Making the Case for Systematic, Gender-Based Analysis in Sustainable Peace Building

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In this article, we address protracted, often recurring violent conflict, arguing that the failure to solve entrenched conflicts and build sustainable peace is due in part to the absence of women from peace-building processes. To change this negative status quo, we put forward three essential instruments: gender mainstreaming to make gender relations the foundation of any analysis and decision making, the three-pillar framework of conflict mapping, and the New European Peace and Security System model of conflict intervention. When these tools are employed together, they can establish conceptual and operational coherence and positive systemic change by empowering women to work with men as equal partners to build and maintain sustainable peace in fragile, postconflict environments.

According to the Failed States Index 2014, which ranked 178 countries on twelve indicators of state stress, sixty countries worldwide—nearly a third of the members of the United Nations—qualify as “failed states” (Fund for Peace 2014). Variously labeled as “fragile,” “weak,” “failing,” and other expressions of state “distress,” failed states tend to encompass the “bottom billion” of impoverished peoples worldwide who live on less than one dollar a day (Collier 2007). Over half of the failed states are in Africa, where 72 percent of countries with either high or the highest risk of instability are also located (Backer, Wilkenfeld, and Huth 2014, Ch. 2).

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Many of the intrastate “new” wars (Kaldor 2012) that play out in failed states recur for at least three reasons: (1) the failure of the international community to deal with the deep-rooted, underlying causes and conditions of the original conflicts (Autesserre 2010, 2014; Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2010, 3–4; Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2012); (2) the absence of the private sector in efforts undertaken by the international community to address conflict origins such as poverty and unemployment (Sandole and Staroste 2014; United Nations Women 2015b; Wenger and Möckli 2003); and (3) the absence of women and gender from the conflict analysis and design and implementation of peace-building interventions into those conflicts (United Nations Women 2012).

The protracted conflicts in failed states are not only incubators of local, regional, and global terrorism, but are also embedded in a complex matrix of global stresses that themselves pose many challenges. Comprising the *global problematique*, these are interconnected, interdependent issues that nations and international governmental organizations can adequately address only in collaboration with others (e.g., climate change, environmental degradation, pandemics, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). These transnational issues simultaneously drive and are exacerbated by violent conflict systems (Sandole 2010).

What, if anything, can be done about this complex state of affairs? In this article, we focus on one of the three sets of factors that account for the persistence of deadly conflicts. We argue that the absence of women—more than half of the affected population—from peace-building processes explains in part why sustainable peace has remained beyond reach, and we introduce the three sets of tools that facilitate the inclusion of gender and women—their experiences, knowledge, and skills—in conflict analysis and peace-building design and implementation. This effort is a recognition of women’s social and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986), which can be leveraged by policymakers and others interested in solving complex conflicts and brokering sustainable peace.

### The Concepts of Women and Gender

Before proceeding, we clarify how we understand and use the concepts of women and gender. Although these terms are related, neither is synonymous with the other, as both women and men have a gender. The category “women” is in itself complex.¹ When we refer to “women,” we mean individuals who are female. However, knowing that an individual is female
does not give us much information “about [her] gender beyond a basic grammatical assignment or identification of [her] accepted sex” (Bradley 2013, 5). The concept “gender,” a contested concept that has a broad usage and is continuously developing, makes visible the socially constructed notions of womanhood/femininity and manhood/masculinity, which are not fixed and vary across time, place, and culture. Other social categories, such as age, class, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, race, and religion, shape the construction of gender as well. As a construct, gender is also used politically; that is, it refers to power relations between women and men (Bradley 2013, 4). The result is unequal gender relationships: the cultural attributes and behaviors associated with masculinity are valued, while the cultural attributes and behaviors associated with femininity are not; worse, they are devalued (Johnson 2006, Ch. 7). Gender must be understood as lived experience as well, that is, “gender is at the same time both a material and a cultural phenomenon. It refers both to the lived experiences of men and women in relation to each other and to the ideas we develop to make sense of these relations to frame them. Material experiences inform cultural meanings which in turn influence the way lived relations change and develop” (Bradley 2013, 5).

Thus, for women to be equal partners with men, not only must individual men and women become aware of how womanhood/femininity and manhood/masculinity are constructed in their society and how their gender categories intersect with other, multiple categories, in turn shaping their gender roles and expectations, they must also be willing to transform the existing gender relationships at all levels of society. In practice, this means that the transformed gender relationship must be reflected not only in individual perspectives and lives but also in institutions where policies are formulated—for example, in local and national governance structures and in other legal, political, economic, and cultural systems.

Women and Gender in Violent Conflict

We concur with what Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen (2001) and Sjoberg (2014) have documented extensively in their work: women who are caught up in war and other forms of violent conflict do not constitute a homogeneous group. Their connections to and experiences of conflict vary widely; consequently, their positions and needs in the aftermath of conflict also vary widely. This is explained in part by the different geographical, historical, cultural, political, economic, religious, and other contexts and
related gender ideologies that construct femininity and masculinity and corresponding gender roles and expectations and in part by warfare itself, which forces women to develop survival strategies during and after war (Jacobson 2012; Onyejekwe 2005, 278–280; Tickner 2001).

Dyan Mazurana (Onyejekwe 2005, 279), for example, found that during the past ten years, women and girls have fought in a minimum of fifty-four countries, most of them in the developing world, including Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. Some women smuggle contraband arms and precious stones and sell illegal drugs (Bop 2001, 25), while others join militant groups such as the Maoists in Nepal and become combatants and spies (Manchanda 2001, 118). In Eritrea’s war of independence, women made up more than 30 percent of combatants, serving in multiple roles (Hale 2001, 124). Currently, women are fighting on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) against the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), in part, to demonstrate to surviving ISIS fighters that their comrades were killed by women (Tavakolian 2015, 40).

For other women, war and other forms of violent conflict heighten their vulnerability. They experience increased sexual violence and loss of their homes, family members, communities, and all too often their own lives. They are cut off from access to justice, economic possibilities, and essential services such as education and health care, and they face an increased rate of maternal mortality, 2.5 percent higher on average in conflict and post-conflict countries (De Largy 2012; United Nations Women 2012). Many become refugees or displaced persons. As we write this, a greater number of people than at any other time since such data began to be recorded have fled their homes seeking refuge and safety elsewhere. By the end of 2014, the number of people forcibly displaced had increased to 59.5 million in contrast to 51.2 million a year earlier and 37.5 million the decade before (Forbes Martin 2004; Giles 2012; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2015). In refugee camps, women face further problems such as the absence of protection from sexual and other forms of violence, exclusion from the planning and designing of programs and food distribution, denial of identity cards, and demands for sex from humanitarian workers (Onyejekwe 2005, 277).

Although women’s experiences differ at some levels during war and other forms of violent conflict, at other levels they are similar precisely because they are women. One stark similarity across different conflict situations is the exclusion of women from participation in various aspects of building
peace and security (United Nations Women 2012, 2013). Egypt is a recent case in point where women played pivotal roles during the Arab Spring, but in the aftermath of the upheaval, their demands have been ignored and they have been excluded from key decision-making roles (Fadel and Hassier 2012, A7). Similarly, in Rwanda, women’s demands to legalize abortion due to rape-induced pregnancies were disregarded. The Catholic Church, the predominant religious institution in Rwanda, reasserted its power by ensuring that abortion remains illegal. In Algeria, Islamic religious leaders influenced the government to adopt laws based on sharia in order to control women’s lives—the very women who had supported and fought alongside men in the war for independence (Meintjes et al. 2001, 15).

Women and Gender in the Aftermath of Conflict and War

Despite formidable obstacles, women have participated in rebuilding their respective societies, assuming leadership roles in the process. The importance of their participation in conflict analysis and peace-building design and implementation is increasingly acknowledged with growing evidence that women can have positive impact on outcomes. For example, they make a measurable difference in the quality of peace negotiations. When women are at the peace table, they talk about more than politics and power. Women raise key economic and social issues including education, health and justice. When women are present, peace agreements are 64% less likely to fail. Just last spring, women played a leading role in a peace agreement in the Philippines that ended a 45-year civil war. (Gbowee 2015, para. 10)

In practice, however, women are seldom, if ever, invited to the negotiation table as equal partners (Barr 2015; Snyder 2009, Ch. 3). From 1992 to 2011, less than 4 percent of those who signed peace agreements and fewer than 10 percent of the negotiators producing agreements were women, and only 92 of 585 peace agreements from 1990 to 2010 included any reference to women at all (United Nations Women 2015a). The historical record demonstrates that the spaces women have created during war and their resourceful ways to keep families and communities intact are not preserved in the postconflict period. Their efforts and skills remain unacknowledged and are often devalued by others, sometimes by women themselves, who view their assets and accomplishments as marginal and incidental to the
actual conflict (Meintjes et al. 2001, 8–9). “Back to normal” all too often means that old structures and hierarchies are reestablished, a very real challenge currently faced by women in Afghanistan where, in anticipated peace talks with the Afghan Taliban, President Ashraf Ghani has indicated that women will not have any role in the talks (Barr 2015).

Women’s exclusion from policy-relevant decision making has incalculable consequences, not just for women but for men, their families, communities, and nations as well. Their exclusion from decision-making processes leading to war and from the negotiations ending hostilities and reaching sustainable peace has resulted in women shouldering disproportionally the long-term high costs of violent conflict:

70 percent of the casualties are non-combatants, mostly women and children. Rape, abduction, humiliation, forced pregnancy, sexual abuse, and forced slavery are among the ways that women’s bodies have become part of the battleground. Sexual violence has been used as a strategy of war in conflicts ranging from the partition of India to . . . wars in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone [and, as of this writing, in the wider Middle East and Ukraine]. (United Nations 2011b)

The perilous situation of women does not end with the signing of a peace treaty. The postconflict period may pose a greater threat than the war itself, as women may be at risk of being trafficked and forced into prostitution or face increases in domestic violence as men reassert control, engage in honor killings, and commit gang rape (Leatherman 2011; Leatherman and Griffin 2009, 362–363; Pillay 2001).

During the postconflict period, typically characterized by scarce resources, women disproportionately assume the daily tasks of putting their households back in order—taking care of the needs of their children, the elderly, and their communities. The very men who plan for war usually plan for peace and therefore are in charge of allocating available resources. Among the consequences of such arrangements, a mere 1 percent of spending on security sector reform is provided for initiatives that view gender equality as a significant objective. Also, “in a sample of six post-conflict countries, less than eight per cent of spending was specifically budgeted to empower women or promote gender equality” (United Nations Women 2015a). In addition, a US$77 billion budget for eight postconflict needs allocated less than 8 percent of the total to address the needs of women (Enloe 2007, 157; United Nations 2011a). The quality of women’s lives in

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postconflict settings reflects their absence from decision-making processes that affect them, as expressed in the all-too-familiar metrics:

Women are more likely than men to be poor and at risk of hunger because of the systematic discrimination they face in education, health care, employment and control of assets. Poverty implications are widespread for women, leaving many without even basic rights such as access to clean drinking water, sanitation, medical care and decent employment . . . [and] little protection from violence and . . . no role in decision making. (United Nations 2011b)

A former UN undersecretary general for disarmament affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala (2002, 3), tried to direct attention to this state of affairs when he said that peace “and gender equality are global public goods whose benefits are shared by all and monopolized by no one. . . . When women move forward . . . the world moves forward. Unfortunately, the same applies in reverse: setbacks . . . impose costs for all.”

Women’s Leadership in Peace Building

We must bring women who have their fingers on the pulse of their communities to join the war makers around the decision-making table.

Swanee Hunt (2004, 1)

Women and men experience and participate in war and peace differently due to prevailing gender ideologies and corresponding gender roles, expectations, skills, and opportunities that are shaped by cultural, social, economic, political, and other contexts in which women and men live (Bradley 2013; Myrtytinen, Najoks, and El-Bushra 2015). The resulting gender or power relationships almost always favor men and masculinity and underpin the war system (Cockburn 2001; Cohn 2003; Goldstein 2001; Moser and Clark 2001) and subsequent peace-building processes, which are failing at a frustrating rate (Autesserre 2010, 2014; Sandole 2010).

Gendered relationships manifest themselves during the mobilization for war when the political economy of society makes different demands on women and men (Raven-Roberts 2012). Men (and some women) become soldiers, and women (and some men) work to support the war effort at
home on farms and in factories and service sectors (Geiger and Field 2015; Meintjes 2001, 6). Yet war also undermines traditional gender roles when women take on responsibilities formerly assigned to men. In some cases, this opens up opportunities for women such as access to public spaces, economic independence, and leadership opportunities. These experiences have consequences for gender relations once hostilities cease, leading to the recognition that certain challenges must be addressed in the postconflict period. There is also a recognition that a deeper understanding is necessary to assess how gender relations and identities contribute to and shape the potential for sustainable peace (Myrttinen et al. 2015). In practice, this has meant that for peace building to succeed, the interests, experiences, skills, and leadership of women must be an integral part of the design and implementation of peace building. Otherwise, key resources will be ignored and squandered at everyone’s peril.

This awareness has resulted in women’s increasing participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Currently, women constitute 3 percent of military and 10 percent of police personnel (United Nations 2015). Notably, evidence is increasing of women’s far-reaching, albeit often unacknowledged, contributions to rebuilding their communities and societies and preventing conflict recurrence (Anderson 2008, 258–64). Women are active in rebuilding their war-torn societies in many ways: they vote, organize, network across national frontiers, donate, investigate, publish, win elections, and write laws (Dhanapala 2002). Swanee Hunt, former US ambassador to Austria, has compiled the experiences of and actions taken by women during and after the genocidal war in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1990s (Hunt 2004, 2011). The Institute for Inclusive Security, which Hunt chairs, works with women leaders from around the world to collect data on the impact women have had on peace-building outcomes. These data demonstrate that women play at least six vital yet largely unrecognized and unacknowledged roles:

1. Women are skillful at building bridges across supposedly insurmountable divides (ethnic, political, religious, and cultural) to build peace. For example, “In Liberia, Leymah Gbowee and others organized Christian and Muslim women who, together, pressured warring parties into the 2002 negotiations that ultimately ended years of horrific war. Recognizing that achievement, the Nobel Committee awarded Ms. Gbowee the 2011 Peace Prize for her ‘nonviolent struggle for . . . women’s rights to full participation in peace-building work’” (Institute for Inclusive Security 2015, para. 2). Similarly, in the aftermath of ethnic killings in some parts of Burundi, Tutsi women crossed ethnic
and religious divides to help Hutu women. Together, they initiated agricultural projects, sent their children back to the same schools, and rebuilt their houses, strengthening solidarity among the Hutu and Tutsi women and their communities (Sideris 2001, 54).

2. Because women are traditionally deeply rooted in their communities, they have a unique awareness of communal needs for security, education, economic production, and political engagement. In Colombia, women negotiated their security in conflict areas; in Nagaland, India, they mediated between fighting parties; and in Uganda, they helped child soldiers reintegrate into society (Onyejekwe 2005, 279). In Darfur (Sudan), women insisted on and succeeded in the inclusion of “previously neglected provisions addressing safety for internally displaced persons and refugees, food security, and gender-based violence . . . in the negotiations leading to the May 2006 Darfur (Sudan) Peace Agreement” (Institute for Inclusive Security 2015, para. 4).

3. In conflict-afflicted areas, it is often the case that women have access that men do not have. This is due in part to women’s status in their societies. Because women are perceived as politically powerless, they are not considered a threat. As a result, women are often thrust into the role of mediator between warring factions, becoming pivotal in initiating talks and/or ensuring that communication channels remain open (Institute for Inclusive Security 2015).

4. Women have unrealized power within their families and communities. Because their social positioning is different from men’s, they bring another perspective to threats to security at the personal, family, and community levels. They often know if, or when, small arms and light weapons have entered and transited through their communities. They recognize when the local language changes in favor of extremism. They are therefore an important early warning and intelligence system with regard to the initial onset or recurrence of conflict (United Nations Women 2012). Because women have “their ears to the ground,” they are able to restrain political and religious extremism. They are among the first to notice when family members “exhibit telltale signs of violent ideologies” (Institute for Inclusive Security 2015, para. 9), allowing them to organize for appropriate action. In Pakistan, for example, members of a women’s coalition moderated extremism by traveling regularly to remote areas of the country to persuade young men not to become suicide bombers (Hunt 2012).
Women increase the operational effectiveness of police and military forces, because when they are members of the security forces, they are often more effective than men in certain precarious situations (Institute for Inclusive Security 2015). For example, female officers tend to be more inclined than men to lessen tensions in a given situation and less inclined to employ excessive force. Also, they can approach and perform tasks that their male colleagues cannot because of cultural customs and norms. For example, female officers can conduct physical searches of women. Because female security personnel have access to all members of the community, they are better able to piece together a comprehensive picture of the needs and problems that exist in a community, such as gang recruitment and violence, human trafficking, organized crime intimidation and extortion, and drug use in schools. Having more female police officers on the force has led to an improvement in responses to domestic and sexual violence, which are among the most common crimes in postconflict situations (Institute for Inclusive Security 2015; United Nations Women 2012).

An important consequence of women assuming leadership positions is that they inspire a culture of inclusion for the next generation. In effect, they become role models, as research demonstrates that not only do more women aspire to leadership roles in their communities, but girls can imagine a different future for themselves. Also, more parents are supportive of their daughters’ aspirations in this regard (Institute for Inclusive Security 2015).

Gender, Women, and Gender-Responsive Approaches

What tools can be employed so that women are included as equal partners in peace-building processes and share equal access to resources? What can be done so that a gender-responsive approach to building sustainable peace is safeguarded by all? Methods in use for analyzing complex conflicts and designing strategies for building sustainable peace have been wanting as effective gender-responsive approaches. More effective tools are, however, available: the three-pillar framework (3PF) for conflict mapping and analysis, the New European Peace and Security System (NEPSS) model of peace-building design, and gender mainstreaming to make gender relations an integral part of conflict analysis and peace-building design and implementation (Sandole and Staroste 2014). When used together, these
instruments can effectively address seemingly unresolvable conflicts. They facilitate conceptual and operational coherence and positive systemic change by empowering women to work with men as equal partners. They guide women and men to adhere to the principles of gender equality and justice, and they hold accountable those who deviate from formulating gender-responsive peace-building strategies and policies and/or prevent their implementation in the field. Indeed, the use of these instruments is critical. As Enloe (2004, 94) has observed, not everyone has to be a gender specialist, “but what they have to do is say that leaving out the serious asking of the gender question . . . will mean that their [analysis] . . . will not just be incomplete. It will be unreliable.” The policies generated by such analyses therefore will be flawed, and likely self-defeating and counterproductive.

Applying a gender-responsive approach to building sustainable peace requires that those in positions of leadership must create and sustain environments that make such an approach possible. In this regard, Morris (2001, vi) has compiled case studies from countries in Africa following her discovery “quite unexpectedly [at the] International Gender Conferences hosted by Ghana’s Gender Development Institute in 1999 [that over] 40% of the participants at this conference were men seeking ways to build partnerships with women to promote equitable and sustainable development” (v). Nongovernmental organizational partners and local leaders supported male gender trainers and consultants who worked with local populations and used “positive customs and culture to transform negative gender relations and build new traditions.” Trainers and consultants were guided by InterAction’s Commission on the Advancement of Women (CAW) Gender Integration Framework and effectively brought about “organizational and social change processes in support of gender equity.” The framework included the following four elements (Morris 2001, vi–vii):

**Political will.** Evidenced when top-level leadership publicly supports gender integration, effectively communicates the organization’s commitment to gender equity, commits staff time and financial resources, and institutes needed policies and procedures.

**Technical capacity.** Evidenced in increased staff skills in gender analysis, adoption of new systems for gender disaggregated data, and the development of gender-sensitive tools and procedures for programs and projects.
Accountability. Evidenced in institutional incentives and mandates that encourage and reinforce gender-sensitive behaviors by individuals and within the organization as a whole.

Organizational culture. Evidenced in a gender-balanced staff, a gender-sensitive governance structure, and the equal valuing of women and men’s working styles.

Morris’s work is an example of women and men acknowledging that a cultural value system organized around male privilege (Walby 1990) does not serve them well and must be changed to a system that is not male-dominated, male-identified, and male-centered (Johnson 2006).7 Morris’s case studies indicate that gender equality is a necessary condition of human rights, justice, development, and therefore sustainable peace building. Fort and Schipani (2004, 5) support this claim in their work, demonstrating that “countries with practices evidencing higher degrees of gender equity tend to resolve disputes more peacefully. . . . Conversely, those countries experiencing low degrees of gender equity appear to be more prone to violence.”

Gender Mainstreaming

Our discussion thus far has called for the systematic use of appropriate frameworks, treaties, and tools in peace building. Among these, the following are designed to advance gender mainstreaming: UN Security Council Resolution 1325; related resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, and 2122 (United Nations Women 2015a); and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against All Women (CEDAW).

UN Resolution 1325 (and related resolutions) “reaffirms . . . the linkages between peace, development and gender equality” (King 2003, 3). It mandates that women play an equal part in peace-building processes, and “recognize[s] the special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction” (Farr 2003, 26). Resolution 1325 and related resolutions are also an acknowledgment by the international community of “the enormous potential contribution of women as stakeholders of peace, disarmament and conflict prevention” (Heyzer 2003, 5). They mandate that all participants involved must ensure that women play an equal part in peace building, recognizing the importance of women’s visibility and actions in national and regional instruments and in bi- and multilateral organizations (Farr 2003, 32). Significantly, Article 1 of CEDAW defines discrimination against
women as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women . . . of human rights” (Elson 2006, 31).

Despite the UN’s emphasis on gender mainstreaming, it has proven to be a contentious concept and practice;³ its form varies in different countries and in different areas of policy. Misunderstandings and tension can arise if actors have a different understanding of gender equality (see endnote 4) or question the primary focus on gender in the context of other significant forms of inequality (Walby 2005, 453). Also, the responsibility for adopting and employing the concept of gender mainstreaming lies predominantly with the leadership of an organization or network; hence, it is a top-down practice.

These persistent challenges notwithstanding, gender mainstreaming has become a powerful tool for analysis and policy formulation and implementation (Stiegler 2001; United Nations Entity for Women’s Equality and the Empowerment of Women 2015). Once a gender perspective has been adopted, decision making rests on the supposition that all problems or conditions being addressed have a gender component that has to be seriously considered. In practice, this means that women no longer “approach decision-making . . . as petitioners seek[ing] to attract support” for their ideas. Rather, decision makers must take into account the gender mainstreaming principle and consult women as experts on specific situations of their lives (Stiegler 2001, 11). So-called women’s problems are no longer expected to be solved by women alone; instead, women and men accept responsibility for changing gender relations. If men had to endure the same living conditions that many women have during and after war (e.g., crowded cohabitation with young children and scarce or no available resources), their needs and interests would be the same as women’s (Stiegler 2001, 10).

Accordingly, gender mainstreaming is a method and practice—an applied theory—for changing the status quo of unequal gender relations in decision making and policymaking and service delivery. It allows close monitoring and makes possible evaluation of decision-making and policymaking processes and the implementation of their results to ensure that they meet the objectives of parity, equality, equity, empowerment, and transformation (De Waal 2006).³ The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality in all aspects of life.

The application of gender mainstreaming ensures that all decisions and subsequent actions are scrutinized for their reflection of and impact on gender. Both women and men must consistently ask and answer questions
such as: “What will be the impact of this decision on women’s lives?” “What will be the impact on men’s lives?” “How does this action differ for women? How does it differ for men?” In peace building, these questions take on a particular urgency because it is during the transition from war to peace that patriarchal power tends to be reconstituted. Some even suggest that “the post-war period is too late for women to transform patriarchal gender relations” (Meintjes et al. 2001, 4). Even so, it is precisely because the social fabric of families, communities, and countries has been shattered and the preconflict status of gender relations profoundly disturbed, destabilized, and perhaps even destroyed that women and men are given a narrow window to renegotiate their public and private relationships. Consequently, profound changes in gender relations must be an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and evidence-based upgrading of peace building if the goal is to achieve sustainable and just peace, security, and development (Sandole-Staroste 2009).

Employing gender mainstreaming heightens awareness and attention to issues that affect women disproportionately and differently in comparison to men—for example, the use of rape as a weapon of war, human trafficking, and the relegation of women in political discourse to objectified entities. Equally, gender mainstreaming directs attention to the leadership roles that women can and have assumed in daily life in their families, communities, and societies that are vital for strengthening resilience at all levels. Employing the method and practice of gender mainstreaming ensures that any attempts to relegate so-called women’s issues to the margins are emphatically rejected.

To ensure a sound gender analysis of any given conflict and develop concrete steps to formulate and implement policies that address the issues of all—women, men, and children—gender mainstreaming can be coupled synergistically with the Three Pillar Framework (3PF) to make explicit what is already implicit in the multidisciplinary character of the framework: gender is a critical component of any analysis, as well as any response to a violent conflict situation. Gender enhances the success of peace-building interventions. This proposition is based on the premise that peace-building initiatives tend to fail in part because gender and women are missing from both the analysis of and the response to conflict.

The Three-Pillar Framework

John Burton (1997), one of the founding fathers of the multidisciplinary field of conflict analysis and resolution, has said that it is vital to get the
analysis right; otherwise the policies erected on its foundation will be flawed, self-defeating, and counterproductive (Sandole 2013). The 3PF is designed to get the analysis right by guiding analysts to identify and capture the multidisciplinary complexity of a given conflict as a basis for doing something positive about it (Sandole 2010, Ch. 2).

Specifically, the 3PF facilitates analysis of the characteristics (Pillar 1) and causes and conditions of a latent or manifest conflict (Pillar 2) as a basis for exploring and designing optimal responses to it (Pillar 3) (see also Figure 1). Those responses can include any, some combination, or all of the following:

- (Violent) conflict prevention (*preventive diplomacy*): Preventing the house from catching on fire
- Conflict management (*peacekeeping*): Preventing an existing fire from spreading
- Conflict settlement (*coercive peacemaking*): Forcefully suppressing an existing fire
- Conflict resolution (*collaborative peacemaking*): Once a fire has been suppressed, determining what the underlying combustible causes and conditions are and then addressing them so that the recent fire is not reignited
- Conflict transformation (*peace building*): Working with the survivors of the fire to invent or discover new problem-solving processes and mechanisms so that next time they have a problem, they do not have to burn down the house, the neighborhood, and the commons

![Figure 1. Three Pillar Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution (3PF)](image-url)}
Under Pillar 1, conflict researchers and peace builders analyze a developing or manifest conflict in terms of the parties involved; the issues about which the parties are engaged; the objectives they hope to achieve by engaging in conflict over certain issues; the means they are employing—violent, nonviolent, or a mix—and, despite those, the means they would prefer to employ for philosophical, theological, or other reasons; and the environments within which the conflict is playing out.

Under Pillar 2, conflict researchers and peace builders analyze the conflict in terms of its deeply rooted, underlying causes and conditions. These may be operative at the individual, societal, international, and/or global/ecological levels, depending on the multidisciplinary complexity of the conflict. It is these, including gender-related factors that are often not addressed by third parties or not addressed to the satisfaction of all concerned, that can lead to the ultimate failure of peace building as indexed by its core indicator, conflict recurrence.

Once conflict researchers and peace builders know more about the nature of the conflict (Pillar 1) and what drives it (Pillar 2), they are then ready, under Pillar 3, to design a response to it, which takes into account third-party objectives and means for achieving those objectives.

Third-party objectives include, as already mentioned, (1) violent conflict prevention (preventive diplomacy), (2) conflict management (peacekeeping), (3) conflict settlement (coercive peacemaking), (4) conflict resolution (collaborative peacemaking), and/or (5) conflict transformation (peace building “writ small”). Collectively, all five intervention objectives comprise peace building “writ large.”

Third party means for achieving any or all of the above objectives include confrontational and/or collaborative means, negative peace and/or positive peace orientations, and track one (governmental) or multitrack (business, media, civil society, and other nongovernmental as well as governmental) actors and processes. The traditional security paradigm, associated with Realpolitik’s coercive means and zero-sum outcomes, comprises track one (public sector, governmental) actors employing primarily confrontational means to achieve and maintain negative peace (the absence of hostilities). By contrast, an alternative comprehensive security paradigm includes multitrack (private sector, civil society, and other nongovernmental as well as public sector, governmental) actors using collaborative as well as confrontational means to achieve and maintain negative peace as a basis for achieving sustainable positive peace (substantial reduction in, if not total elimination of, the deeply rooted, underlying causes and conditions).
Making gender relations integral to each element of each pillar of the 3PF ensures that, in practice:

differential effects [of gender] must be analyzed in the context of all [peace-building] activities. Thus, where women’s difference from men has in the past served as a justification for marginalizing women’s rights and gender inequality more broadly[,] women’s difference now informs the responsibilities of all [peace-building] institutions and involved individuals to incorporate a gender analysis in their work. (Williams Crenshaw, 2000; cited in Kelly 2005, 490)

**NEPSS and the “Wisdom of Crowds”**

Once a 3PF-based analysis has been completed, another construct, the New European Peace and Security System (NEPSS), can guide the design and implementation of a peace-building intervention into the conflict.

Although NEPSS was initially designed as a systematic response to the genocidal conflicts of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia (Sandole 2007, Ch. 3; Sandole 2010, 52–54), the model can be used for mapping an intervention into any conflict system. A major feature of NEPSS is that it incorporates the nine tracks of Louise Diamond and John McDonald’s (1996) multitrack framework. In any NEPSS application, each track of the model would be mainstreamed, that is, subjected to an analysis of differential effects of conflict on women and men to make certain that women’s rights and gender equality remain essential foci of all actors involved in the peace-building enterprise.

The multitrack framework comprises the following:

- **Track 1 (official, governmental):** peacemaking through political/military engagement, diplomacy, and humanitarian aid and development
- **Track 2 (nongovernment/professional):** peacemaking through professional conflict resolution
- **Track 3 (business):** peacemaking through commerce
- **Track 4 (private citizen):** peacemaking through personal involvement
- **Track 5 (research, training, and education):** peacemaking through learning
- **Track 6 (activism):** peacemaking through advocacy
- **Track 7 (religion):** peacemaking through faith in action
Track 8 (funding): peacemaking through providing resources
Track 9 (communications and the media): peacemaking through information

The nine tracks of the multitrack framework represent the horizontal axis of NEPSS, while local, societal, subregional, regional, and global levels of explanation constitute the vertical axis (Sandole 2010, 168; see Figure 2).

Apropos the need to ensure the success of any peace-building intervention—prevent the recurrence of violent conflict—one assumption underlying NEPSS is that “all conflicts are local” (Autesserre 2010, 2014). Once an early warning system (including 3PF-based systems) indicates that a conflict is developing in any locale, resources associated with tracks 1 to 9 from the local to the global levels could be activated and coordinated in response to the event—if not simultaneously, then sequenced appropriately over time.

Women are located at the pulse of their communities, which uniquely enables them to sound the alarm when a conflict is developing. The NEPSS model is useful in that “the importance of gender to conflict prevention and early warning [becomes visible . . . and] concrete measures to improve the flow of early warning information from and about women” are put in place. The gathering and analysis of data on early warning indicators require, however, that “fact-finding missions to areas of potential conflict . . . routinely include gender expertise and consultations with women’s organizations” (Hill 2003, 23).

This relates to the need in complex conflict systems for multiple actors to be involved in helping to bring the primary conflict parties to a tipping point where they can shift from their seemingly perpetual negative-sum

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**Figure 2. The Structure of NEPSS**

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Systematic, Gender-Based Analysis in Sustainable Peace Building

To enhance the likelihood of achieving positive outcomes, peace builders would be well advised to work in terms of the dynamics implicit in Surowiecki’s (2004) _The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economics, Societies, and Nations_. They could also make use of Rifkin’s (2009) concept of the “collaborative work environment,” where peace builders have “the opportunity to challenge each other’s assumptions, build on each other’s ideas and insights, and come to a negotiated consensus regarding [a given conflict] situation.” The goal is to arrive “more quickly and accurately” at an assessment of the conflict “than when [peace builders analyze conflicts and design interventions into them] alone” (605). The point here is that the quality and relevance of the intervention _product_ depend on the quality and relevance of the _process_ leading to it, including the women and men driving it.

**Conclusion**

We began this article by referencing a vexing state of affairs: protracted, often recurring violent conflict and the global problematique—interconnected, interdependent challenges that simultaneously drive and are exacerbated by violent conflict systems. We argued that the failure to solve entrenched conflicts and build sustainable peace in many fragile states is due in part to the absence of gender and women from peace-building processes. To change this negative status quo, we put forward three essential instruments—gender mainstreaming, the 3PF, and the NEPSS—arguing that these tools together can synergistically establish conceptual and operational coherence and facilitate positive systemic change by empowering women to work collaboratively with men as equal partners in the construction of sustainable peace. These instruments guide women and men to adhere to the principles of gender equality and justice and hold accountable those who deviate from formulating gender-responsive policies and their effective implementation on the ground.

We argued that applying these three tools to any intractable conflict facilitates a systematic analysis of the characteristics (Pillar 1) and causes and conditions (Pillar 2) of the conflict, enhancing prospects for exploring and formulating optimal responses to it that take into account gender and
other inequalities (Pillar 3). A gender-responsive approach is ultimately practical because increasing evidence indicates that women’s equal participation and leadership in peace building can have a significant positive impact on outcomes.

The promise of such outcomes can sustain supporters of gender equality and justice when they are faced with the challenges inherent in attempting to change the status quo of deeply entrenched interests and institutions. This was illustrated recently by the swift domestic and international rebuke of the Swedish foreign minister, Margot Wallström, after she had criticized the Saudi government for its egregious human rights violations. She was promptly disinvited as a guest of honor to speak before the Arab League. The Saudi government also threatened to cease renegotiations on “a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation,” jeopardizing Sweden’s multibillion dollar arms exports to Saudi Arabia, leading to a withdrawal of support from her mostly male colleagues at home (Crouch 2015). To practice “a feminist foreign policy, which [Wallström] says should include the strengthening of women’s rights, increasing women’s participation in decision-making, and a gender perspective on how resources are allocated,” is still fraught with peril (Crouch 2015, para. 6).

A more obvious example of deeply entrenched interests undermining efforts to apply a gender-responsive approach to postconflict peace building can be found in war-torn Afghanistan, where President Ashraf Ghani has joined a long list of stakeholders who have excluded women from “their rightful place in talks about the future of Afghanistan”:

These dismissive, destructive and—yes—sexist attitudes come not just from old-school misogynists in the Afghan government. Donor governments have for 14 years touted their support for Afghan women while excluding them from peace talks. A 2014 study by Oxfam found that, in 23 known rounds of talks between international negotiators and the Taliban since 2005, not one woman was included. In discussions between the Afghan government and the Taliban, women have been present during two rounds of talks. The offenders include the United States, which has played a major role in engaging the Taliban but failed to insist on the inclusion of women. (Barr 2015, A19)11

Accordingly, gender justice is a serious peace issue. The synergistic combination and coordination of gender mainstreaming, the 3PF, and the NEPSS promise success in addressing it and building sustainable peace.
Gender justice can be achieved only with “clear goals, a timeline, ownership, accountability, measurement and consequences for failure and success” (Jenkins and Agnew 2015, 1, 19). Given peace building’s less-than-stellar record to date, the need is patently clear and by using appropriate instruments, it can be met.

As our overall project to enhance the effectiveness of peace building continues, we will explore the veracity of our propositions—that the inclusion of women in peace building will increase its success rate, reducing the frequency of conflict recurrence. In pursuit of this objective, we will apply the three tools to a specific conflict involving women and men who call the conflict-affected area their home, possessing a deep knowledge of their cultures, customs, and histories. Given the various cultural, political, religious, economic, and other markers of these women and men, we expect the evaluation process to be comprehensive. In each application, the three tools will be examined for their efficacy and weaknesses, and appropriate adjustments developed and adopted.

We will also explore the digitization of the 3PF and NEPSS to maximize the two frameworks’ utility as conceptual platforms for analyzing complex conflict systems in order to do something about them. A related goal will be to work with game designers to develop a computer-based peace-building game to explore the conditions under which the inclusion of women and the private sector in peace-building interventions to address conflicts’ deep-rooted causes and conditions, makes an appreciable difference in peace-building outcomes.

This article is one of the first steps in the trajectory of a complex journey that is just beginning.

Notes
1. For reasons of space, we do not address but are cognizant that “the issues and concerns of sexual and gender minorities, including intersex, transgender, and third gender persons, are often completely absent from [peace-building] debates and programming” (Myrttinen et al. 2015, 7).
3. In contrast, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that “during 2005, the world’s total military expenditures reached a stunning all time high of 1.1 trillion. . . . That amounted to spending, in just one year, $173 on militaries for every single woman, child, and man on the planet” (Enloe 2007, 157).
4. In this regard, we point out three different models of gender equality: “The first model is one in which equality based on sameness is fostered, especially where women enter previously male domains, and the existing male norm remains the standard. The second is one in which there is a move toward the equal valuation of existing and different contribution of women and men in a gender segregated society. The third is one where there is a new standard for both men and women, that is, the transformation of gender relations” (Rees 1998, cited in Walby 2005, 455). We argue that in the context of peace building, the third model of gender equality is the most effective one.

5. The countries represented at the conference were Gambia, Ghana, Burkino Faso, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Morris 2001, vii–viii).

6. “InterAction is a membership association of over 160 US private voluntary organizations engaged in international humanitarian efforts including relief, development, refugee assistance, environment, population, public policy, and global education. InterAction’s Commission on the Advancement of Women (CAW) promotes gender equity in the policy and practice of InterAction members, national and international development and humanitarian assistance organizations” (Morris 2001, back cover; also see http://www.interaction.org/).

7. According to Johnson (2006), male-dominated means that in most sectors of society, positions of power are occupied predominantly by men, reflecting their interests and experiences in times of war and peace. Because men occupy the dominant positions in their society, they make the decision to go to war, and when a cease-fire has been declared, they decide the terms of peace. Male-identified means that privileged groups are “the standard of comparison that represents the best that society has to offer” (95); since “men are the cultural standard for humanity” (96) few policymakers question, therefore, the absence of women in decision-making processes. It is taken for granted that men—perceived to represent the best—“speak and act for all” (97). Male-centeredness means that the focus of attention is on men: “who they are, what they do and say, and how they do [and say] it” (100). If primarily men occupy most positions of authority in policymaking and if war and peace negotiations are identified with men, then the focus is on their experiences and interests “all the time as a matter of course” (103). The bottom line is that the absence of women is not even noticed.


9. According to De Waal (2006, 212), the terms are defined as follows: parity: equal representation and participation of women and men; equality: equal access, control, opportunities, rewards, and benefits for women and men; equity: the ratio of participation, access, opportunities, rewards, and benefits; empowerment: cognitive, behavioral, and affective changes to increase levels of equality and empow-
erment of women in relation to men; and transformation: transforming the gender order; changing the existing distribution of resources and responsibilities to create balanced gender relations.

10. Realpolitik is the oldest action paradigm in the recorded history of interstate relations. It goes back in time at least to Athenian historian and general Thucydides’s observations on the Peloponnesian War, specifically his narrative on the Melian Debate in 416 BC, when an Athenian ambassador negotiating with the Melians uttered the words that stand to the present day as the core principle of so-called political realism: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (book V of History of the Peloponnesian War). Realpolitik also reflects the dim view of the human condition and corresponding need for a strong state articulated by Thomas Hobbes in his classic, The Leviathan, written in the late 1640s. Furthermore, it captures the virulently zero-sum behavior to maintain the security of the state recommended to policymakers by Niccolò Machiavelli in his classic, The Prince, written in 1513.

11. Even in post-Taliban Afghanistan, deeply entrenched interests undermine women at all levels of society, and long before they may (or may not) be involved in peace negotiations. This is illustrated by the Afghan parliament’s rejection of Anisa Rasooli, who had been nominated by “Afghanistan’s US-educated president, Ashraf Ghani . . . to become the country’s first female Supreme Court justice.” Significantly, a number of female lawmakers were complicit in this decision (see Raghavan 2015).

References


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