG was amended in 1994 by declaring ‘Gleichstellung’, the actual implementation of legal equality, a goal of the state; ‘Gleichstellung’, a somewhat fuzzy term similar to the American ‘affirmative action’, led to the policy of ‘gender mainstreaming’.

Elisabeth Selbert (1896–1986), a lawyer and politician in the Weimar Republic, was elected to the Constitutional Committee in 1948 and fought for equal rights for women and for their active participation in politics.

Established in 1953 as Bundesministerium für Familienfragen, it was reconfigured repeatedly; headed by Angela Merkel, Chancellor Kohl's ‘Mädchen’, from 1991 to 1994, it then received its present configuration. After the elections of fall 2013, it is now headed by Manuela Schwesig while Ursula von der Leyen has moved on to the position of Secretary of Defence.


Colvin, *Ulrike Meinhof*, p. 194.


Brunst in *Zeit Online* (see previous note).

Feldbusch, a former Miss Germany, TV personality and model, now goes under the name of her second husband Pooth.

See Simon Möller, *Sexual Correctness. Die Modernisierung antifeministischer Debatten in den Medien*, Opladen 1999. Judy Faludi demonstrated this also for the American and Western press in *Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women*, New York 1992; see also...


