INSTITUTIONALIZING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: The Dual Strategy of the Korean Women's Movement

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Since the 1990s, scholars have paid attention to the role of social movements traversing the official terrain of politics by blending a "contention" strategy with an "engagement" strategy. The literature often highlights the contribution of institutionalized social movements to policymaking and sociopolitical change, but rarely addresses why and how specific social movement organizations gain routine access to formal politics. Using the Korean women's movement as a case study, I analyze the conditions for movement institutionalization. As I perceive it as the consequence both of social movements' decision to participate in government and of the state's desire to integrate such movements into its decision-making process, movement institutionalization appears when the three factors are combined: (1) pressure from international organizations, (2) democratizing political structures, and (3) cognitive shifts by movement activists toward the role of the state.

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1960s, with the growth of new social movements in the West, scholars began to identify social movements as a type of collective action that employs disruptive tactics, has a loosely coupled nonbureaucratic organizational structure, maintains contentious relationships with polity members, and operates outside formal politics (Tilly 1994; Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004). However, recent studies show that some social movement organizations (SMOs) are professional and bureaucratic, build cooperative links with institutional actors, use moderate strategies and tactics to achieve their goals, and become integrated into administrative and legislative bodies, gradually blurring the boundaries between the social movement and formal authority (Oommen 1990; Santoro and McGuire 1997; Giugni and Passy 1998; Goldstone 2004). Unlike the negative normative consequences of co-optation or preemption of movements by political elites, ultimately leading to a protest cycle end (Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1994), the institutionalization of social movements often leads to the achievement of movement goals or to social and political changes that benefit the collective good (Ruzza 1997; Stearns and Almeida 2004; Meyer 2007). When social movements pursue institutional politics or engage with political actors, what conditions impel movement institutionalization? If it occurs, how can movements avoid being co-opted by power elites?

Using Korean women's movements as a case study, this article analyzes the conditions in which social movements become institutionalized. I chose the Korean case because it is considered an example of "best practice" in movement coordination with

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state actors on gender issues (Jones 2006). Institutionalization is not one of the cycles that social movements are fated to undergo as they evolve. Rather, it is an outcome of joint strategic choices by both the movement and the state—a sociohistorical construct that is only possible under specific conditions in which propitious international environments, favorable political structures, and opportune activities of movement leaders and members coalesce. This article makes the case that the institutionalization of women's movements in Korea became possible when (1) an international organization, specifically the United Nations (UN), established "gender mainstreaming" policies and urged its member states to ratify and pursue them; (2) the democratizing government responded positively to movement demands for gender equality and incorporated them into its policymaking; and (3) women's movement organizations recognized the state as a partner rather than a target and thus associated their strategy of a "politics of contention" with a "politics of engagement" to achieve gender goals within the realm of formal politics.

MOVEMENT INSTITUTIONALIZATION AS A CONSEQUENCE OF STRATEGIC CHOICES[1]

I define *movement institutionalization* as a process of social movements traversing the official terrain of formal politics and engaging with authoritative institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, the state, and political parties to enhance their collective ability to achieve the movement's goals.[2] Once institutionalized, social movement activists take posts within the government and work toward their goals from inside institutions; they modify their goals in ways that make them attainable through bureaucratic, legislative, and judicial procedures; and they regularize and moderate their collective action repertoires to persuade or pressure the government to enact policies and laws that reflect movement priorities.

I understand institutionalization as the consequence of a collective strategic choice of an SMO and of its interaction with its counterparts, not as a predestined stage in a movement's trajectory, as protest wave theorists argue (Oommen 1990; Kriesi et al. 1995). For example, Tarrow (1994) theorizes that social movements move from an oppositional protest posture to an increasingly bureaucratic and institutional position, which allows them to negotiate with or become part of the political establishment. Furthermore, contending that people join social movements and collective action based on a rational calculation that the benefits of protest exceed its costs, Przeworski (1991) avers that movement actors sensibly shift strategies once protests secure access to the state via institutional means. At this point, participants perceive that radical collective street action is less beneficial than inclusion in established state processes: They believe they must choose to "participate or perish."

In the literature of social movements, some equate movement institutionalization with co-optation. The government (the co-opting body) embraces a movement in order to sustain its own legitimacy and authority and to avert threats to its stability. Such movement institutionalization is thus regarded as detrimental to social movements

(Piven and Cloward 1977): When a movement is co-opted, it inevitably loses its collective identity and solidarity (Castells 1983); its power to provide alternatives to conventional politics declines (Meyer and Tarrow 1998); it shifts its focus from innovation to organizational sustainability and adaptability (Jordan and Maloney 1997); its utopian ideal of changing society and the radical outward thrust of mass politics falters (Piven and Cloward 1997); and the disruptive effect of its collective action no longer exists (Kriesi et al. 1995). As Katzenstein (1998) argues, these views presume a fundamental difference in "form," "location," and "content" between movement politics and institutional politics: Movement politics are disruptive rather than peaceful; they take place in the street rather than in institutions; and they seek radical change rather than incremental innovation.

I argue here that movement institutionalization does not always entail the risk of deradicalization, depoliticization, or demobilization of collective action. And it does not necessarily make social movements subservient to and dependent on state hegemony (Rootes 2007). Instead, even after institutionalization, social movements can maintain an equal and balanced—conflictive and/or cooperative—power relationship with the state, and conventional tactics can complement—not replace—disruptive tactics (Pruijt 2003). Once entrenched in a formal political arena and having established "organizational habitats" within institutions (Katzenstein 1998), activists can become "institutional activists" (Santoro and McGuire 1997) or "unobtrusive activists" (Katzenstein 1998). By taking advantage of institutional opportunities, they can contribute to producing stable and influential policies that respond to movement goals; they can extract concessions from the government and urge the government to be accountable for their implementation (Moore 1999; Raeburn 2004; Banaszak 2010). Institutionalization can also enable social movements to acquire stable platforms and channel otherwise underrepresented or unrepresented collective interests to a policymaking domain. Therefore, movement institutionalization should not be associated with co-optation or be considered the end of movement vitality.

The effect of movement institutionalization is, however, contextually varied and historically contingent (Reinelt 1995). Institutionalization can either enervate or energize social movements, depending on the context (Amenta and Young 1999). In women's movements, for instance, "femocrats" (feminists-turned-bureaucrats) within institutions tend to hold a dual, hybrid identity, simultaneously representing the movement and the state (Kim 2005b). Their position and identity are unstable, even contradictory, because they must simultaneously abide by the rules and norms of institutional politics and sustain the values and demands of movement politics. Consequently, they can be isolated by professional policymakers and at the same time criticized by feminist activists, often leading to conflict and competition between activists and femocrats on the one hand, and femocrats and bureaucrats on the other. Gradually, femocrats can begin to feel more accountable to government regulations than to movement causes. This contradictory location often compels femocrats, as Eisenstein (1995) suggests, to become, paradoxically, faithful mandarins of the government in order to remain full-fledged missionaries of the movement. Nevertheless, as long as social movements sustain

the vigor of collective mobilization, activists' participation in institutions can help them promote their agendas and see them enacted as policies and laws. The location of social movements does not always mandate their form of collective action and the outcome of their claim making (Katzenstein 1998).

The fact that insider activists can play a pivotal role in achieving movement goals implies that the boundaries between challengers and polity members can overlap (Moore 1999) and that the area of contention for social movements need not be outside the polity. Despite the burgeoning literature on movement outcomes and growing attention to their causes over the past two decades, only a few researchers have paid attention to the fact that social movements sometimes create political opportunities and sometimes turn formal politics into contested terrain (e.g., Santoro and McGuire 1997; Moore 1999; Raeburn 2004; Stearns and Almeida 2004). "Multi-lingual" (to borrow Moore's [1999] term) institutional activists are not only well versed in decision-making and policymaking mechanisms within institutions but also effective in representing and channeling movement demands within the polity, and ultimately achieving them.

If we agree that social movements frequently entail both confrontation and collaboration with power holders (Tilly 1994), movement institutionalization can be understood as one possible outcome of that process. The relationship between the social movement and the state is by nature interactive—neither static nor unilateral. The understanding that social movements can both disagree and cooperate with the state means that the state can be an important "ally" as much as a "target." The state is a critical political opportunity structure that constrains and empowers movements, and with which movements can cooperate (Jenkins 1995). This perspective contributes to the growing literature on social movement coalition (e.g., Van Dyke and McCammon 2010) by highlighting that social movements occasionally build coalitions with state and political parties, especially for purposes of capitalizing on opportunities or countering threats. The conditions that are conducive to establishing a social movement–state coalition are distinct from the mechanisms of within-movement and cross-movement coalitions (Almeida 2010). The process of movement institutionalization can happen in two ways: (1) social movements can press for institutional recognition that allows them to pursue "bottom-up" demands in state policymaking, as South American feminist movements did; or (2) in a "top-down" process, the state can invite movement participation as a way of resolving emerging social problems, as in the cases of governmental integration of homosexuals in decision making on how to contain the proliferation of AIDS in Latin America (Giugni and Passy 1998). These two modes of movement integration into formal politics are far from mutually exclusive; they are complementary and may occur simultaneously.

The process of movement institutionalization described above has several implications. First, movement institutionalization requires both that movement actors decide to join the state apparatus and that power elites elect to incorporate them and respond positively to their demands (Dryzek 1996; Giugni 1998; Giugni and Passy 1998; McCammon et al. 2001). In other words, movement institutionalization is a

consequence of concurrent strategic choices and strategic alignment by both parties—an engagement approach by social movements coupled with an integration policy by the state. If the two sides discover that they have competing but reconcilable interests, or even shared interests, they may decide to pursue them through institutionalized processes. To understand institutionalization, we need to recognize the interdependent nature of strategic calculations by both the state and the social movement (Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995). Because the underlying rationale for a social movement's choice to engage and a state's choice to integrate is based on both parties' desire to further their respective interests and goals, movement institutionalization is by nature a loose, temporary, and strategic coupling between the social movement and the state (Stearn and Almeida 2004). The identification of movement institutionalization as a strategic choice rather than a type of movement outcome means that institutionalization is a precarious state, resulting in either success or failure in attaining goals depending on the specific situation (Giugni 1999). Though Gamson (1990) conceptualizes "acceptance" and "advantage" (generating collective benefits to beneficiaries) as separate types of movement outcomes, they in fact overlap—not being mutually exclusive (Amenta and Young 1999).

Second, to proactively respond to social movement demands, the state must possess a modicum of capacity and propensity (Tilly 1994; McAdam 1996). The state tends to encourage institutionalization only if it considers it politically necessary to avoid disruption of the normal political process and social order. Otherwise, the state will be inclined to dismiss movements as irrelevant distractions. Social movements can contribute to social and political change so long as they maintain relative autonomy from the state; at the same time, the state should retain the capacity (let alone the propensity) to control movement challenges to policy implementation (Kitschelt 1986). This need for a match between state capacity and social movement vitality indicates a corollary—when power imbalances arise, the power relationship between the social movement and the state is not always zero-sum but can be negative- or positive-sum (Oxhorn 1995). Because of this, an analysis of movement outcomes (and the consequences of movement institutionalization) should include not only an investigation of movement mobilization, organization, and power but also scrutiny of state actors and their responses: The former is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a movement outcome (Burstein et al. 1995; Jenkins 1995; Amenta, Halfmann, and Young 1999; Moore 1999).

Third, movement institutionalization and independence may appear antithetical but can prove complementary. That happens when SMOs adopt what Cohen and Arato (1992) call a "dual strategy" of exercising simultaneously assimilative and disruptive collective actions, such as American feminists pursued in the first- and second-wave women's movement (McCammon et al. 2001; Banaszak 2010). An ongoing debate over the efficacy of mobilization versus moderation in the movement outcome literature becomes less important if we acknowledge that the two strategies can coexist—in fact, the mix of the two increases the power of social movements. In addition, the impact of the respective strategies is historically and contextually different and is influenced by the

political opportunity structure, the cultural climate, and a moment in a protest cycle (Giugni 1999). For instance, the persuasive strategies of American women's movements were effective in maintaining organizations in the "doldrums" from 1945 to the 1960s, whereas disruptive tactics during the peak protest cycle afterward helped them achieve policy changes (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989). Any benefits from movement institutionalization and integration accrue only if the social movement and the state have relative autonomy from each other. This ensures the state's capacity to integrate and the movement's inclination to engage, as well as the continued ability of the social movement to avoid co-optation. Although this requires the blending of independence with dependence, what emerges is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the state and the social movement, an interdependence that can facilitate the process of social transformation. For social movements to maintain collective power while participating in the established system, they must safeguard their organizational identity and autonomy—their original source of collective power (Sandoval 1998). A social movement that complies politically with or subordinates itself to the "powers that be" loses its autonomy and forfeits the opportunity to contribute to social advancement. SMOs that are politically institutionalized and integrated must freely cross the boundary between the social movement sector and the state.[3]

HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS BECOME INSTITUTIONALIZED

The conditions that allow movement institutionalization are multiple and work best when they occur simultaneously. The specific factors may vary greatly depending on movements' type, history, and environment. Three critical factors in the institutionalization of the Korean women's movement were the influences of globalization, domestic political structures, and organizational strategies and cognitive liberation of movement activists and members. Each was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for institutionalization; the combination of the three constitutes multiple conjunctural causation.

Global Influences: International Organizations and Transnational Networks
As globalization develops, the influences of international environments exert more pressures on the state and on its relations with domestic sociopolitical forces, as well as with other nations. The state is still a dominant political agent; nonetheless, its functions are facilitated or constrained by foreign countries, international organizations, and SMOs of other nations over which the state lacks full control. Its clout may be magnified through its involvement in international relations and global society, but it also cannot ignore legitimate international demands or ruthlessly crush the challenges posed by national and local organizations (Brysk 2000). Ironically, a state that becomes deeply involved in international relations reduces its influence over other nations as well as its domestic autonomy in relation to other sociopolitical powers.

Globalization renders the relationship between the state and the social movement (or civil society in general) more complicated: It is neither unilateral and monotonous nor hierarchical and authoritative, but mutually enforcing and dialectical. The state

cannot dominate social movements unilaterally; likewise, movement protest becomes only one of many routine means of influencing the state. One of those means is the emerging transnational network among SMOs focusing on their joint struggles. The resulting solidarity identity formed among movement adherents in different nations facilitates their collective action across national borders. Transnational networks can impose roundabout pressures on the state. For example, when the channels of negotiation and communication between the state and the social movement are blocked, they can use indirect means, calling on support and pressure from international organizations and transnational networks to create a so-called "boomerang effect" (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The complexity of the state–society relationship and the diverse measures available to SMOs extend their leverage in a globalizing society (Zippel 2004).

Global networking can press or persuade the state to adopt policies to ensure justice and equality for the public; transnational SMOs can heighten public awareness of the value of social justice and equality (Keck and Sikkink 1998). As the Western international feminist movement in the early 20th century indicated, transnational networking creates a solidarity that can bridge national differences and rejuvenate local and national movements (Rupp and Taylor 1999; Ferree and Mueller 2004). The effects of transnational movements on social change vary geographically, but international environments often play a no less pivotal role than domestic structural configurations and the organizational traits of social movements themselves. Consequently, globalization and transnational social movement networks produce noteworthy, multidimensional changes in the state and the social movement.

Although international influences are clearly important, their effects are often mediated by the domestic power structure of the state and the organizational activities of social movements. Moreover, the growth of transnational networking and the empowerment of domestic organizations, though correlated, are not necessarily causal. For instance, external pressures imposed on the state can be justified so long as the state is vulnerable to them, SMOs possess the ability to make allies with reform-minded power elites and other social groups, and values expressed from outside coincide with the national interests or imperatives of the state and are consistent with the local discourse and societal norms. Thus, international factors are affected by domestic structures and organizational activities—which function as "intervening variables"—because the same external pressures can lead to different consequences in different circumstances.

Domestic Situations: Political Opportunity Structures

For social movements to institutionalize, domestic structural conditions must allow their demands to be incorporated into substantive policy alternatives and promoted within a political process (Tilly 1994; Tarrow 1998). Still, the state's capacity and inclination to productively engage with social movements largely determines whether the latter will advance, distract from, or remain irrelevant to institutionalization. The structure of political opportunities—especially as perceived by movement activists—is important because it prescribes the choice of movement strategies and the types of

movement gains (Ferree and Mueller 2004). Along with political opportunities, for women's movements in particular, "gendered opportunities"—the public's and policy-makers' view of women's roles in society and changing gender relations—are critical to movement institutionalization and its outcomes (McCammon et al. 2001). As the political opportunity structure expands, it increases the chances for social movements to become institutionalized. However, the relationship between political opportunity structure and social movements—institutionalized or not—is not one-sided, but mutually dependent or empowering. Collective action, with or without movement institutionalization, may pressure political forces to pursue further political reforms. Moreover, institutionalization expands movements' political clout by consolidating political collaboration among reformist political groups and providing more favorable conditions—including enhanced power, repertoires, and legitimacy—to pursue political objectives (Tarrow 1998).

Two variables largely determine the political opportunity structure for movement institutionalization—the nature of the state structure and the character of political parties. An open state and democratic parties are essential for movement institutionalization, whereas closed state structures and the absence of democratic political forces effectively foreclose a movement's opportunities (Hipsher 1998b). In addition, the character of the state and the status of reformist forces within the state constitute a political environment that directly influences the prospects and procedures for movement institutionalization (Giugni and Passy 1998). First, in terms of state character, strong, "overdeveloped" states that respond to challengers by excluding them are less conducive to movement institutionalization than weak or more inclusive states. Strong states, those with a centralized power structure and organized institutions for administrative management, are more effective at policy formulation and implementation, and therefore social movements, once they gain political and social support, can win significant concessions from the state and achieve their goals (Kitschelt 1986). Yet strong states rely less on the assistance of other institutions or groups (including SMOs) than weak states. They exclude SMOs because they do not consider them trustworthy and legitimate allies or representatives of popular opinion. By contrast, movement institutionalization is more likely to be achievable under a democratic, decentralized state structure that gives local governments, courts, and the ruling party relative autonomy. These institutions are additional "entrée points" for social movements that provide opportunities to build coalitions with state actors (Stearns and Almeida 2004).

Second, with regard to the political status of reformist forces, in order for SMOs and reformist groups to forge successful policy-oriented alliances, they must be integrated into a political system where reformist political forces already enjoy legitimacy and influence through a moderate level of electoral success. Also, movement forces and reformist power elites must maintain mutual cohesion to guard against counterattacks by nondemocratic power elites (Sandoval 1998). Institutionalization is more viable when a movement can form alliances with influential progressive groups, such as political parties with similar agendas and strategies. Such ties between social movements and

political parties—what Almeida (2010) calls "social movement partyism"—provide social movements with more opportunity for movement institutionalization and may increase their impact on policy outcomes.

Organizational Conditions: Social Movement Activities

While exogenous variables affect movement institutionalization and effectiveness, endogenous variables are also important. Several organizational attributes facilitate movement institutionalization (Giugni and Passy 1998). First, movements with professional or specialized knowledge that the state needs are more likely to be drawn into the political arena. Second, social movements with formal, professional, centralized, and bureaucratic structures are more readily institutionalized than those without them. Such organizational traits facilitate the resolution of disagreements; moreover, once movements so structured are institutionalized, they are adept at generating consensus on what demands to present and at reaching political compromises (Gamson 1990). A formal and centralized organizational structure is not necessarily detrimental to social movements and does not always result in organizational oligarchy; instead, it often helps them survive, particularly in an unreceptive political environment where the mobilization of supporters is difficult (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Staggenborg 1988). Third, when social movements present challenges that do not directly impugn the existing political authority, their legitimacy and concerns are more likely to be considered, which expedites institutionalization.[3] When political power elites feel threatened by a movement, they are more likely to suppress it than admit it to the institutional corridors. For movement institutionalization to occur, movement demands must be compatible with state imperatives (Dryzek 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998). If they are not, politically institutionalized movement groups will likely receive only symbolic rewards that result, in effect, in their co-optation. Dryzek (1996:480) contends, "To the extent that public policy remains under the sway of state imperatives, groups whose inclusion coincides with no imperative will not easily acquire the tangible goods they value. They may be allowed to participate in the policymaking process, but outcomes will be systematically skewed against them"—in which case their legitimacy, integrity, and survival require them to opt for exclusion and continuing collective confrontation rather than political inclusion.

Movement institutionalization represents movement activists' and members' "cognitive liberation" in the state. The state is not inclined to open the chances and channels of participation unless movements themselves respond positively to opportunities. Political opportunities are critical to the rise and progress of political protest, but unless agents perceive them as propitious for collective action, they will be of little use (Suh 2001; Kowalchuk 2005): It is not structural but discursive—perceived—opportunities that promote social movements (Gamson and Meyer 1996). Perceived opportunities often change movement strategies and lead to their institutionalization. The same logic applies to global influences on democratic movements. Global events are filtered by movement discourses or cultures, and depending on the process and nature of this cognitive mediation, global events can have starkly contrasting influences (Kubik 2000).

Therefore, political opportunities are neither equally open (or closed) nor externally given to all SMOs—they are to be internally seized. In the end, "movement actors are agents who make decisions about how to respond to such opportunities" (McCammon et al. 2007:732).

RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA SOURCES

Based on a case study of the Korean women's movement, the following sections analyze the conditions for and dynamics of movement institutionalization by drawing on the archives of movement organizations and the government, as well as on secondary sources. These data help explain the changes in the international environment (i.e., globalization) and domestic political structure (i.e., democratization) that impose profound external constraints on—and help to empower—organizational leaders and members. In addition, in 2008 and 2009, I interviewed several prominent leaders of Korean women's movements, some of whom served also as high-ranking officials in government and as lawmakers in parliament. I administered loosely structured questionnaires and conducted interviews in a snowballing process. All of the interviewees worked for the Korea Women's Associations United (KWAU), which, after being established in 1987, functioned as a national umbrella organization representing progressive women's associations. Interviewees provided details about the inner workings and strategic decision making by the movement organization as it pursued a politics of engagement. These firsthand and in-depth interviews recorded and transcribed in English are quoted verbatim to show how feminist activists perceived budding opportunities (both international and domestic), tried to exploit them, and developed a strategy mixing the politics of contention with the politics of engagement to achieve gender equality demands as policies and laws.

A DUAL STRATEGY OF CONTENTION AND ENGAGEMENT BY THE KOREAN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

When the longtime authoritarian regime was finally toppled in June 1987 by massive, nationwide civilian mobilization, women's organizations transformed themselves into partners of citizens' movements, gradually distancing themselves from former revolutionary colleagues who had been allied with women's movement activists in fighting against the dictatorship. The women's movement began pursuing "institutionalization" in the mid-1990s: Movement issues were "routinized," organizational activities were "included," and agents became "integrated" into institutional politics (Meyer and Tarrow 1998), spanning the boundaries of a politics of identity (and influence) and a politics of engagement (Reinelt 1995). Yet the institutionalization of women's movements does not mean that they became merely an interest group. Instead, the women's movement pursued a dual strategy, simultaneously retaining the character of social movements and pursuing "institutional politics." In the early 1990s, the women's movement juxtaposed structural issues such as political democratization and national

unification with more practical and substantive concerns that could directly improve women's rights, reduce gender inequality, and raise women's status in society; however, the practical steadily outweighed the political as the movement became institutionalized. Demands related to the "reproduction sphere"—including family, environment, education, sexuality, and culture—gradually replaced the transformative issues in the "production sphere," such as the exploitive capitalist relations of production (Kang 2001). The movement's focus moved from class exploitation to patriarchal oppression—a dramatic paradigm shift.

The movement suggested that patriarchal oppression was embedded and reproduced not only in society but also within the family. Along with many other issues, sexuality—in particular, sexual harassment and assault—came to dominate and unite diverse women's associations, conservative and progressive alike. Women's organizations raised awareness of rampant domestic violence and were able to draw support from the public on the issue. They criticized the conventional civil society perspective that ignored the private sphere (the family): Traditionally, what happened within the family was not a subject of public contention and legal enforcement. After the redefinition of the private sphere, domestic and sexual violence toward women became a social issue about "women in general"; it transcended personal boundaries and even the boundaries of class and social strata. The feminist tenet that "the personal is political" was realized, and the personal issue of sexuality and violence became publicized and politicized (Staggenborg 1998; Kim 2000). As a means to achieve sexual and gender equality, women's groups began pursuing legal and institutional remedies. One interviewee recalled, "We struggled to modify institutions to be better, as we firmly believed that they affected people's consciousness" (Park Inn Hea, personal interview, April 22, 2009).[4] Another interviewee added, "Since laws benefit and protect people, making laws is critical and implementing them is necessary" (Lee Kyung-Sook, personal interview, April 30, 2009).

By combining the politics of influence with the politics of engagement, the women's movement was able to get laws enacted against sexual abuse despite strong resistance from conservatives. Conservatives argued that such laws would disrupt rather than preserve the family, for example, through the filing of frivolous lawsuits over domestic violence. The importance and efficacy of melding the two strategies—participation and contention—is affirmed by a former activist:

> For social movements to progress and contribute to history, we need to maintain an exquisite balance between influence politics and engagement politics and develop vital links between them. They are not dichotomous but overlapping. Yet more sustained efforts are needed to oversee the implementation of gender laws and policies, enhance advocacy networks, and voice persistent demands for further reforms and gender equality lest social movements shrivel and fall to co-optation and preemption. (Yoon Jung Sook, personal interview, April 20, 2009)

As the movement agenda became familiar to average women, its agents became women in general, including housewives, middle-class women, and unmarried women. As the movement took on more issues, its participants expanded from the economically

exploited and politically oppressed to the sexually molested and socially discriminated against. As democratization progressed, the women's movement too became more popular—both more national and more local. The movement grew more selective in networking with former revolutionary groups, while taking on more issue-based joint activities with other civic groups, even conservative ones, that had been faithful advocates and beneficiaries of the authoritarian government. Ideological considerations, such as whether a movement organization was a former prodemocracy group, no longer prevented groups from collaborating. Networking and collective action developed even beyond national borders.

Strategies and collective action became more moderate and less radical. In addition to staging demonstrations and issuing protest statements, the movement began using the more traditional means of governmental policymaking, such as holding hearings and presenting petitions (Kim 2000). The movement was allowed to register with the state in 1995 under the Kim Young Sam administration (1993–1997) and soon began building partnerships with the government (Moon 2002). Because most of the public continued to believe that the women's movement was still too radical, a former activist said, "Women's organizations were eager to expand their public support base and were contemplating establishing local branches. Attaining state recognition was critical to approach laywomen more effectively and enhanced the appeal of the movement to the public" (Yoon Jung Sook, personal interview, April 20, 2009). After this legitimization, women's groups began to receive subsidies and utilize the institutional resources of the state. Moreover, an increasing number of movement activists, while maintaining their status as organizational leaders, served on government commissions on gender issues, which proliferated after democratization: In 2001, 27.7 percent of commission members were women, most from outside government (see Table 1). Thereafter, the number and rate of female participation in government commissions steadily increased until 2008, when the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration restricted participation and downsized the Ministry of Gender Equality (MOGE). Some feminists joined the government as "femocrats" and entered the legislature. Another example of growing engagement with the administration was that, after its establishment in 2001, MOGE was presided over by the former chairpersons of KWAU.

INSTITUTIONALIZING THE KOREAN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

The institutionalization of women's movements was not unique to Korea but was common in both democratizing and democratic countries (Cohen and Arato 1992; Ferree and Martin 1995). Nevertheless, some contextual factors were particularly relevant to the institutionalization of the Korean women's movement in the mid-1990s. Understanding the conditions that made the movement's institutionalization possible is crucial for analyzing its outcomes (i.e., the implementation of policies and laws that improved women's rights and reduced gender discrimination). The consequences of social movements are often decided not only by the efficiency and efficacy of movement

TABLE 1. Female Participation Rate in Government Commissions

Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Number of commission members	16,393	16,926	16,113	17,470	19,969	19,873	23,368	26,093	30,134
Number of female commission members	4,547	5,093	5,095	5,617	6,476	6,688	7,715	8,070	8,048
Female participation rate (percent)	27.7	30.1	31.6	32.2	32.4	33.7	33.1	30.9	28.0
Increase rate (percent)	4.1	2.4	1.5	0.6	0.2	1.3	−0.6	−2.2	−2.9

Source: Statistics Korea (2008).

strategies but also by the context in which they are formed and adopted (Amenta et al. 1999; Moore 1999; Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon et al. 2001, 2007; Raeburn 2004).

Globalizing Gender Policy

Globalization increased the leverage of international environments on domestic situations. The UN, along with a transnational advocacy network that had grown substantially since 1975, emerged as a strong supporter of women's movements and of their efforts to improve gender equality, which began with the establishment of the UN Commission on the Status of Women in 1947 (Kim 2001). In particular, the Beijing Platform for Action (PfA) adopted at the Fourth Beijing World Conference on Women organized by the UN in 1995 had significant impacts on women's equality and empowerment—not only in Korea but also internationally. All of the UN member states ratified the PfA, and more than 600 activists from approximately 80 women's organizations in Korea participated in the Beijing Conference.

The core of PfA was a gender mainstreaming strategy with a particular focus on the Gender and Development (GAD) perspective. This contrasted with the previous Women in Development (WID) policy upheld by the UN at the First World Conference in 1975. As the UN became more concerned with gender discrimination and inequality in the developing world, it initially devised WID measures to provide women equal opportunities with men in society and in the labor market, and to meet the basic practical needs of women, including family planning, health care, nutrition, and income (Kim 2001). The WID strategy carried the assumption that antidiscrimination policies and foreign aid to reduce the alienation of women in the course of development would promote their participation in the labor market and contribute to economic development, thereby leading to a more egalitarian society. Women were viewed as a valuable resource for industrialization, and increasing female workforce participation in economy would result in gender equality and industrial development (Kim 2005a). This policy was predicated on a liberal, reformist stance toward gender problems and regarded women as the main beneficiaries of gender equality and economic growth.

In response to feminists' critique that economic growth in the developing world aggravated gender inequality, contrary to the thinking of WID policy advocates, the UN shifted its policy toward GAD, the essence of which was gender mainstreaming. Its aim was to ensure that gender issues would be taken into account in all policy formulation and implementation processes and in public organizations and that men and women would be treated and benefit equally. No further inequalities were to be generated by the design, execution, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programs in the political, economic, and social spheres (Kim 2001). The gender mainstreaming perspective took a more comprehensive, transformative, and long-term view of gender problems than did WID. GAD acknowledged the inevitable gender differences between men and women and focused principally on the relationship between them, rather than on the discriminations and disadvantages that women faced alone. GAD considered gender inequality a social issue, not a women's issue, and suggested that gender inequality was reproduced via a structurally and institutionally embedded male-centered ideology and not caused

by any inherent deficiencies of women. The problem of gender inequality thus required a fundamental structural transformation of government policymaking and legislative processes: All policies must be "engendered" (i.e., gender sensitive or gender equal) and demarginalize women. Women were viewed as active agents in (rather than passive recipients of) an equalizing society. Thus, some affirmative action was needed to compensate for the sustained discrimination that women had long suffered.

In the late 1990s, influenced by the PfA proposal, the majority of women's organizations in Korea began to focus on the enactment of laws and policies (KWAU 2004). With the ratification of the UN proposal and increasing pressure from women's movement organizations, "President Kim Young Sam advanced 10 agendas for promoting women's social participation and established the Women's Development Act in 1995" (Nam In Soon, personal interview, February 29, 2008), and later, as a former head of MOGE attested, "The government was forced to establish a bureau for gender equality. The Presidential Commission for Women's Affairs was set up in 1998, and later became MOGE in 2001" (Ji Eun Hee, personal interview, April 16, 2009). As the influence of international organizations grew and their evaluations of governmental gender policies made the state more subject to international constraints, "the women's movement undertook a transnational networking effort as a way of pushing the government to enact policies that met global standards" (Ji Eun Hee, personal interview, April 16, 2009).

Sometimes, women's movement organizations took a roundabout path in exerting pressure on the government. When government reports overlooked or disregarded independent and reliable information about gender inequality/discrimination and violence against women, the women's organizations often drafted "shadow reports" containing the same information. After submitting them to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women—one of the UN bodies—activists lobbied committee members. Once they responded positively to the shadow reports, a former activist revealed, "We [KWAU] coerced the government to devise laws and policies compliant with global standards and international laws. This strategy was effective and had huge impacts" (Yoon Jung Sook, personal interview, April 20, 2009). President Kim's "keen interest in Korea's international reputation prompted efforts to strengthen the government's record on women's rights" (Jones 2006:103). Capitalizing on the auspicious international environment, a former "femocrat" testified, "Feminists forced government officers to respond to movement demands for gender equality. When pressured, most bureaucrats tried positively and promptly to be supportive of the demands so as not to look 'premodern and uneducated' or as if they did not understand and accept global standards" (Lee Sang-Deok, personal interview, April 23, 2009).

Another dimension of international relations that incited movement institutionalization was ideological. The collapse of the Soviet system and the consequent decline of Marxist ideology came as a shock to the social movement sector in Korea in the early 1990s and led to distrust of ideology-oriented movements among feminists. Ji Eun Hee, who was a staunch feminist activist and later chaired MOGE, recalled,

I was very much surprised to see the huge differences between what I had learned from written papers and the realities I witnessed when I traveled in [former] East Germany in 1991. The communal life in Berlin was far from ideal but seriously lacked productivity and specialty. The community was very unsanitary and unbelievably contaminated by pollution. . . . When I visited Yanbian in China later, I was stunned again to see a variety of social irregularities committed under the slogan of market socialism. . . . Disillusioned with socialism, I realized the limitations that ideology-oriented movements carried and believed that they should change to be more people-friendly and practical. . . . The women's movement was able to swiftly adjust to the changing international and political environments of gender mainstreaming in part because of its relatively weak ideological orientation in the 1980s. (Ji Eun Hee, personal interview, April 16, 2009)

Consequently, as another activist noted, "Consensus to improve gender equality through legal procedures and policy reforms was easily built among movement activists" (Kim Sunmi, personal interview, April 3, 2008).

Democratizing Political Opportunity Structures

The history of movement institutionalization in developing countries differs from that in Western Europe. Unlike in the case of revolutions, the collapse of an authoritarian regime followed by transition to democracy does not summarily remove conventional dictatorial political forces. When strong authoritarian forces remain, they can either impede coalitions between civic movements that support participatory democracy and liberals in the political system or, conversely, facilitate movement institutionalization (Mainwaring and Viola 1984). The majority of developing countries transitioning to democracy were devastated by dictatorship. They experienced intermittent militant antidictatorship struggles until frustration reached a critical mass. Social movements erupted, challenged authoritarian power, and prompted a transition to democracy by destabilizing and delegitimizing authoritarian rulers and making it impossible for them to govern (Collier and Mahoney 1997). As the transition to democracy took hold, collective and militant popular mobilization gave way to mediation of conflicts through democratic procedures and rules. The raw experience of dictatorship and the remnants of conventional authoritarian forces were compelling reminders to movements of the need to develop democratic means of resolving diverse interests (Hipsher 1998a). Should they fail, authoritarian or dictatorial forces could use popular dissatisfaction or the political vacuum to return to power by force or to capitalize on popular disenchantment (Mainwaring and Viola 1984). Indeed, even if such regression was practically impossible, social movement forces tended to fear the possibility and became wary of a sustained mobilization of collective action that might abet it (Kubik 1998). This led them to restrain the confrontational collective action they had used to initiate reform and to choose more institutionalized modes of achieving social progress (Valenzuela 1989).

In Korea, the expansion of political opportunities that appeared after the assumption of political power by civilian leaders facilitated movement institutionalization.

Significant structural transformations took place in the government, including the establishment of new apparatuses in charge of gender issues and the staffing of such organizations with professionals from outside the government. These changes functioned as an important "pull" factor—inducement—for movement institutionalization (Kim 2005b). After the Kim Young Sam administration was inaugurated in 1993, it devised the First Basic Plans for Working Women's Welfare in 1994; in 1995 it established the Globalization Commission, which identified 12 major gender issues. The government's efforts to promote women's well-being were echoed by those of other institutions: The National Assembly organized the Special Committee on Women's Affairs in 1994. Further, new legislation and revised laws provided civil society and women's movements with opportunities for institutionalization. For instance, a revision of the Act Concerning Incorporation and Operation of Nonprofit Corporations in 1994 made it easier to form citizens' organizations; the enactment of the Basic Law on the Development of Women in 1995 demonstrated the government's more serious consideration of women's issues in policy. The introduction of the Open Position System for government jobs in 1996 made it possible for civilians to be named to high-ranking positions responsible for policymaking within the bureaucracy.

The Kim Dae Jung government (1998–2002) was the first to achieve a "horizontal" transfer of power from the ruling to the opposition party in Korean politics; however, throughout Kim's term, the government failed to acquire a majority in parliament, thus placing the state in desperate need of a strategic alliance with reliable reformist political forces. The Kim administration sought to establish partnerships with civil society organizations that had maintained close relationships with him to compensate for the government's political failures at institutional politics. From then on, the channels for civil society organizations to participate in institutional politics were wide open, and institutional innovations that facilitated movement institutionalization continued: Upon assuming office, Kim Dae Jung established the Presidential Commission on Women's Affairs in 1998 to coordinate all government policies related to women's welfare. The government also instituted special bureaus—that is, Women's Policy Divisions—in six ministries and appointed a Gender Equality Officer in charge of gender issues in 1998. The same year, the Framework Act for Women's Development was implemented and the Second Basic Plan for Working Women's Welfare was revised. In 1999, the government established the Basic Plans for Female Public Servants' Development. The Nonprofit Organization Support Law in 2000 enabled the government to subsidize citizens' organizations. When MOGE was established in 2001, it declared the Constitution of Gender Equality in the 21st Century and developed a Five-Year Plan for Fostering Women in the Agriculture and Fishery Industry. The Women's Resource Development and Building Women in IT projects were strengthened in 2002. A former head of MOGE noted that "scarce human and fiscal resources made it imperative for the ministry to closely cooperate with women's movement organizations to pursue gender policies" (Ji Eun Hee, personal interview, April 16, 2009).

Women-friendly attitudes and policies continued under the Roh Moo-hyun government (2003–2007). In the presidential election in 2002, Roh and his party made a series of election pledges concerned with women's welfare and gender equality that were rated by women's movement organizations as highly progressive. His proposals focused on the sustained development of gender mainstreaming with concrete plans for allocating a "gender-sensitive budget," applying "gender-based analysis," and providing "gender training." The government adopted diverse measures to increase women's representation and participation in decision making in government bodies, including the National Assembly, public corporations, and government commissions. The president pledged publicly to name women to at least 50 percent of the ministerial and vice-ministerial positions and to more than 20 percent of the high-ranking public servant slots (class 5 and above). In fact, his first cabinet consisted of 4 female ministers out of 19, and some feminists/activists were appointed as high-ranking officials at the Blue House (the Korean White House). As an instrumental body, the government established the Women's Policy Coordination Committee, a Gender Equality Officer, and a Senior Gender Equality Officer in charge of gender mainstreaming policies (KWAU 2007). Since the arrival of political democratization more than 10 years earlier, "Women's movements proliferated in number, diversified in character, strengthened in collective power, expanded to local regions, and thus grew as significant sociopolitical force that the government could no longer disregard" (Nam In Soon, personal interview, February 29, 2008). But what was more important for movement institutionalization was that "President Roh was responsive to the gender equality demands of the movement and was supportive of the enactment of gender policies" (Ji Eun Hee, personal interview, April 16, 2009).

Undoubtedly, these expanding political opportunities stimulated women's movement institutionalization. Yet they did not simply appear or happen after democratization began but were a consequence of polity members' strategic choice to integrate feminist activists into policy deliberations and policymaking. Whether voluntarily or reluctantly, political actors opened and dictated political opportunities, which reflected a change in their perception about the role and status of women in society. Though nascent democratic governments were challenged to respond positively to the pent-up demands for gender equality raised by the movement, factors other than movement pressure impelled elites to open the door to feminist activists.

First, in tandem with democratization, Korea's economy began to suffer relative high wages and experienced a skilled workforce shortage (especially in the industrial sector), and consequential declining competiveness in an international trade. But the female workforce participation rate was low: In 2002, only 59 percent of female university graduates were employed, whereas 88 percent of male graduates were (KWDI 2004). Policymakers attributed the differential to persistent—though improving—inequalities in job opportunities and wages by gender (in 2003, women were paid 65.2 percent of male income) and to the heavy burdens of household chores, childbearing and child care, and insufficient government subsidies. A feminist-turned-legislator lamented, "How long do women have to suffer disadvantages due to pregnancy, child birth and

child care? Why isn't the cost of the child care and maternity leave shared with society? Discrimination against women has led them to choose late marriages or no marriage at all, and diminished women's desire to have a child. . . . This seriously low birthrate could hamper national competitiveness or national security" (quoted in Yang [2002:77]). To address these problems, state actors tried to harness women's movements and networks for more active women's participation in the labor market and their voluntary work for national economic growth. The Prime Minister stated in 1995, "The government views the utilization of the unused women's labor force, including married women, [as a way to] increase women's participation in society, mitigate the shortage of human resources . . . [and] strengthen the competitiveness of Korean industry" (quoted in Yang [2002:77]).

Second, due to historical gender discrimination and Confucian patriarchal culture, women in Korea tended to ignore politics and the women's voter turnout rate was always lower than men's in major elections. Accordingly, women were hugely under-represented in the legislature and the government—in 1996 women held only 3 percent of the National Assembly seats, and in 1997, only 13.3 percent of central government positions (KWDI 2004). Likewise, traditionally most politicians and bureaucrats in Korea were male, ideologically conservative, and politically insensitive to gender equality issues. The following testimony presents how gender issues were neglected in the parliament owing to the lack of feminist lawmakers: "Women's strength in major policy areas is weak because of their low numbers. Not only is the budget for women-related issues always low but in times of economic turmoil these items are axed first. Male committee members always accord women's issues rock-bottom priority" (quoted in Jones [2006:185]). However, democratization awakened political actors to the importance of women's voting and thus stirred them to court female voters and garner their electoral support. Politicians' cognitive shift to encourage women's vote and not to alienate any particular voting bloc from social minorities is revealed in the following statement (Jones 2006): "In order to create a new political culture, our party will accelerate the introduction of participatory democracy from now on. We will try our best to facilitate the political participation of women, youth, office workers and low-ranking public officials who have been reluctant to participate in politics" (quoted in Kim [2002:26]).

Politicians' statements about women's economic and political participation and the urgency of gender-related legislation may have been largely political rhetoric designed to achieve their political goals. But the economic recession and political democratization did enhance state actors' interest in female voting and women's economic contributions, led them to frame gender issues more strategically, and opened up opportunities for women to take positions of authority.

Awakening Feminist Consciousness and Liberalizing Awareness of the Nature of the State

Authoritarian regimes had long maintained a policy of "exclusion" toward civil society and SMOs: They excluded the public from participation in policymaking and

lawmaking processes and from fair distributions of economic growth, instead calling on individuals to sacrifice for the sake of national development and security and to support the modernization and industrialization strategies of the "developmental" state (Moon 2002). Consequently, during the democratization movement before 1987, SMOs considered the state merely a political appendage that faithfully represented the interests of capitalists and imperial power at the expense of public welfare. Budding political democratization usually expanded opportunities for political participation in institutional politics. Yet when opportunities for participation grew, not all SMOs were eager to participate. One group advocating participation argued that nonparticipation would mean forfeiting a golden chance to engage in democratic policymaking and implementation processes and would thus marginalize social movements in society; the other side claimed that participation would result in the co-optation or preemption of social movements and weaken movement leverage, ultimately leading to the end of movement influence.

History shows that postauthoritarian movements in the developing world were marked by either mobilization or moderation (including institutionalization), and occasionally both. In Korea, civil society grew under dictatorial rule through relentless contestation against the authoritarian state; it was later excluded, however, in a "political pact" negotiating the transfer of power from authoritarian to democratic rule. Because of the historical legacy of militancy under authoritarianism and the political exclusion during the transition to democracy, civil unrest continued even after democratization began.[5] In addition, SMOs were in general unwilling to participate when opportunities arose because of a deep-seated distrust of state power. A majority of organizations previously affiliated with the radical antidictatorship movement did not join the fledgling democratic government but instead pursued a mobilization strategy: "Movement politics" was sustained. A good example of this was the "nonparticipation" stance taken by a radical faction of labor movements represented by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions. Yet women's movement groups were different.

Gender consciousness, which was nurtured through struggles against the authoritarian regime during the 1980s, sought institutional and legal mechanisms to remedy gender injustices and ensure gender equality after the beginning of democratization (Ho 2007). Citizens' groups, including women's associations, began to view the state as a public arena and at the same time a semiautonomous, crucial political agent for compromise and negotiation, as well as for contestation, if necessary, where important decisions that could directly influence women's welfare were made. The state was no longer considered by nature oppressive and patriarchal, gender-blind or gender-biased, but sometimes could be even "emancipatory" and "gender-bright," depending on the political situations and movement's strategic abilities (Kim 2005b). Movement activists began to perceive a new "state pluralism" in the wake of political democratization. This nurtured a belief in the potential of engagement politics to secure women's rights and citizenship and to correct gender inequalities. As the popular view of the state changed, mainstream institutions came to be viewed by movement activists as "absolutely necessary terrains of political struggle" (Reinelt 1995:85).

Women's organizations persistently demanded that the government establish special institutional apparatuses responsible for gender policies. A chairperson of KWAU attested,

> When we started women's movements 20 years ago, no comprehensive and effective laws and policies on women and gender equality existed. When struggling to resolve problems related to infant care and sexual and domestic violence, we pressured the government to prevent them mainly through street demonstrations during the Roh Tae Woo (1988–1992) and Kim Young Sam governments because they were not responding to movement demands. (Nam In Soon, personal interview, February 29, 2008)

Yet, as a former activist added, "While working for the issues by building and running day care centers and counseling victims of sexual violence on our own, we realized the necessity of legal and institutional bodies and regulations to punish offenders and understood that gender inequality was a public issue and a social, not persona, problem for which the state must be responsible" (Park Inn Hea, personal interview, April 22, 2009).

As the reformist Kim Dae Jung administration became increasingly interested in gender issues and attentive to social minorities and the weak, women's organizations began to collaborate with bureaucrats in pursuing gender mainstreaming, although the organizations did not decide to "strategically allocate" a specific portion of movement activists as "femocrats" within the government (Lee Kyongsook, personal interview, February 29, 2008). After the gender mainstreaming strategy was adopted, government bureaucrats' roles were held to be more critical; however, since the majority of them were already gender-biased, movement activists believed that it was imperative that they and nongovernmental organization leaders engage in the state as "femocrats" to voice, monitor, and participate in "engendering" policymaking (Ma 2007). The relationship between the state and the women's movement then evolved to become more conciliatory than confrontational, a development that aided the progression of movement institutionalization. A former leading activist commented on the cognitive shift among women's movement activists: "Social movements and institutions are an interrelated space, not mutually conflicting, contradictory alternatives. Institutions are a space for the women's movement to exercise a 'dual' strategy and a space where 'contention' and 'compromise' are competing" (Yun 2004:68). This view of the reciprocity between movements and institutions echoes Oommen's (1990:151) argument: "[M]ovements require institutions to concretize their visions; institutions need movements to sustain their legitimacy." In the same vein, True (2003:372) argues, "The policy entrepreneurship of gender advocates in the executive level of government was also found to be instrumental in leveraging policy change at the national level, especially in democratic states" since " '[m]ainstreamed' institutions, even when they are weak, provide a platform for change by encouraging new alliances and networking among feminist activists, scholars and policymakers inside and outside of government." The same change in understanding of the role and the nature of the democratizing state was replicated in the Korean women's movement. Thus, "the nonideological nature of gender discrimination and

sexual violence issues . . . allowed the women's movement not only to earn public and governmental support but also to accomplish their goals through legal and institutional reforms" (Kim Sunmi, personal interview, April 3, 2008).

CONCLUSION

I have argued in this article that Korean women's movements' use of a dual strategy to achieve their goals resulted from the specific context of the mid-1990s: (1) the external assistance of the UN, which advocated a gender mainstreaming policy; (2) the democratic government's positive response to gender equality demands; and (3) movement activists' and rank and filers' liberalizing conception of the nature and the role of the state. These combined to permit the building of a movement–state partnership to resolve gender issues via legal and institutional reforms. A coincidence of external influences, domestic circumstances, and organizational decisions led to movement institutionalization. It was not a linear process, but a result of concurrent strategic choices by the movement to participate in formal politics and of the state to integrate movement activists and their demands into political institutions under specific, propitious conditions. Movement institutionalization is thus relational by nature, and historically and socially made, not naturally evolving or structurally determined.

The movement's efforts to blend a politics of contention with a politics of engagement maximized the sociopolitical leverage of movement activities, made possible legislation and the enactment of policies germane to gender equality, and provided institutional and legal foundations to avert gender discrimination. Policy implementation and legislation raised women's awareness and socialized public consciousness as to the value of gender equality, making additional measures possible. The engagement strategy pursued by "femocrats" and feminist activists did not push for the wholesale incorporation of movement activists into the state machinery and thus did not result in co-optation or preemption that could have sapped movements' vitality. Rather, Korean women's movement activists worked inside and outside the state, through diverse local communities, and in global civil society, seeking what Moser (2005) calls "twin-track action."

The conditions affecting movement institutionalization are contingent and contextual (Katzenstein 1998). Therefore, the conclusions of this article cannot be generalized beyond the specific spatiotemporal context in which the Korean women's movement operated. Further comparative research should be conducted to validate theoretical conclusions. Nevertheless, I believe that some theoretical implications and contributions can be drawn from the arguments presented here.

First, the argument that women's movements become institutionalized through strategic alliances with the state is in line with other recent findings that SMOs forge coalitions with states and private corporations, as well as with other SMOs (e.g., Santoro and McGuire 1997; Moore 1999; Raeburn 2004; Stearns and Almeida 2004; Almeida 2010; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). This argument revisits underlying propositions about the nature of the state and its relationship with social movements. The

relationship of social movements with the state does not need to be all the time contentious but can occasionally be cooperative. Movement activists and polity members can overlap, and the contested terrain of collective action is not always outside the polity. Entrenched in the polity, "insider activists" function as interlocutors representing and channeling movement causes and demands to influence policymaking and legislation (Santoro and McGuire 1997). These points may require revising or stretching the conventional conceptualization of social movements as collective action employing disruptive tactics, contending state authority, and retaining outsider status from formal politics (Tilly 1994; Snow et al. 2004). Moreover, the state should be viewed as not only a structure but also an agent (Jenkins 1995). When analyzing the conditions that lead to a movement outcome and make a movement coalition possible, one needs thus to examine the systemic and proximate opportunities/threats that the state imposes and observe its responses to movement challenges and demands (Burstein et al. 1995; Jenkins 1995; Amenta et al. 1999; Moore 1999). State actors engage in "strategic framing" as much as movement activists do (McCammon, Hewitt, and Smith 2004), both to gain advantage and to maintain legitimacy when forging a coalition with SMOs and handling a movement protest. Because the power imbalance between the social movement and the state is not always zero-sum, examining movement vigor alone is insufficient to understand a movement outcome and a movement–state coalition; instead, state capacity and propensity of exercising political power needs to be studied.

Second, understanding that movement institutionalization is a strategic choice and that the implementation of gender equality agendas as laws and policies is a movement policy outcome sheds new light on the existing literature on movement outcomes. Research on movement outcomes has been hindered by the inherent difficulty of categorizing the many types of outcomes (Amenta and Young 1999). The conceptual categorization of the plethora of movement outcomes must be mutually exclusive. In this respect, Gamson's (1990) widely accepted distinction between "acceptance" and "advantage" seems less than tenable because the two concepts are not conceptually discrete. Movement institutionalization may or may not generate desired outcomes, whether they are policies or collective benefits: The consequences of movement institutionalization vary contextually, sometimes leading to positive results; at others, negative ones. Also, the long-standing debate over the relative efficacy between a mobilization strategy and a moderation strategy in generating desired outcomes can be refocused since the merits of assertive versus acquiescent strategies are contingent on economic and political situations (Amenta et al. 1999), as the women's movement literature illustrates (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989). Furthermore, the fact that Korean women's movements succeeded in legislating gender equality issues by adroitly balancing engagement with mobilization shows that the two strategies can be complementary.

My study raises the opportunity for research on several questions. It would be useful to analyze how an outcome (particularly movement institutionalization) affects the internal dynamics of social movements. Only a few researchers (e.g., Suh 2004; Kane 2010) have touched on this question. Similarly, we need to monitor whether and how much the implementation of gender-related policies and laws actually improves gender

equality in society and whether their collective benefits are fairly distributed to women in general without discriminating or marginalizing particular groups (Amenta and Young 1999; Amenta *et al.* 1999). Last, when a government's political opportunities are no longer furthered by movement demands for participation and legislation, it would be useful to examine whether institutionalized movements thrive or wither, causing activists to feel again that "surviving was equivalent to political success in the dark days" (Bashevkin 1998:245).

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NOTES

[1]Some of the theoretical discussion in this section and the next elaborates on my previous work (Suh 2006).

[2]According to Giugni and Passy (1998), social movements institutionalize gradually—they join the political power structure in three stages: first, through consultation with the state or parties, which allows them to disseminate information and opinions as well as policy recommendations; second, through integration, which gives movements some responsibility for policy implementation; and third, through delegation, which empowers movements with a degree of responsibility in policymaking and policy implementation. See also Meyer (2007).

[3]In particular, developing countries in democratic transition and consolidation present a political climate in which social movements with adequate organizational identity and autonomy can maintain their independence even as institutionalized participants; their continued fight against the vestiges of authoritarianism often makes them coequal with opposition parties or reform-minded political elites with whom they can form alliances (Dryzek 1996; Sandoval 1998).

[4]For instance, if environmental movements stress the ravages of environmental destruction and the public benefits of prevention without implicating the political power elites, they and their concerns are more likely to be welcomed in decision making—become institutionalized—than had they presented those challenges as an indictment of the standing political system (Dryzek 1996).

[5]Following Korean custom, the surname precedes the first name.

[6]The June Democratization Uprising in 1987 that lasted three weeks nationwide and mobilized several million civilians brought authoritarian rule to an end. In the aftermath, the Great Worker Struggle that began in July and continued until September affected the whole nation with its radical and militant labor strikes. During the period, unprecedented 3,500 labor conflicts occurred and 1,060 new trade unions organized. Labor militancy continued from 1986 to 1989, as the number of trade unions doubled and the number of union members tripled (Suh 2009).

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APPENDIX. INTERVIEWS

Ji Eun Hee, former head of MOGE and former chairperson of KWAU, (Seoul) April 16, 2009

Kim Sunmi, former activist of KWAU, (Seoul) April 3, 2008

Lee Kyongsook, activist of KWAU, (Stanford, CA) February 29, 2008

Lee Kyung-Sook, former activist and legislator, (Seoul) April 30, 2009

Lee Sang-Deok, former activist and femocrat, (Seoul) April 23, 2009

Nam In Soon, former chairperson of KWAU, (Seoul) February 29, 2008

Park Inn Hea, former chairperson of Korea Women's Hot Line, (Seoul) April 22, 2009

Yoon Jung Sook, former chairperson of Korean Womenlink, (Seoul) April 20, 2009