Configurations of gender inequality: the consequences of ideology and public policy

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Abstract

This paper gathers a wide range of indicators into distinctive profiles to show how configurations of gender economic inequality are shaped by both welfare state strategies and gender role ideologies. When multiple aspects of gender inequality are assembled together, it becomes evident that all societies exhibit both gender-egalitarian and inegalitarian features. These tradeoffs can best be understood through the ideological and institutional contexts in which they are embedded. Empirical illustrations are provided for fourteen advanced societies by analysing the major expressions of gender inequality; from women’s economic wellbeing and financial autonomy, through labour force participation and continuity of employment, to occupational attainments and economic rewards. The analysis confirms the existence of distinctive profiles of gender inequality and their affinity to normative conceptions of the gender order and ideal types of welfare state institutions.

Keywords: Gender inequality; welfare state; gender ideology; family policy; welfare regimes

The role of the state in reproducing gender stratification has been central to feminist discussions of the welfare state. In parallel, extensive empirical research has demonstrated the impact of welfare policy on various forms of gender inequality, particularly the massive entry of women into the labour market over the last half century. With the increase of women’s labour force participation, significant cross-country variations have emerged in their patterns of integration within labour markets and in the nature of gender stratification. Empirical studies that focus on these variations have yielded contradictory conclusions concerning the implications of welfare states for gender stratification. While progressive welfare states were generally found to be those with the highest women’s labour market participation rates, and thus
the lowest levels of women's economic dependency and poverty rates (e.g., Daly 2000; Esping-Andersen 1999; Korpi 2000; Misra, Budig and Moller 2007; Orloff 2006), they were also found to be those with the lowest women's occupational and earnings attainment (Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006; Wright, Baxter and Birkelund 1995). The prediction of gendered outcomes from patterns of state intervention very much depends on the dimension of gender inequality in focus.

While previous studies tend to base their conclusions on a single dimension of gender inequality or several dimensions treated serially, this paper favours a holistic perspective by analysing relations between dimensions. This shift is significant because only when multiple aspects of gender inequality are simultaneously mapped is it possible to see that all societies exhibit both gender-equalitarian and unequalitarian features. Rather than viewing some contexts as more unequalitarian than others, the paper highlights configurations of inequality and bases its discussion on the inherent tradeoffs between them. These unique configurations are then analysed and understood within their distinctive institutional and ideological context.

Analysing configurations of gender inequality rather than single outcomes opens a wider perspective on gender stratification, and suggests a different outlook for understanding the implications of welfare states on it. The interpretative framework developed in this paper views the uneven record of achievement and failure that characterizes welfare regimes as products of welfare state interventions and intentions. Thus, what could be interpreted as a paradoxical consequence of welfare state activity when highlighting one dimension is viewed here as a by-product which might be considered justifiable, or even worthwhile, within its particular ideological and institutional context.

Identifying configurations of gender inequality rather than configurations of welfare policies provides a counterpoint to mainstream studies which have been primarily interested in the welfare state, and investigated gender inequality as a way of exemplifying its significance for various forms of stratification. Accordingly, Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) and Korpi (2000) cluster countries into regimes on the basis of welfare state characteristics and then validate these clusters by predicted outcomes, principally women's employment levels. As the main concern of this paper is gender, it identifies profiles of gender inequality and places them in context rather than the other way around.

The article begins by pointing to the different conceptions of gender equality – based on either similarity or difference – which, throughout the history of welfare states, have served as the basis for demands for social protection for women. Its first section exposes the affinity between these conceptions and the distinctive strategies of state interventions found in different welfare regimes. The second section provides empirical evidence, which establishes the association between configurations of policies and
configurations of outcomes. The theoretical discussion that follows it offers an interpretive framework for understanding the unique form of gender stratification in each regime, by referring to both the institutional characteristics and the dominant gender ideologies that characterize it. Configurations of inequality are identified through cluster analysis – a statistical method for discovering affinities between cases – on the basis of a wide range of indicators of gender economic inequality for fourteen advanced societies.

**Gender ideology and welfare regime**

Advocates of gender equality are committed to a variety of different ideals. Nevertheless, demands to empower women by allowing them to set up an independent household, calls for an equal division of labour between spouses, and the protection of women’s economic independence are among the requirements consistently voiced as conditions for the attainment of equality between women and men (see, for instance, Fraser 1994; Hernes 1987; O’Connor 1996; Orloff 1993). The economic and social importance of the labour market has led both mainstream and feminist researchers to see women’s participation in it as a principal and essential condition for meeting those demands. Because labour market attainments are the most important determinant of life chances, the gendered division of labour between breadwinner and housewife not only makes women economically dependent on their spouses in the immediate present, but also prevents their equal access to social rights that are tied to paid labour in the long term (Sainsbury 1993, 1996). Moreover, because employment is the main source of self-realization and social status as well as income and social protection, labour market activity has become a necessary condition for equality in contemporary societies.

In the liberal approach to gender equality, this outlook is taken to its extreme. As an economic ideology, liberalism regards paid work in a free market as properly being the almost exclusive determinant of individual life chances. The USA is the closest empirical approximation to a political economy in which the state supports an uninhibited market that is not only the dominant mechanism for service provision, but also the primary source of social protection. Consequently, care services that facilitate women’s employment, such as daycare, are mostly purchased in the market, with price determining their quality. Likewise, paid maternity leave is not provided universally by the state, but rather is conditional on each mother’s terms of employment (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Kamerman and Gatenio 2002; OECD 2005). The state takes no practical responsibility for the special needs of women as childbearers and mothers. In the liberal belief that there is no better alternative to the labour market for attaining economic independence, women, like men, are seen as potential earners, and the grounds for achieving gender equality rest clearly on similarity rather than difference.
Although participation in the labour market is seen as a choice made privately by the individual, rather than as a public responsibility, the liberal state is committed to enabling the market to work efficiently and without interference. Accordingly, it seeks to remove obstacles by legislating against discrimination, with the aim of ensuring equal competition for jobs and earnings (Orloff 2006). In keeping with this ideology, liberal-feminist calls for gender equality are based on women’s status as workers rather than as mothers. They aim to guarantee the interests of working women by ensuring equality of access and equivalent salaries (Goldberg and Ureman 1990), or by offering tax credits (Orloff 2006).

Adopting the terminology proposed by Chang (2000), the liberal regime is committed to formal egalitarianism, rather than the substantive egalitarianism that characterizes settings in which the state actively intervenes in the stratification process by providing public services and cash transfers.

The notion of gender difference underlies the alternative to the liberal emphasis on equality of access. This alternative view rejects the idea that women need to compete with men in the labour market in order to attain equal rights and social recognition, and makes claims on women’s behalf that rest on their status as mothers and caregivers. Instead of aspiring for equality of equals, this ideology ties social rights to motherhood as an alternative mechanism for economically empowering women. A key claim is that if caregiving were to accrue social and economic rewards, this would improve the chances of both sexes participating in both paid and unpaid forms of work (e.g. Koven and Michel 1993).

Translated to existing family policies, the ideology of difference legitimates financial support to mothers in preference to employment-supportive policies. Such financial support has been adopted mainly in the conservative welfare states of continental and southern Europe. Even in the 1980s and 1990s, in the wake of the dramatic rise in women’s education and the weakening of the single-earner model throughout Europe, daycare services for infants remained extremely limited in conservative states. Instead, some of them, such as Austria, Germany, Italy, France, and Belgium, have begun to provide child allowances that encourage women to stay at home with infants for the first few years of their lives (Kamerman 2000). The absence of employment-supportive policies, together with moderate levels of financial support for stay-at-home mothers, has contributed not only to lower women’s participation rates, but – as will be demonstrated in the next section – to a distinctive pattern of gendered outcomes inside the labour market.

It is important to note that although economic support for non-working mothers may have the potential to advance women’s economic independence, in practice that was never their intention. In contrast to income-related benefits, cash benefits for mothers that are not conditional on employment are provided on a flat-rate basis. At best, they barely reach one third of the average wage (Ferrarini 2003; OECD 2005). Such limited allowances are insufficient to
independently run a household, and are therefore only effective when accompanied by the protection of an institutionalized marriage. The fact that such financial support is most common in conservative states and has historically always been relatively ungenerous, reinforces the conclusion that its aim is to strengthen the traditional household division of labour, rather than to promote women’s autonomy.

The contrast drawn here between the liberal principle of similarity that links equality to free competition in labour markets, and the principle of difference that ties social rights to unpaid care work, reflects extreme attitudes. In practice, with the entrance of women into the labour market and the rise of dual-earner families, women began to benefit from the social rights associated with employment in an increasingly independent manner. As a result, demands based on difference and similarity began to be mixed together. This mix between contrasting principles reflects the importance of the labour market as a means of attaining gender equality, on the one hand, and on the other the state’s obligation to assist women to reconcile paid employment with their roles as child-bearers and mothers.

This tendency has been especially evident in Scandinavia. Public policies in these settings have explicitly sought to bring women into the labour market, thereby providing them with social rights based on paid work, while at the same time actively intervening to meet the special needs of working mothers. Unlike liberal-feminist ideology, feminists in social-democratic countries have been less concerned with mechanisms that would facilitate gender-blindness in the labour market, instead demanding that the state actively intervene to provide services and resources to reconcile work and family commitments (Goldberg and Ureman 1990; Lewis and Astrom 1992; Orloff 2006). Thus, while both settings have shared the aspiration of turning women into workers, it has been translated into very different practices in social-democratic and liberal welfare regimes.

Policies in the social-democratic nations clearly reflect an assumption that women’s advance in the labour market is impossible without active efforts by the state to protect their rights as mothers, and to provide them with comfortable terms of employment and support services. Foremost among the latter is an extensive supply of high-quality public daycare facilities subsidized by the state, in addition to flexible terms of employment, long maternity leaves, and paid leave to care for sick children (Esping-Andersen 1999; Gornick and Meyers 2003).

In social-democratic countries, then, the attempt to introduce women into the labour market, i.e. to change their status from housekeeper to provider on a similar basis to men, does not come at the expense of attaching rights to women as mothers. The social-democratic model, especially its Swedish version, has managed to overcome the sameness/difference dichotomy by simultaneously providing women with rights based on their being both
workers and mothers (Lewis and Astrom 1992). This hybrid form, as will be shown in the next section, explains the distinctive pattern of gender stratification in the labour markets of the social-democratic nations, in which high levels of female labour force participation co-exist with inferior occupational and earnings attainments for working women.

Profiles of inequality: empirical evidence

This section provides empirical support for establishing the association between configurations of policies and configurations of outcomes. It shows that the different models of gender equality – based on the analytical axis of difference vs. similarity – not only underlie different patterns of state intervention, but also correlate with the diverse patterns of gender stratification found in rich democracies. In order to cover the major expressions of gender economic inequality, I have gathered a wide range of indicators that encompasses most aspects of women’s economic activities in comparative research. To cover a broad spectrum I chose indicators that reflect different dimensions of gender inequality (like access to paid work on the one hand, and the economic attainments of those who work on the other), and included indicators that pertain to economic position of women in different class situations (like access to managerial positions at the top and poverty rates at the bottom). As different measures tend to suffer from different biases and to emphasize different nuances, I deliberately utilized multiple indicators of each major dimension of inequality.

Although most of these indicators have been subjected to comparative analysis in previous research, they have never been gathered together to create distinctive profiles. The importance of this analysis lies in its potential to highlight the tradeoffs between these different dimensions and to establish their connection to the diverse modes of state intervention found in the countries under study. For this reason, instead of making separate cross-country comparisons for each indicator, all measures are presented in a single table and the focus is on configurations.

The connection between these configurations and welfare state strategies lies on the assumption that countries with similar welfare state strategies should also resemble each other in their patterns of gender stratification. Therefore the fourteen OECD countries that included in the analysis are all countries with familiar institutional context, characterized primarily by Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) famous typology, and by other studied in previous welfare state research.

According to Esping-Andersen’s classification Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland are the typical social-democratic welfare states; the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia are liberal welfare states; Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and southern European Italy and Spain are all regarded as
conservative welfare states. Although Esping-Andersen’s typology is the predominant approach, feminist scholars have played a dominant role in challenging it, pointing to the neglect of gender-related criteria of welfare like the mode of care-giving and the effect of welfare state institutions on gender relations. This neglect, they have argued, obscures dissimilarities within welfare regimes in either gender ideology or welfare state interventions that are more relevant to women and families, which weakens the ability of the typology to capture gendered outcomes (Langan and Ostner 1991; Lewis 1992; O’Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994). Foremost among these reservations is the deviation of the more familistic southern European countries from the typical conservative model in their patterns of care provision and gendered outcomes (e.g., Mingione 1995; Trifiletti 1999). Other familiar observations are Australia’s stronger male breadwinner model in comparison to the typical characteristics of the liberal welfare states (Shaver 1995; O’Connor Orloff and Shaver 1999), and the divergence of France and Belgium from the other continental European countries in their gender ideology as well as in the benefits and services provided to families with children (e.g., Bettio and Plantenga 2004; Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997; Lewis 1992; Misra, Budig and Moller 2007).

Although these critical observations rest on solid empirical evidence, feminist researchers have now largely recognized the explanatory power of Esping-Andersen’s triple typology as a basis for distinguishing between ‘institutional contexts’. However, since it is the ‘gendered institutional context’ that is most pertinent, feminist responses are important for better understanding the relevant context and framing theoretical expectations. In any case, the purpose of the present research is not to validate any particular welfare state typology, but to link welfare state strategies to their gendered outcomes. On the assumption that welfare state strategies affect patterns of gender stratification, if countries within each regime share a similar institutional context they are also expected to resemble each other in their patterns of gender stratification. Deviations from general patterns are also expected to be reflected in outcomes. Thus, I will try to benefit from such deviations in order to better explain the fit between welfare regimes and their presumed outcomes.

The chosen statistical method is hierarchical cluster analysis, a technique for discovering underlying affinities between cases on the basis of a variety of observable features, measured for each case. In the present instance the goal is to distinguish clusters of countries that exhibit internal homogeneity in their patterns of gender inequality, such that cluster members are more similar to each other than they are to cases in other clusters. The resulting structure is visualized by means of a chart called a dendrogram. Figure I presents the dendrogram and Table I displays the indicators of gender inequality on which the analysis is based. Most measures have been calculated from national micro-datasets collected and harmonized by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Definitions of the indicators and sources are presented in Appendix I.
Figure I: Patterns of gender stratification: dendrogram using Ward’s method

Rescaled distance cluster combine

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<th>Case</th>
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Den
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Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3

Note: See Table I for list of variables.

Table I: Means of gender inequality factors, and significance of differences across clusters

|-----------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------|---|

Variables:
1. LFPR – all women
2. LFPR – mothers of preschoolers
3. % dual-earner households
4. % male breadwinner households
5. % working mothers who work after birth and during the child-rearing period
6. Levels of women’s earning dependency
7. Accesses to managerial positions
8. Occupational segregation
9. Women’s representation in quintile 1
10. Women’s representation in quintile 5
11. Gender wage gap
12. Educational wage gap among women
13. Poverty rate among lone mothers

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<tr>
<td>1. LFPR – all women</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>56 (41)</td>
<td>9.48</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. LFPR – mothers of preschoolers</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50 (42)</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. % dual-earner households</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>48 (28)</td>
<td>12.88</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. % male breadwinner households</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39 (58)</td>
<td>9.73</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. % working mothers who work after birth and during the child-rearing period</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52 (46)</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Levels of women’s earning dependency</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52 (66)</td>
<td>12.32</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Accesses to managerial positions</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>47 (43)</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Occupational segregation</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54 (51)</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Women’s representation in quintile 1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25 (25)</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Women’s representation in quintile 5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16 (19)</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Gender wage gap</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11 (7)</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Educational wage gap among women</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>38 (40)</td>
<td>10.69</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Poverty rate among lone mothers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26 (23)</td>
<td>24.16</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
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Notes:
i. See Appendix I for measures and data sources.
ii. Means for Italy and Spain alone shown in parentheses.
Figure I strongly supports the existence of distinct clusters of gender inequality that are characterized by familiar welfare state strategies. The longer the horizontal lines at the point where countries or clusters are joined, the more the countries or clusters differ. The social-democratic nations are very clearly gathered together, as are three of the four liberal countries. The within-cluster similarity of the social-democratic countries stands in sharp contrast to their distance from the other clusters. The analysis is also sensitive to well-known within-cluster nuances, such as the small distance of Norway from the other Nordic countries, and the UK from the USA and Canada (see Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997). The third cluster clearly reflects the diversity of the countries associated with the conservative regime, and it also incorporates Australia, an obvious outlier. Familiar differences are evident between the countries of continental and southern Europe, as well as between Belgium and France and the other continental countries.

**Cluster characteristics**

Table I displays the average values of the indicators for each cluster, along with tests of the significance of between-cluster differences. Overall, with the exception of only one indicator, the Anova tests show that between-cluster differences are statistically significant, a sign of the robustness of each cluster’s internal similarity and external dissimilarity. Looking at the dendogram side-by-side with the indicator averages on the basis of which it was generated, we can identify the pattern of gender inequality that characterizes each cluster.

The first and most fundamental dimension of equality or inequality, which is also the one most obviously influenced by state intervention, is women’s economic activity. Six indicators in Table I reflect this dimension. Although they emphasize different nuances, all six indicators strongly confirm the effectiveness of the social-democratic model in raising women’s participation rates, most notably among mothers of young children. High rates of paid activity among women and mothers are also indicated by the centrality of the dual-earner family model and the tiny proportion of couple-headed households in which the man is the sole earner. The commitment of the social-democratic welfare regime to promoting women’s labour force participation is also reflected in the continuous involvement of mothers in paid work. Three-quarters of married women continue to work after birth and during the child-rearing period (see also Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun 2001). The continuous access of women to an independent income significantly reduces their economic dependency on their partners, as seen by the low level of women’s earning dependency in the social-democratic regime. Although earnings dependency is primarily influenced by access to a paycheck, it also reflects differences between the spouses’ income, as it is measured by the gap (in
favour of the husband) between the relative contributions of the two spouses to the household income (see also Bianchi, Casper, and Peltola 1999).

In sharp contrast to the social-democratic model, the conservative cluster is characterized by low proportions of working women and a large number of households with only a male wage-earner. The more familistic southern European countries (separate averages shown in parentheses) are the only ones in which male-breadwinner households are more common than dual-earners. The levels of work continuity in the conservative cluster are also the lowest, but the divergence from the liberal cluster on this dimension is not statistically significant. The patterns in both clusters, however, are very different from the continuous working pattern of the social-democratic model.

Each of the different indicators of participation has a somewhat different emphasis. A comparison of the levels of participation of mothers and all women reveals that children constitute a significant obstacle to employment in the conservative countries, but not in the southern European countries. Detailed data (not shown) show that in France and Belgium as well, children do not inhibit employment. While developed childcare services could be the primary cause of the marginal effect of children on employment in the latter, the low levels of non-mothers’ employment constitute the main explanation in the former.

The restricted access of women in general and mothers in particular to sources of independent income in the conservative countries increases women’s economic dependence on their partners, as illustrated by the dependency index. Further analysis (not shown) for three representative countries – Sweden, Germany and the USA – shows that when adding childcare and maternity allowances to women’s income they slightly reduce the dependency levels of German women and bring them into line with the USA, where the paucity of these allowances causes them to have almost no effect on the average woman’s income. Because of their commitment to paid work, Swedish women enjoy comparatively low economic dependence on their partners. Childcare allowances to mothers in Sweden further reduce women’s dependency levels, without inhibiting their high rates of paid employment.

The impressive entry of women into the labour markets of social-democratic countries and the relative economic autonomy that they enjoy from their partners have not, however, been accompanied by gender convergence in labour market attainments. On the contrary, in the protected labour markets of social-democratic welfare regimes women are concentrated in high proportions in female-typed jobs within the public sector and, compared to other countries, have less access to positions of power and prestige and enjoy lower economic rewards (e.g., Ellingsæter 2006; Hansen 1997; Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Wright, Baxter and Birkelund 1995).

Table I illustrates this through the occupational and earning attainments of working women. Occupational attainments are captured by two of the most
notable parameters of gender inequality in the Scandinavian countries – horizontal and vertical gender segregation. Compared to the other welfare regimes, the social-democratic cluster has the highest rate of occupational sex segregation and the lowest proportion of women in managerial positions. Given the high rewards that usually accompany managerial positions and the comparatively low pay typical of female-typed occupations, women’s position in the occupational structure has tangible consequences for their economic achievements (Petersen and Morgan 1995).

Three indicators evaluate economic rewards for working women; two of them refer to women’s representation at the top and bottom of the wage hierarchy, by measuring the proportion of women in the first and fifth wage quintiles. Table I shows that in all welfare regimes women are overrepresented at lower wage levels, but there are almost no differences between clusters in the magnitude of this unequal representation. By contrast, there are significant differences in women’s access to top wage levels. In social-democratic countries the under-representation of women at the top of the wage structure is most severe – the proportion of women is farthest from 20 per cent (gender-egalitarian representation).

All indicators of women’s attainments are more favourable in the conservative than the social-democratic cluster. Apparently working women in this setting have better positions in the occupational structure and are better rewarded. This is especially evident in Italy and Spain, where levels of gender occupational segregation and the gap between the mean wages of men and women are the lowest, and women’s penetration into the upper wage quintile very nearly reaches equality of representation with men.

In social-democratic countries, then, the equality implied by measures of women’s employment rates is replaced by inequality when we turn to the achievements of working women. In the conservative cluster, particularly in Italy and Spain, the picture is reversed: low participation of women in paid work is parlayed into relatively favourable attainments for those who do enter the labour market. This is something of a surprise for societies with a conservative tradition. One plausible explanation is that women who enter an economy dependent on highly-committed male labour tend to be highly qualified. They are a relatively select group able to compete with men in a labour market that is not adapted to women and does not offer them preferential terms of employment.

Figure II, which presents the two factors that most influence women’s employment – motherhood and education – substantiates this selectivity, particularly in Italy and Spain. Only in the social-democratic countries are there virtually no barriers to employment – even in the most vulnerable group, low-educated mothers of preschool children, almost 80 per cent of women work. Motherhood and low education, however, play a significant role in women’s decisions to enter the labour market in both liberal and conservative
regimes, but more so in the latter. Because selectivity takes a unique form in Italy and Spain, the averages in Figure II were calculated separately for Italy and Spain and the other conservative nations. In the latter, education is a significant factor for employment, but motherhood is still a very central obstacle to labour force participation, even among educated women. In Italy and Spain, however, motherhood does not impede employment (see also Table I), while holding a college degree has an enormous effect. Nearly all women with a BA work – even more so among mothers of preschool children – while women without a college education have very low levels of employment, even when they do not have children. The low rates of women’s participation in the labour market in Italy and Spain would seem, therefore, to be more a result of gender conservatism than familial constraints. As the female workforce in Italy and Spain is strongly influenced by self-selection, those women who work are likely to have superior earnings potential and to succeed in attaining relatively highly-paid positions (Boeri, Del Boca and Pissarides 2005).

Turning to the liberal cluster, Table I and Figure II show that women’s labour market activity is higher than in the conservative countries. Also, in notable contrast to the social-democratic cluster, labour markets are less gender-segregated both horizontally and vertically. General levels of occupational segregation are comparatively low, and women have also succeeded in

* Conservative without Italy and Spain.

Source: LIS wave V, except Sweden wave IV.
penetrating privileged positions. Thus, at first sight it seems that the liberal version of the dual-earner model has managed to avoid the failures of the social-democratic and conservative welfare regimes, succeeding in both bringing women into the labour market and providing them with access to senior positions. However, these successes have not come without their costs, which are paid primarily by disadvantaged groups.

The lack of regulation of employment conditions and earnings – a central characteristic of the liberal labour markets – erodes the wages of the weaker groups, in which women are overrepresented (Rubery et al. 1997). This is held to be the main explanation for the large wage gaps between men and women in liberal markets in general, and the USA in particular (Blau and Kahn 1996, 2003; Mandel and Shalev 2009). Table I indicates that the gap between the average hourly wage of men and women in the liberal cluster is almost double that in the conservative cluster, and almost three times higher than in Italy and Spain. Notwithstanding the modest levels of occupational segregation and women’s impressive representation in managerial positions, in the liberal countries as well most women continue to hold less advantaged positions than men. As a result, the wide wage differentials between lower and higher positions exacerbate the overall wage gap between men and women (Mandel and Semyonov 2005; Mandel and Shalev 2009).

The class stratification that characterizes the liberal markets is translated into class differentiation among women themselves (e.g. Shalev 2008). Table I indicates this by the wage gap between high- and low-educated women. As shown, the average wage of high-educated women in the liberal labour markets is more than double the wage of the low-educated (a 50 per cent gap would be double). This gap is twice as high as the gap in the social-democratic cluster, and is also substantially higher than in the conservative cluster. It would therefore be mistaken to interpret the impressive success of American women in entering managerial positions as representing success for women as a whole. For most women, attaining economic independence without protective social rights implies a significant disadvantage.

Moreover, Figure II shows that motherhood continues to constitute an obstacle to employment in the liberal countries, even among educated women. But while married mothers who withdraw from the labour market are protected by their husbands’ income, this is not the case for the unmarried. The limited support for mothers in market-oriented welfare regimes – either in terms of cash transfers or public services that facilitate their employment – is a central factor behind the high rates of poverty among women in general, and lone mothers in particular (Christopher 2002; Kilkey and Bradshaw 1999). The last row of Table I shows that the average rate of poverty among lone mothers is 8 times higher in the liberal cluster than in the social-democratic, and twice as high as in the conservative cluster. Table II, which provides additional characteristics of lone mothers, shows that almost 80 per cent of non-working
lone mothers in the liberal countries live in poverty, as do more than a third of
those who work. These rates are incomparably higher than those of the other
clusters. Bearing in mind that more than one fifth of all households in the
liberal cluster are lone-parent families, and that the vast majority of these
families live in poverty, it would appear that equal opportunity legislation is
ultimately of little help to a considerable portion of women.

Social-democratic conditions for lone mothers are almost the mirror-image
of those in the liberal countries. Table II confirms that poverty rates among
both working and non-working lone mothers are relatively low in the social-
democratic countries, compared to all the other clusters, especially the liberal.
Table II also shows that the best economic protection for mothers in all
regimes – including the conservative – is participation in the labour market.
As financial assistance to lone mothers is ungenerous in many conservative
countries, the participation rates of lone mothers are high in absolute and
relative terms, posing a striking contrast to the low rates of married mothers’
employment in these countries. However, the most notable feature of the
southern European countries is that so few women are lone mothers, indic-
ating the strength of the institution of marriage as the main source of pro-
tection against poverty for women (see also Casper, McLanahan and
Garfinkel, 1994).

**Summarizing the findings**

Based on indicators of gender inequality, the above analyses provide strong
empirical evidence for the affinity between the clustering of countries on
indicators of gender economic stratification and their clustering into welfare
regimes. This fit is evident not only by the allocation of countries to familiar
welfare regimes, but also by the nature of their gender stratification, as sum-
marized in Table I. Even deviations from the general pattern correlate with
deviations in welfare state characteristics, and therefore support rather than
weaken the linkage between context and outcomes. The most conspicuous
deviation is Australia, which the literature characterizes as a liberal welfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regimes</th>
<th>% lone mothers families</th>
<th>% of lone mothers employed</th>
<th>Employment ratio: Lone mothers/ Other mothers</th>
<th>Poverty rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lone mothers/ Other mothers</td>
<td>Not in work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-Democratic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy and Spain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Conservative</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kilkey and Bradshaw (1999) Tables; 5.1 (pp. 156–7), 5.2 (pp. 158–9), and 5.3 (p. 161).
state, but which exhibits very similar characteristics to the continental European countries in its pattern of gender inequality. This is mainly due to the comparatively low levels of female and mothers’ labour force participation in Australia, but also due to the relatively low gender wage gap and favourable access to highly paid jobs. Only the poverty rate among lone mothers in Australia is clearly more similar to the liberal than the continental countries (data available on request).

This deviation, though, may accord with Australian unique characteristics which have been highlighted by previous research. For example, the divergence of Australia from other liberal welfare states in levels of female labour force participation is compatible with its historical commitment to a strong male breadwinner model, which continues to be reflected by a tendency for women to claim social rights on the basis of care-giving (Shaver 1995; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999). The comparatively low wage differentials in Australia among women and between genders can be explained by the country’s unusual system of centralized wage-setting (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999), while its distinctiveness as a male ‘wage-earner’s welfare state’ (Castles 1994) may explain its resemblance to the other liberal states in miserliness towards lone mothers.

The heterogeneity of the countries associated with the conservative regime, especially the distance of Italy and Spain from the other continental countries and the resemblance between Belgium and France, has fed into the cluster analysis and further confirms the linkage between policies and outcomes underlined in this paper. Indeed, France and Belgium – which are characterized by well-developed childcare facilities (e.g. Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997) – rank higher on all measures of maternal participation rate (data available on request). The location of Italy and Spain in Figure I, and their pattern of gender stratification as revealed in Table I, indicate that these countries share the same basic patterns of inequality as the continental European countries, but take them to an extreme. The mean measures for Italy and Spain show that their participation levels are the lowest and that the dominance of the male breadwinner model produces very high levels of women’s economic dependency. On the other hand, the more selective group of women who do work have impressive access to highly paid positions, and enjoy the lowest levels of sex segregation and the lowest gender wage gap. These findings provide further support of Esping-Andersen’s decision to include the continental and the southern European countries under the same welfare regime. Justifying his decision, Esping-Andersen claims (1999; Chapter 5) that the basic principle which lies at the foundation of the conservative welfare state – reliance on the family as the dominant welfare provider – is shared to continental and southern European nations. This shared principle is validated here by its shared outcome – similar patterns of gender stratification. It is noteworthy that the Anova tests show that
between-cluster differences are statistically significant, however the differences between Italy and Spain and the other conservative countries are statistically insignificant on most measures of inequality.4

**Ideology, policy and inequality tradeoffs**

The findings above reveal that multiple indicators of the economic position of women combine to form distinctive patterns of gender stratification. These patterns are qualitatively different across welfare state regimes, and each one of them implies different tradeoffs for women. These tradeoffs become readily interpretable once gender politics are taken into account, in the form of the different conceptions and ideals of gender equality that prevail in different welfare regimes.

Substantively, it is often the case that the very success of one element of a welfare regime is the source of the inadequacies of another. The gender segregation characteristic of the labour market in Scandinavia indirectly results from the state’s success in eliminating the gender gap in labour force participation. In the conservative countries, women’s relative success in penetrating positions of power is explained by the selectivity of the female workforce, that is, the barriers that discourage many women from entering the labour market in the first place. In the liberal context, the burden placed on economically disadvantaged women is the consequence of the very same policy that has enabled relatively advantaged women to attain high rewards in the labour market.

Patterns of inequality in countries with a social-democratic welfare regime reveal a particularly clear tradeoff. Aiming to encourage mothers to join the labour market, the state passes laws that protect their jobs and provide them with convenient terms of employment. Similar effects result from the state’s direct role as an employer. These interventions knowingly bring women with a weaker attachment to work into the labour market. They also channel the female workforce into gender-specific occupations within the public sector and heighten the reluctance of private sector employers to hire women. The labour market in social-democratic countries thus becomes more gender-segregated the more that the state attains its goal of high rates of employment among all women.

Esping-Andersen sees the commitment of the social-democratic welfare state to full employment, and the use of the public sector as a mechanism for creating jobs for women, as one of its more noteworthy achievements (Esping-Andersen 1990: ch 6). The assumption at the basis of the ‘productivist’ social-democratic regime, one based on employment rather than financial transfers, is that it is better to over-employ, or at least to provide non-profitable jobs, than to financially support non-workers (Esping-Andersen 1990: 149). As
a consequence, while the benefits accruing to working mothers render female job applicants less attractive to private employers, this is justified by the higher aim of full employment. Women’s entry into the labour market, even at the price of their concentration in feminized ghettos and their relative exclusion from positions of economic power, is seen as an important step towards equality in that it provides more women with the elementary right to independence: liberation from long-term dependency on their spouses and families on the one hand, or the state’s welfare institutions on the other. From this perspective, part-time work and a high concentration of women in education and care services are legitimate means to the end of narrowing gender inequality by supporting women’s employment. The by-products – unusually gender-segregated working patterns and a relatively low glass ceiling – are justified by social-democratic ideology, which in sharp contrast to the liberal faith in markets forces, actively aspires to advance equality on a universal basis, even at the expense of hampering the attainments of the advantaged.

While the stratifying outcomes of the social-democratic pattern of state intervention are understandable when viewed through social-democratic lenses, Scandinavian feminists have been increasingly critical of the price that it exacts from women. The context in which social-democratic family policies first emerged – the 1940s and 1950s, years in which career women were a very rare phenomenon – explains their emphasis on integrating working life with the family, rather than providing women with the means for competing with men in the labour market. The innovations of the late 1960s, through which women won social rights on the basis of motherhood, are today clouded by feminist criticism concerning the outcomes of this ‘friendliness’, as seen in gender segregation and discrimination. These discussions recognize that attempts to fit the labour market to women, by taking into account their special needs as mothers, prevent them from competing with men for the most desirable and lucrative positions in the labour market because they sustain the model of ‘women’s two roles’ (worker and caregiver) as opposed to ‘men’s one role’ (Hernes 1987; Langan and Ostner 1991; O’Connor 1993, Orloff 1996). As a result, contemporary feminist demands for gender equality in the social-democratic countries seek to go beyond policies aimed at easing mothers’ double role, by creating conditions under which both parents combine wage-earning with caregiving. Learning from the Scandinavian experience, prominent feminist scholars in other countries also now argue that for the dual-earner model to bring about substantive change in gender roles and power relations, it must be accompanied by a dual-caregiver model (e.g. Fraser 1994; Gornick and Meyers 2003).

The limits of social-democratic policies have different parallels in the other welfare regimes. While Scandinavia’s segregated labour markets are a by-product of successful attempts to provide more women with a source of independent income, in conservative settings the picture is reversed: a
relatively egalitarian labour market within a non-egalitarian society. Italy offers the clearest example. The significance of the Catholic Church has been reflected in both the political establishment and prevailing social norms, both of which uphold the traditional gendered division of labour within the family. The absence of employment-supportive policies is bolstered by strong ties of solidarity and dependency within both the nuclear family and the extended family (Mingione 1995; Saraceno 1994). As demonstrated above, this results in limited participation of women in the labour market and a high level of economic dependence on their husbands. Nonetheless, based on parameters of occupational segregation and earnings, this traditional society actually has a relatively egalitarian labour market. The reason for this is that employed women are more selective and better educated than in other countries, and consequently are better able to integrate into a labour market that does not offer women special terms of employment. Given that this market has a relatively small service sector and a limited supply of part-time jobs, women who work are able to attain high salaries, as reflected in more egalitarian wage ratios between men and women.

Most conservative countries testify to the fact that cash benefits to caregiving mothers are unlikely to adequately replace employment in the labour market as the basis for women’s economic independence. In any event, given contemporary pressures to curtail public expenditure and increase the tax base by expanding employment, there is little likelihood that feminist appeals to increase caregiver subsidies will bear fruit. Under these circumstances, this type of assistance is a potential trap so far as women’s economic independence is concerned. For this reason, Sweden’s Social-Democratic party revoked childcare allowances only six months after they were legislated (Nyberg 2006).

The traditionalist gender role ideology that animates family policy in the conservative welfare regime receives clear expression in the comparatively low proportion of working mothers and limited support for lone mothers. In most conservative countries the male breadwinner model rests on two mutually reinforcing foundations: sparse provision of public care services and extensive protection of male wage-earners, based on the assumption that they bear sole responsibility for the economic wellbeing of the household. This has freed married women from financial pressure to support their family, and allowed their selective entry into the labour market with a bias in favour of women with high levels of human capital. On the other hand, the limited aid available to lone mothers has forced them to participate in the labour market at considerably higher rates (Christopher et al. 2002).

Given the role of selectivity, continuing increases in female labour force participation in conservative countries can be expected to undermine gender equality within the labour market. The decline in fertility rates, which especially characterizes central and southern Europe and which has been convincingly linked to the difficulties experienced by mothers in these countries in
combining paid and unpaid work (Esping-Andersen 1999; Hobson and Livia 2006), may create pressure on conservative states to assist women to integrate work and family (as has already happened in Japan (Peng 2002)). However, many questions remain open. Will the integration of women into a labour market that is attuned to male working patterns require women to also adopt those patterns? Or will the vocational training programmes that lead to jobs in core industrial firms – which are currently more suited to men than women – be replaced by gendered forms of training that channel men and women into segregated sectors and occupations? With the growth in women’s employment, the public service sector in continental European countries may expand in the direction of the Scandinavian model. Even today, health, education, and welfare services in these countries are overwhelmingly provided by the public sector. A prediction of convergence between these two welfare regimes is also supported by the literature on Varieties of Capitalism, which has emphasized similarities between the political economies of conservative and social-democratic countries, including extensive labour market regulation (Estevez-Abe 2005; Soskice 2005). On the other hand, the fact that conservative welfare states have historically prioritized transfer payments over social services (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2000), together with their continued support for the male breadwinner model, points to a future that will continue to differ from the social-democratic and liberal welfare regimes.

The liberal model – especially its exemplar, the USA – is similar to conservative settings in that the state plays a passive role regarding women’s employment. However, unlike the interventionism of conservative states in regulating working conditions and providing social protection, the liberal state largely refrains from interfering with class stratification. High participation rates of women are, therefore, the joint result of market-based provision of care services and the sheer necessity of working due to miserly income guarantees. The prevailing ideologies of non-intervention and gender neutrality reflect the liberal faith in markets. However, given the burdens placed on women as primary caregivers, and the consequent unequal division of labour within the family, mothers cannot compete with men on equal terms.

The consequences of the liberal model are evident in the contrasting impacts of women’s employment on their economic wellbeing in the liberal and social-democratic regimes. While in the later women’s high rates of participation coincide with a relatively high wage floor and publicly subsidized care services, in the former high rates of employment have not succeeded in reducing the substantial risk of poverty among women. In a market-oriented economy where success is determined mainly by personal characteristics and skills (Rosenfeld and Kalleberg 1990), women’s ability to escape poverty largely depends on the amount of time they can allocate to paid employment. Most women would therefore benefit from policies that ease the family burden and help them combine their caregiving obligations with commitments to the
workplace. The absence of such policies is a substantial barrier against equal competition between men and women, and laws that promise equality of access to employment are not enough to overcome this barrier.

State passivity not only explains women’s average disadvantage in relation to men, but also contributes to pronounced diversity among women because of the contradictory effects of non-intervention on different classes. For advantaged women, whose skills enable them to successfully compete with men without assistance from the state, the liberal labour market provides conditions that facilitate success. They benefit from the state’s insistence on gender neutrality, with the absence of legislation mandating paid maternity leave being the most significant example, as it reduces employers’ tendencies to discriminate against women on the basis of gender. In any case, many of the women who work in higher-status and well-paid jobs have access to maternity leave by virtue of private arrangements with employers. They are also able to consume relatively cheap childcare services, given that the state refrains from regulating the qualifications and employment conditions of caregivers (Morgan 2005). Consequently, they do not need help from government in entering the labour market and are not harmed by the potentially negative consequences of such policies, as in the social-democratic case. The liberal assumption that free competition will advance equality without state interference is therefore substantiated in the case of higher-class women. Moreover, state interventions in ensuring free competition in the labour market through equal opportunity laws are mainly likely to benefit these women (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999).

Conditions for working women who are less skilled and educated are very different. The non-compulsory character of paid maternity leave excludes most of them from this form of support. Likewise, the limited scope of public financial assistance for families with children and public provision of care services render the child penalty especially burdensome for these women. Finally, the same unregulated market that enables higher-class women to purchase care services relatively cheaply denies their lower-class counterparts economic security. For these women, therefore, class inequality looms much larger than gender discrimination as a source of disadvantage in the labour market.

Conclusions

This article has argued that the nature of gender stratification varies across countries in accordance with different modes of welfare state intervention and divergent ideological approaches to gender stratification. In theory, the principles of similarity and difference constitute two alternative paths to gender equality. In practice, neither paying women to mother their children, nor
providing them with benefits designed to ease work/family conflicts, have succeeded in eradicating women’s economic disadvantage, mainly because both approaches take traditional gender roles for granted.

The solution favoured by conservatives, income replacement for mothers, could potentially empower women economically without requiring their participation in the labour market. But existing childcare allowances have not provided women with financial independence and do not constitute a viable alternative to the protection afforded by marriage. Consequently, policies based on the assumption that there is no real alternative to paid employment contribute more effectively to women’s economic autonomy. However, both the liberal and social-democratic paths to incorporating women into the labour market have seriously inegalitarian consequences. On the one hand, ignoring the traditional division of labour within the household and attempting to sustain gender neutrality places a greater burden on women, especially those who are less privileged. On the other, efforts at making the labour market friendlier to women by recognizing their special needs as child-bearers and mothers transfers the traditional division of labour from the family to the labour market and encourages gender discrimination by private employers.

The attempt made in this article to identify the contextual sources of different patterns of gender inequality emphasizes the pivotal role of state action or inaction and stresses the different challenges that different contexts pose to overcoming gender inequality. Each pattern of state intervention, and the configuration of gender stratification which it promotes, operates in a deeply-rooted ideological and cultural context. As a result, solutions cannot easily be imported from one context to another. Nevertheless, this does not imply that forward movement is impossible. Based on past experience, the most likely scenarios for increased gender equality will entail processes of change that evolve within specific contexts.

An example of such a process is provided by the development of policies towards women’s paid and unpaid labour in Scandinavia during the last half century. In the late 1940s state support for motherhood was aimed at facilitating a two-stage career, starting before women had children and continuing after they began school (Lewis 1990). Twenty years later, the dual-earner model offered support for the employment of mothers of preschool children in order to integrate work and family throughout the life cycle. The reforms of the 1970s indeed changed the position of women, but left that of men relatively intact (Lewis and Astrom 1992). Recognizing that women’s entry to the labour market is not a sufficient condition for them to advance within it so long as the burden of care remains on their shoulders is what prompted feminist calls for a dual-earner/dual-carer model.

These paradigm shifts have received concrete expression in changing parental leave policies in Sweden, and most other Scandinavian countries – a shift from maternity leave to parental leave, and the introduction of daddy quota
In 1974 traditional maternity leave was replaced by a parental leave scheme covering fathers as well. Subsequently in 1995 an additional month of leave was offered solely to fathers. True, apart from this innovation the dual-earner/dual-carer model has still largely to be translated into substantive policies, and in the 2006 election campaign the social-democratic party chose not to advocate further enlargement of the quota reserved for fathers. Nevertheless, in the new millennium the existing quota (which was raised to two ‘daddy months’ in 2002) was increasingly utilized, with fathers’ share of total leave rising rapidly to reach one-fifth by 2006. Notably, while the initial transition to gender-neutral parental leave had very little effect on the behaviour of fathers, this is not the case for the ‘use it or lose it’ system adopted at a later stage (Kamerman and Gatenio 2002; Nyberg 2006). The lesson is that when states offer strong incentives to men to participate in care work, they are able to powerfully influence their actions.

(Date accepted: July 2009)

### Appendix I: Measures and data sources of the 13 indicators of gender inequality presented in Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labour force participation of all women</td>
<td>LIS wave V, except Sweden wave IV</td>
<td>For women aged 25–60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Labour force participation of mothers of preschooler (0–6 years old)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>% dual-earner households</td>
<td>LIS wave IV</td>
<td>Married or cohabiting couples where both partners have earnings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>% male breadwinner</td>
<td></td>
<td>Married or cohabiting couples where only the men have earnings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>% mothers who work after birth and during the child rearing period</td>
<td>ISSP 1994 ‘Family and changing gender roles II’</td>
<td>Based on questions V58 and V59</td>
<td>For France, Denmark, Finland and Belgium (Flanders) module III (2002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix I: Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Women’s earning dependency</td>
<td>LIS wave IV, except USA wave V</td>
<td>The gap between the spouses’ relative contribution to the household income: Dependency = 100*[(male earnings/both spouses’ earnings)-(female earnings/both spouses’ earnings)]</td>
<td>Based on annual earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Access to managerial positions</td>
<td>Mandel and Semyonov 2006: Figure 6</td>
<td>Based on the net odds of female to be employed in managerial positions</td>
<td>The coefficients were multiplied by 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Occupational segregation levels</td>
<td>Anker 1998: Table 9.1</td>
<td>Index of dissimilarity (Duncan and Duncan 1955)</td>
<td>Denmark was estimated by Sweden. Data for Belgium from Charles and Grusky 2004: Table 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Women’s representation in low earnings</td>
<td>LIS wave 4/5</td>
<td>The proportion of working women in the top and bottom quintiles of their country’s earning distribution</td>
<td>Based on hourly earnings quintiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Women’s representation in high earnings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Gender wage gap</td>
<td>LIS wave 4/5</td>
<td>100 * [1 – (average female hourly wage/average male hourly wage)]</td>
<td>In hourly earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Wage gaps between high and low-educated women</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 * [1 – (average annual earnings of low educated/average annual earnings of high educated)]</td>
<td>High and low education was identified according to LIS standardized education levels: Low education: up to compulsory education, or initial vocational education. High education: university or college education, or specialized vocational education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Poverty rate for lone-parent families</td>
<td>Kilkey and Bradshaw, 1999: Table 5.3</td>
<td>People in poverty are defined as those whose equivalent disposable income is less than 50% of the average equivalent disposable income in their country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1. I would like to thank Haya Stier, Moshe Semyonov, and Michael Shalev for their helpful comments.

2. Overall wage inequality (wage structure) has been found to significantly affect the gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn 1996, 2003; Mandel and Semyonov 2005). In order to eliminate this effect, these two measures standardize the wage distribution by wage quintiles, thereby focusing attention on the wage hierarchy while eliminating distances. In the third indicator – average gender wage gaps – the effect of the wage structure is not neutralized, which primarily affects the gaps in the liberal cluster, as will be discussed later.

3. Belgium is an exception, (Huber et al. 2004; Kilkey and Bradshaw 1999).

4. On four out of thirteen indicators the differences between the two groups are statistically significant. These are: LFPR of all women, % dual earners households, % male breadwinner households, and women’s representation in quintile 5 (results available on request (Independent Samples Test, equal variances assumed)).

5. The proportion of fathers who utilized parental leave after the Swedish reform in 2002 increased from 9% to 47% within a single month (Ekberg, Eriksson and Friebel 2004).

Bibliography


