Implicit Bias and Gender (and Other Sorts of) Diversity in Philosophy and the Academy in the Context of the Corporatized University

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Introduction

It struck me recently that two of the things I value most, issues to which I have devoted my academic career, are under threat from the same cause. Both the movement for more racial, ethnic, global, and gender diversity in philosophy—and in the academy generally—and the existence of the discipline of philosophy in institutions of higher education, are threatened by the spread of neoliberal thinking and practices.

Philosophy has the lowest ratio of women to men of any of the humanities. Equal employment opportunity strategies required by Title VII, designed to address explicit or overt discrimination on the basis of sex, have not significantly increased the numbers of women faculty or graduate students in philosophy. Philosophers have recently begun exploring the possible implications—both practical and theoretical—of unconscious or implicit bias, for the lack of gender diversity in philosophy.

These concerns about the lack of gender diversity in philosophy are taking place in the context of the corporatization of higher education. The new dominant model of higher education as a commodity has serious implications for philosophy and for concerns about diversity. In many countries, including the United States, the perceived purpose of higher education is changing. Colleges and universities were once charged with educating citizens and were seen as places for the collaborative pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. On such an understanding, the once explicit goal of broadening access to higher education to all segments of society made sense.

There are many ways in which this new conception of higher education can be analyzed, but I will focus here on my two major areas of interest—philosophy and diversity. What happens to diversity as a value under a neoliberal regime? What does the reconceptualization of higher education mean for the discipline of philosophy? Finally, what is the impact of these changes on diversity in philosophy?

I shall first describe the changes in institutions of higher education caused by the spread of neoliberalism into the public sector. I shall then argue that the changing values and structure of higher education allow only one justification for diversity in higher education, and that this justification is not premised on social
justice or ethical obligation. Next, I will address the discipline of philosophy, arguing that neoliberalism threatens its existence in higher education. Finally, I shall examine the implications of the corporatization of higher education for diversity within philosophy. I shall suggest that subtle forms of prejudice and implicit bias play a role in the continuing lack of gender diversity in philosophy, and in the academy generally. Implicit or unconscious bias is bias of which we are not aware but which can be detected in certain test situations, and can clash with our professed beliefs about members of social groups. These biases can affect our judgments and decisions in every aspect of our academic lives, including explanations for the lack of diversity in the discipline of philosophy.

Unlike many fields—medicine, law, the natural sciences, and engineering—philosophy has only recently begun examining the reasons for its own lack of diversity among faculty and students. My concern is that at the very moment that academic philosophy as a discipline has begun trying to diversify its students, faculty, and curriculum, both such concerns, and philosophy itself, are in peril in higher education. Yet philosophy should be one of the best disciplines for clarifying the limits of neoliberal higher education, and for showing that there are significant moral and pragmatic arguments for the inclusion of diverse groups, diverse disciplines, and diversity within disciplines, in the university.

Neoliberalism and the Corporatized University

Neoliberalism is devoted to the principle that the market is the best means of producing and distributing resources. This principle is familiar from some forms of classical liberalism, often termed “free market” capitalism. However, the market of neoliberalism is anything but free, and the scope of the efficiency of markets is not limited to the private sector. Hayek argued that free markets were more efficient mechanisms for producing and distributing resources than central planning of any kind because markets operate in part on local knowledge that a state or any other larger organization could not access. Furthermore, Hayek and others limited the scope of the efficiency of free markets to the private, business sphere. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, extends the argument for the efficiency of markets to all public sector organizations and contends that government must interfere with markets in order to maintain their efficiency.

Those who promote the principles of neoliberalism argue that the efficiency of public sector organizations, such as higher education, can be improved by the imposition of neoliberal principles, and many nations have been implementing such principles over the last twenty years. As a result of the imposition of neoliberal principles and practices onto higher education, a radical shift in values has occurred. Public universities and liberal arts colleges once considered it their mission to further the “common good,” by educating students to be good citizens and better economic agents. However, the implementation of market thinking and management strategies has dramatically changed higher education. As Olssen and Peters put it, under neoliberal management theories, “education is represented as
an input-output system which can be reduced to an economic production function.\textsuperscript{8} We academics have grudgingly accepted the new regime of “assessment,” not realizing that this is part of a much wider change in higher education, one that imposes the values of the market in an area once relatively protected from such values. We now focus on “outcomes” and outputs, strategic plans, benchmarks, and continuous improvement. We must prove that our academic programs “add value” to our students. Our institutions must justify their existence by successfully competing with other institutions of higher education for students, grants, and faculty. And we must justify our disciplines, including philosophy, in competition with other programs and disciplines within our own institutions, where we compete for start-up funds for developing new ways of increasing student credit hours.\textsuperscript{9}

The application of neoliberal policies to higher education has resulted in what has been called the “corporatized” university.\textsuperscript{10} Higher education is being corporatized, as the language, categories, and values of the past give way to the language of business—students have become “consumers,” and knowledge is a commodity. According to Margaret Thornton,

Student/consumers are more likely to be interested in credentialism than the pursuit of a liberal education because they have one eye on ballooning education debt and one eye on an assured career path in an uncertain world that has reified the swing towards vocation- alism. Commodification has encouraged a dilution or a sloughing off of the liberal curriculum altogether. . . . Regardless of discipline, the emphasis is now on marketable skills. Instrumentalism encourages a less reflexive, theoretical, and critical approach to the knowledge transmitted. The skills/applied focus is designed to appeal to prospective employers, thereby strengthening the conveyor belt between universities and business.\textsuperscript{11}

Thornton and others call the new model of higher education “academic capitalism.”\textsuperscript{12} Academic faculty are supposed to pay for their own salaries either through teaching large numbers of students marketable skills, obtaining grants, or through marketing their “knowledge” in collaboration with private businesses. The primary purpose of higher education is now the transfer of information and skills to workers, and wealth production for the state.

In the United States, we have seen this shift to academic capitalism in its most pristine form in recommendations for higher education reform championed by Texas Governor Rick Perry. Perry has endorsed the proposals of a conservative Texas organization called the “Texas Public Policy Foundation” (http://www.texaspolicy.com). The Foundation created “Seven Breakthrough Solutions” for higher education, including tying faculty raises to student evaluations. This organization was also behind the “audit” of professors at Texas A&M. Each professor’s salary was compared with how much research money he or she generated, and how much tuition money he or she generated from teaching.\textsuperscript{13} Perry and the Texas Public Policy Foundation are also responsible for raising the question, “whether there’s a need for more critiques of Shakespeare and other esoteric research that doesn’t generate money.”\textsuperscript{14} Florida Governor Rick Scott recently similarly
questioned the “need” for anthropology: “If I’m going to take money from a citizen to put into education then I’m going to take that money to create jobs. So I want that money to go to degrees where people can get jobs in this state. Is it a vital interest of the state to have more anthropologists? I don’t think so.”

These are examples of the effects on higher education of the shift from a set of values that include, but are not limited to, narrowly construed economic values, to neoliberal values. Both teaching and research must be reconceptualized in terms of their contribution to the product of higher education. The “knowledge” that is the proper product under neoliberalism is a commodity so that research is driven by demand for the research result. The understanding of what it means to be human is apparently not in demand. Thus, anthropology, literature, and philosophy—all of the humanities, in fact—are valueless in the corporatized university.

Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity/Diversity in Higher Education

The definition of “affirmative action” is contested, but no matter the definition, affirmative action is inherently bound up with issues of justice. Arguments for affirmative action in higher education require the recognition of inequalities of power and of concepts of fairness. They emphasize the injustice of policies and practices that prevent members of some groups from having the same educational opportunities as members of others. Furthermore, arguments for affirmative action are typically based on values that are independent of market values. The shift from affirmative action to diversity as the focus of opportunities and access tends to mask issues of justice, for diversity requires only the recognition of difference. Furthermore, arguments for diversity in higher education are often based on values that are consistent with neoliberalism. Thornton identifies the distinction as follows: affirmative action “[begins] from the implied premise that there is an injustice or an inequality that needs to be remedied, such as sexism, racism, homophobia or disabilism: diversity obscures the issue of inequality which is at the heart of the matter.”

The implications of the neoliberal perspective for creating more inclusive academic institutions and programs are stark. A number of scholars have tracked the transformation of affirmative action into “diversity” through law and policy, highlighting the shift in the justification for attention to diversity from social justice to efficiency. Thornton has written on the changes taking place in Australia. In 1998, a major piece of Australia’s antidiscrimination legislation, the Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act of 1986, was reviewed and revised. One of the primary requirements for assessing the law and its effectiveness was a cost–benefit analysis: “Legislation/regulation should be retained only if the benefits to the community as a whole outweigh the costs.” Although the costs and benefits were not explicitly limited to economic ones, the context of the requirement, the federal government’s Competition Principles Agreement, made it clear that this is what was intended. The result of the review was new legislation. The 1986 Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunity for Women) Act
was replaced by the *Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act of 1999*. According to Thornton, this change in language of the law, from “affirmative action” to “equal opportunity,” was a substantial change that accurately represented the shifting values of the government: “The erasure of [Affirmative Action] from the EEO discourse sent a clear message that a regime of strict equal treatment was now to prevail. Employers were not to be burdened with equity obligations in a neoliberal climate where the focus was on productivity and performativity.” The shift in values from injustice and inequality to mere difference was complete when “diversity management” quickly came to replace “equal opportunity.”

Whereas early arguments for affirmative action were based on group membership, the notion of diversity in “diversity management” is individualized: the emphasis is on individual differences and on “maximizing everyone’s potential.” Furthermore, whereas affirmative action was once under specially assigned offices reporting to government agencies, diversity management in Australia is now voluntary, placing power in the hands of employers. As Bacchi points out, “by transforming the issue of equity into a human resource issue, the implication is that government surveillance of business practices in this area is unnecessary and inappropriate.” This new conception of diversity is thus consistent with the neoliberal trend toward certain forms of government deregulation. This new notion of diversity is not about power relations among and between groups or individuals. It is about productivity and profit. A publication entitled, “10 Minutes on Managing Diversity,” created by PricewaterhouseCoopers, claims that, “those companies that cultivate cultural dexterity now, as a tool for effectively managing diversity, will be better equipped to weather today’s many challenges and will have a competitive advantage when the economy recovers.” In other words, diversity is directly linked to the efficiency of an organization and its greater competitiveness. The idea that certain sorts of diversity in hiring might be justified on the grounds that it benefits society as a whole, or that there are wrongs that can be righted at least in part by an emphasis on diverse hiring, is completely absent.

In the United States, similar changes in the law regarding affirmative action in higher education have taken place, with similar results. Several states have passed referenda prohibiting affirmative action in higher education. A series of Supreme Court decisions in the past decade has narrowed allowable reasons for seeking to diversify institutions of higher education. In its decision in *Grutter v. Bollinger*, the Court accepted the University of Michigan Law School’s argument that a diverse student body has educational benefits. As far as the Court is concerned, including race as a factor in admissions may not depend on any notion of inequality or injustice in a lack of diversity. The only value that is accepted as a justification for diversity is a neoliberal value: a better product. In effect, the only allowable arguments for diversity in higher education today are arguments that the products of higher education—workers and knowledge—are improved by diversity. What these arguments often came down to is that diversity is necessary for the education of white students, or otherwise privileged students, who otherwise would not be exposed to anyone of a different race or ethnicity.
burden of providing diversity for some students, with the educational benefit accruing mostly to the already privileged students. While the students who are chosen to provide diversity benefit individually from admission to an institution, this is almost incidental. The diversity rationale seems to turn the issues of inequality that first motivated concerns with affirmative action on their head.

The issue of who bears the burden for the benefits of diversity, and who benefits most, is a serious one. The potential failure of “diversity” hiring in universities can be seen in this anecdote. Our university held a “Diversity Summit” last year. It was attended primarily by university student affairs staff, with a sprinkling of faculty and other administrators. At a “breakout” session, in which I was a minority in both race and position, two African American student affairs staff complained that all problems with African American students were sent to them by the White staff. What this seemed to show was that the White staff understood that the African American staff were hired primarily to serve African American students, while they, the White staff, could, instead of learning from the African American staff how to serve African American students, as well as other students, go on behaving as they always had.

The decades-long responsibility of institutions of higher education to be more inclusive and accessible, and to work toward diversity of students and faculty, is directly threatened by the spread of neoliberalism. In a recent New York Times opinion piece, Karen Sibert argues that women doctors are not as productive as male doctors throughout their careers because many of them practice part time in order to take care of their families. She concludes, “we can no longer afford to continue training doctors who don’t spend their careers in the full-time practice of medicine.” According to neoliberal ideology, this kind of argument makes perfect sense: using governmental money to educate people who will not maximize their educations is inefficient. It should be stopped, or, alternatively, the consumers of medical training should pay for that training out of their own pockets.

Diversity in higher education is no longer about including groups of people who are underrepresented because of past or present unjust obstacles. It is not about righting wrongs. It is not even about equal opportunity. It is about differences, which may or may not coincide with the differences from the majority represented by oppressed groups. Furthermore, the neoliberal perspective expressed by Sibert above constrains the value of diversity even further. Unless a particular sort of diversity improves the product of institutions of higher education, it has no value.

Philosophy and the Corporatized University

The corporatization of higher education is a threat to the existence of philosophy as a discipline. In the past few years, we have all received urgent pleas from faculty in universities threatening to cut philosophy programs altogether. The administrative justification is usually that philosophy departments are not cost-effective, are not graduating enough students per year, or are not garnering
enough external funds for research. However, philosophy, at least at the undergraduate level, is cost-effective because we teach many students with very few resources. An administrator at my university says that many other programs at the university are balanced on the back of the teaching of the humanities and social sciences, which do not need labs or expensive technologies. Robert Watson has argued that the humanities, generally, “make money” for universities.

Philosophy departments can, and must, play the cost-effectiveness game, but we should be wary of doing so, for that is not ultimately the issue. The issue is that universities are now seen as corporations that produce two commodities: workers and knowledge. These workers need information and technical skills, not knowledge. What philosophy offers is not valued by the technocrats in state and federal government, who make the decisions about state budgets. This is evident in the continuing cuts to federal grants for humanities education.

A recent article on the “irrelevance” of philosophy as a discipline seems to miss this point. Lee McIntyre, in “Making Philosophy Matter—or Else,” argues that academic philosophers are to blame for the decline of philosophy departments. According to McIntyre, we have focused on publishing research for other philosophers, rather than on “philosophy’s historical mission, which is not merely to find the truth, but to use the truth to improve the quality of human life.” McIntyre goes on to blame philosophers for teaching the same old tired courses, using the same old thought experiments, and not showing the relevance of philosophy to the world and its many problems.

In response to this article, there was an immediate outcry from other philosophers, especially from those who felt that they were doing exactly what MacIntyre said we should be doing. I am sure that there are many who are engaging their students with philosophy and the world—another article that appeared on the same day supports this. Furthermore, I agree with much of MacIntyre’s criticism of academic philosophy, particularly at the graduate level. However, MacIntyre does not mention the context in which the demise of philosophy departments is taking place. He refers merely to the “financial crisis.” He does not acknowledge the corporatized university with its consequent shift in values. In arguing that philosophers are contributing to the demise of academic departments, because they do not teach or write on issue of relevance to the wider public, or that philosophy is to be saved by becoming more publicly engaged, MacIntyre assumes that such relevance and engagement is valued by society. But, from the perspective of neoliberalism and the corporatization of the university, critical perspectives on contemporary issues are not valued—unless they are in support of the dominant ideology of neoliberalism.

Diversity and Philosophy

Although MacIntyre does not mention the relative lack of diversity in philosophy, his own argument seems to require it. One of the ways in which academic philosophy can be said to have failed to remain relevant—insofar as it has—is the
way in which it has largely ignored its own whiteness and maleness, both among its faculty and among its students.

The lack of concern for diversity in philosophy—in its students, faculty, and curriculum—is widespread, and, it seems to me, may be explained, at least in part, by an implicit bias that is embedded so deeply in the assumptions of certain dominant types of philosophy, especially in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia, that it is unrecognized as an assumption at all. Feminist philosophers and critical race philosophers have revealed these assumptions in their critiques of mainstream philosophy, but their revelations seem to have been taken up by few, primarily philosophers whose work focuses on issues of justice and oppression. That is, the bias has been revealed, but it has not been recognized as a bias by many of those who possess it. This is part of what it means for a bias to be “implicit.” The bias is about gender, race, and ethnicity, as well as the very definition of philosophy, and so has significant practical implications for those who wish to study and develop careers in philosophy.

It might be argued that the following anecdote is an example of how “implicit bias” can influence recognizing that the low number of women and other people of color in philosophy is a problem. In 2011, Chris Blattman posted the percentage of PhDs per discipline in 2009 on her blog. Philosophy PhDs were near the bottom of the list, with just less than 30% of women PhDs. The only disciplines with lower ratios of women to men were engineering, computer science, and physics.

The very first response to this post was from someone named “Paul” who asked, “Why the implicit presumption that all fields should be 50% female?” In response, “Marc” stated that, if we look at the statistics, “there is a clear distinction between the genders that is not reliant on stereotypes, but rather on physiological differences in how a male and female differ as determined by brain function and hormone influences (to simplify).” “Matt” responds to Marc that, “It’s important to remember that some of those mental priorities may be influenced by social biases. However, your point about gender neutrality is right on point. There are differences between men and women, and pretending like there aren’t is really a frustrating quality of many of my fellow ‘liberals’.” It was only in a later post, by a woman with an undergraduate degree in philosophy, who chose to get a PhD in anthropology, that the subject matter of philosophy as a discipline was questioned. She said that she found the sorts of problems considered in philosophy to be “woefully narrow and disconnected from the reality of the world.” This comment gets at something that the initial respondents hinted at but could not see as a serious point. They claim that there are biological differences between men and women that can explain the lower percentage of women who get PhDs in philosophy. In other words, they confirm that women and men think differently and are interested in different things. What they cannot see is that this is an admission that philosophy as a discipline is dominated by the male interests (they did not question the fact that it is white males). By their own assumption, if women and others with either biologically influenced ways of thinking, or alternative “social biases,” were to have substantial representation in
the discipline, especially at the level of graduate education, we would expect the very discipline to change.

We might interpret the “men and women are inherently different” response to the issue of the predominance of white males in philosophy as simply poor reasoning. However, I think that when people who are as careful and critical as philosophers make mistakes of the sort I have described, something more is going on. They are prevented from recognizing the flaws in their reasoning by implicit biases.

In fact, I do not subscribe to the “biological differences” claims of “Paul” and “Marc.” I think that, before we decide that there are fewer women in philosophy than white men because of biological difference, we should explore the possibility that philosophy has failed to integrate the sorts of issues, problems, and methodologies that women and nonwhite people find interesting and relevant. What has happened, to a large extent, is that the issues and problems that “others” have been bringing to philosophy for the last thirty years or so have been compartmentalized and marginalized.

In discussing the diversity argument for admitting students of color and others to institutions of higher education, I pointed out that the benefit of diversity goes to the students who are already privileged. The burden is borne by the students admitted to provide the diversity. Something similar seems to have happened in philosophy. Many departments have sought to hire faculty that are not white men because they subscribe to some version of the diversity argument. They agree with a version of Justice Powell’s decision in Bakke, in which he stated, “The atmosphere of ‘speculation, experiment and creation’—so essential to the quality of higher education—is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body.”37

However, what often happens is that the addition of women, or women or men of color, to a philosophy department has little effect on the professional activities of the rest of the faculty. Courses in philosophy and gender or race might be added to the curriculum but are taught solely by the “diversity” hires. Concerns about multiculturalism and gender have not generally been integrated into the philosophy curriculum, especially at the doctoral level (see below).

In addition to compartmentalizing the “diversity” philosophers and their work, in some departments, the subjects of interest to a diversity hire may not be accepted as “philosophy.” The hire is not tenured, or receives bad reviews and leaves. Although I do not know all of the circumstances of the case, the denial of tenure to Professor Namita Goswami seems to illustrate the problem. Professor Goswami was hired to teach feminist philosophy, postcolonial theory, and critical race theory. However, the university did not think that what she did was philosophical enough, and so denied her tenure. In looking at her c.v., it is clear that she has not published in what have long been thought to be the top philosophy journals—The Journal of Philosophy, for example. But those journals do not publish the kind of material she produces. She is caught in a vicious circle.

If a department is serious about diversifying its faculty, it is going to have to acknowledge that the very definition of philosophy, along with the standards for
evaluating scholarship in philosophy, will very likely have to change.\textsuperscript{38} To see that social and cultural context influences what counts as philosophical thinking and knowledge, we need only compare academic philosophy in different countries. What counts as a philosophical issue, methodology, and so on, differs in different places. This seems to show that there is nothing sacrosanct about the way that philosophy is done in the major doctoral institutions in the United States.

**Conclusion**

“Diversity” means different things to different people, and nowhere more so than among philosophers. I conceive of diversity in philosophy as diversity among students, faculty, and curriculum; the three are interrelated. Diversity among students means students of different classes, geographical backgrounds, ethnicities, races, genders, sexualities, abilities, nationalities, age . . . all of the categories that social scientists have shown influence the ways in which human beings experience the world. We can attract a more diverse student body by having a more diverse faculty, as well as a more diverse curriculum. A wider range of subjects and perspectives in the philosophy curriculum is unlikely without a more diverse faculty.

Although I have lamented the shift from affirmative action to diversity, the last thirty years show that diversity has changed the discipline of philosophy for the better. As Alcoff notes, it was only when those previously denied access to academic philosophy began to be admitted that issues such as abortion and racism were addressed by philosophers.\textsuperscript{39} Further, feminist and critical race epistemologists argue that we do better philosophy (and science) when we have a variety of thinkers addressing an issue.\textsuperscript{40} However, as I have warned, just having a diversity of people is not enough. Subtle and not so subtle biases must be eradicated if different perspectives are to be recognized and their significance integrated into existing practices. Opening the door of philosophy to people of diverse experiences will not affect philosophy unless those already in the room take seriously what they offer. Feminist philosophy, critical race philosophy, disability philosophy, and many other “new” fields are still largely pursued only by those who brought the issues to the table in the first place. They can be completely ignored by many who study the same general field—a graduate student can study epistemology without studying feminist epistemology, for example.

The greatest change, the best integration of the contributions generated by greater inclusion of people and subjects in the discipline, has come at the level of liberal arts colleges and regional comprehensive universities, where no PhD is offered. Women and men of color are more likely to be hired in such institutions, where the focus is on teaching rather than on research, and the teaching load is high. There is also more likely to be more collaboration among faculty, both within the department and within other disciplines, in such institutions. This has led to a greater diversity in the approaches to philosophy likely to be found.
However, in my experience over the past twenty or so years in hiring, diversity has made limited inroads into the most prestigious graduate programs. A quick survey of Leiter’s top Graduate Programs (2010) reveals that none of them requires that PhD students take a course in gender studies, feminism, critical race theory, multicultural philosophy, or anything other than traditional Western philosophy. Furthermore, in these departments, the numbers of women faculty are low (never above 28 percent), and the number of faculty from nonwhite ethnic or racial groups is even lower. This is important because it is the graduates of these PhD programs that will fill the slots in the top philosophy programs, thus reproducing the narrowness of the field.

I also have much anecdotal evidence from hiring searches for the failure of philosophy to integrate diversity into its curriculum. For example, when asked what kind of experience he had with teaching multicultural students, one job candidate said that he was married to a woman from Vietnam. He seemed not to understand that this was not a satisfactory answer to the question, which indicates that he had not seriously considered his own situation and possible biases in relation to philosophy and to teaching. Another candidate was asked to teach a class on an early paper challenging tradition ethics from a feminist perspective. He led a class discussion in which he said nothing about the rather provocative claims about gender. Afterward, in a discussion with the professor of the class, he was asked why he had not brought up some of the most interesting and controversial claims in the paper. He admitted that he knew nothing about gender, and he had not been taught anything about gender in his graduate education (six years previously).

I will raise one other diversity issue for philosophy. Unlike many other disciplines, we are not consciously globalizing our field. This means that we are not diversifying from a global perspective, taking into the field the different perspectives and ways of thinking that are now easily available to us and to our students, and which are more likely to shape the backgrounds of our students as international students are encouraged to fill our classes. Again, if we look at the top ranked PhD programs, students are able to attain their degrees without every taking a course in non-Western philosophy.

The academy has, to a large extent, accepted the neoliberal model of the university as a corporation, the primary mission of which is to sell information and skill sets and to produce workers. As I have argued, in this context, diversity is only valuable if it is necessary for these goals. That is, diversity of gender or race or ethnicity is only a justified concern in the university if that diversity enhances the product—the information or skill sets or workers. If it should be determined that diversity does not enhance the product, then diversity will no longer be a goal of higher education.

Although it pains me to say it, I do not think that philosophers can stop the shift in values that has occurred with the corporatization of the university. What we can do is write and teach about that change, revealing the assumptions of neoliberalism generally, and its particular effects when imposed on higher education. We can argue that diversity is valuable both for “education benefits” and for reasons of
social justice, even if the law does not accept the validity of the latter. We can welcome students and faculty with different conceptions of philosophy, and learn from them, change the curriculum to include them, and even change our own courses and research to integrate them into our approaches to issues.

I am suggesting that the way to strengthen our discipline and to ensure that philosophy continues to have a central place in institutions of higher education is precisely to make its practitioners and its subject matter more diverse with regard to gender, culture, ethnicity, and race—all of the characteristics of human beings that shape their perceptions and ways of thinking. We must integrate philosophy into the degree programs of other areas of the university, become part of interdisciplinary majors, and explain to our nonphilosophical colleagues the unique contribution of philosophy to education and to culture.

None of this may ultimately save academic philosophy from the knife. However, in order to ensure that philosophy is worth saving, we must take seriously the importance of the changing social and economic environment in which we live and teach. Philosophy is about understanding what it means to be human, and we should be explaining what it means to be human in a neoliberal, globalized environment. To do this well, we need to have students and faculty with diverse experiences of being human contributing to the conversation, and their contributions must be respected and examined, not rejected because what they have to say is “not philosophy.”

Notes

1 Figures are hard to find, which is itself evidence of the overall lack of concern for diversity in philosophy. Alison Wylie summarizes recent figures in her “Women in Philosophy: The Costs of Exclusion—Editor’s Introduction,” Hypatia 26 (2011): 374–82. Other figures can be found on The National Center for Education Statistics site, although it is of limited usefulness, since it combines philosophy degrees with degrees in religious studies. The latest information is for 2009. There were 12,444 bachelor’s degrees granted in philosophy or religious studies. A total of 7,761 were awarded to males. Of those, 6,257 were granted to white males, 421 were granted to black males, 495 were granted to Hispanic males, 431 were granted to Asian/Pacific Islander males, 64 were granted to American Indian/Alaskan Native males, and 93 were granted to nonresident alien males. Women received a total of 4,683 bachelor’s degrees in philosophy or religious studies, with 3,632 degrees going to white women, 340 going to black women, 298 going to Hispanic women, 318 going to Asian/Pacific Islander women, 37 going to American Indian/Alaska Native women, and 58 going to nonresident alien women (table 297). Master’s degrees in philosophy or religious studies totaled 1,859. Males were awarded 1,178, females were awarded 681. Black men were awarded 51, and black women were awarded 48 (table 300). PhDs in philosophy or religious studies for 2009 totaled 686, with males garnering 472 and females garnering 214. Black males were awarded 26, and black females were awarded 15 (table 303).

In 2003, full-time philosophy faculty and instructional staff in degree-granting institutions were categorized as follows: 72.3 percent were white males, 16.6 percent were white females, 2.3 percent were black males, 1 percent were Hispanic males, 4 percent were male Asian/Pacific Islanders, and 2 percent were male American Indian/Alaska Natives. In all other categories, “reporting standards not met” (Table 256). When added to the statistics for part-time faculty and instructional staff in philosophy, the total percentage of white women is 21 percent, while the percentage of black men is 2.8 percent.
The National Science Foundation reports that in 2009, there were 423 PhDs in philosophy awarded. Of those, 298 went to males and 125 went to females, for a percentage of 29.6 (http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf11306/appendix/pdf/tab15.pdf). This information is not broken down by race, ethnicity, or disability.


4 Thorsen and Lie, 2.


6 Olssen and Peters, 381: “While Hayek argued for the importance of markets for the regulation of private-business conduct, it was James Buchanan and his collaborators that argued for an extension of the market as a mechanism for the institutional regulation of public sector organizational contexts. In this, Buchanan introduced a major shift from liberal to neoliberal governmentality. For markets, rather than being seen, as they were for Hayek, and for classical political economy, as a natural, self-regulating reserve, where the hand of nature will produce an optimal social and economic equilibrium, would now become a technique of government’s ‘positive’ power, acting deliberately through the vehicle of the state to engineer the conditions for efficient economic production.”

7 This shift in values, and its consequences, is much further along in the United Kingdom, Australia, and the European Union. See Chris Lorenz, “Higher Education Policies in the European Union, the ‘Knowledge Economy’ and Neo-Liberalism,” *Social Europe* (Autumn 2006): 78–86. According to Lorenz, the aim of the Bologna Declaration is to make European higher education more internationally competitive. But one major consequence of the changes, which include homogenization and transferability of courses and degrees, is control of faculty. He terms this the “MacDonaldization” of higher education (p. 83).

8 Olssen and Peters, p. 324.

9 My university recently held such a competition. It was entitled “The Provost’s Strategic Growth Initiative,” and was designed to “increase enrollment by bringing new students to” my institution.


22 Bacchi, 70.

23 Bacchi, 70.


26 Nebraska, California, Washington, Arizona, and Michigan.


29 For closures, or threatened closures of philosophy departments, see Feminist Philosophers, https://www.feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/category/cutting-philosophy-departmentscentres/


31 International education grants from FIPSE, Title VI, and Fulbright were cut 40 percent, canceling invitations for new grants for 2011, while amendments to eliminate the NEH were proposed in 2011. See “Dept. of Education Cancels Select Title VI/Fulbright-Hays Competitions for FY 2011,” National Humanities Alliance, June 2, 2011, http://www.nhalliance.org/news/dept-of-education-cancels-select-title-vifiulbright.shtml; “FY 2011 Budget Cut for NEH & Other Programs in House-


33 McIntyre, ibid.

34 Dan Berrett, “Philosophers Put Their Minds to Expanding Their Role in Public Affairs,” Chronicle of Higher Education, December 11, 2011, http://www.chronicle.com/article/Philosophers-Put-Their-Minds/130066/?key=SW0iJAQ8NHNDY3owb2tCYm5UPX0%2FOBh1MXdEOX8nbldpFg%3D%3D


41 None of the top 10 U. S. schools require any multicultural, global, or feminist course work. The percentage of female tenure-track/tenured faculty in the top 13 schools is as follows (Leiter’s Philosophical Gourmet Ranking of Faculties in U.S. 2010 <http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com>):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Rank in 2006</th>
<th>Rank in 2004</th>
<th>Rank in 2002</th>
<th>Female Faculty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>New York University</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18% 3/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Rutgers University, New Brunswick</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15% 5/34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Princeton University</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18% 4/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>University of Pittsburgh</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7% 1/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>University of Michigan, Ann Arbor</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20% 5/25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Harvard University</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24% 5/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29% 4/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Yale University</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28% 7/25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Stanford University</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23% 5/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>University of California, Berkeley</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30% 6/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>University of California, Los Angeles</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18% 3/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17% 4/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Columbia University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27% 7/26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>