

The futures past of the Women, Peace and Security agenda

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In October 2015, diplomats, policy-makers, activists and observers gathered in New York to mark 15 years since the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, generally accepted as the founding document of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda (although women's activism for peace predates UNSCR 1325 by many decades). Its passage was described on that occasion as 'one of the most inspired decisions' of the Council, a commitment to women's participation which remains 'at the top' of the UN agenda, and as integral to 'faithfully advancing international peace and security' itself.¹ Having stressed the necessity and vitality of WPS, the Council then unanimously passed Resolution 2242, the eighth in a series of WPS resolutions.²

The case for the novelty of UNSCR 1325 as both a Security Council resolution and a wide-ranging policy artefact has been made well, and often.³ Indeed, UNSCR 1325 has strikingly few critics—or, at least, few who would openly dispute its headline ambition: to achieve global gender equality. Certainly, the WPS agenda is expansive and ambitious; it seeks both the radical reconfiguration of the gendered power dynamics that characterize our world and a properly global commitment to sustainable and positive peace. As the contributions to this special issue of *International Affairs* show, the advances and limits of the WPS agenda are traceable

¹ See, respectively, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, 'Foreword', in Radhika Coomaraswamy et al., *Preventing conflict, transforming justice, securing the peace: a global study on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325* (New York: UN Women, 2015), p. 5; Ban Ki-Moon, 'Secretary-General's remarks to Security Council open debate on women, peace and security', 13 Oct. 2015, <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=9134>; Samantha Power, 'Remarks at a UN Security Council open debate on women, peace and security', 13 Oct. 2015, <http://usun.state.gov/remarks/6881>. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 3 Jan. 2016.)

² For the full list, see table 1 in Paul Kirby and Laura J. Shepherd, 'Reintroducing women, peace and security', *International Affairs* 92: 2, March 2016, p. 251 above.

³ Carol Cohn, Helen Kinsella and Sheri Gibbings, 'Women, peace and security: Resolution 1325', *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 6: 1, 2004, pp. 130–40; Torunn L. Tryggestad, 'Trick or treat? The UN and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security', *Global Governance* 15: 4, 2009, pp. 539–57; Dianne Otto, 'The Security Council's alliance of gender legitimacy: the symbolic capital of Resolution 1325', in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud, eds, *Fault lines of international legitimacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Dianne Otto, 'Power and danger: feminist engagement with international law through the UN Security Council', *Australian Feminist Law Journal* 32, 2010, pp. 97–121; Nadine Puechguirbal, 'Discourses on gender, patriarchy and Resolution 1325: a textual analysis of UN documents', *International Peacekeeping* 17: 2, 2010, pp. 172–87; Fummi Olonisakin, Karen Barnes and Eka Ikpe, *Women, peace and security: translating policy into practice* (London: Routledge, 2011).

across multiple registers, from its implementation by regional organizations⁴ to the heteronormative dynamics of participation, prevention and protection.⁵ And yet, as we hope to make clear, the much-noted gap between WPS ambitions and current realities is not merely a report on imperfect implementation: rather, it takes us to the heart of what the WPS agenda is, and what it might become.

In this article, we explore the implementation of WPS, the tensions that exist within the agenda itself, and the contemporary dynamics of debate in this space. We use the motif of plural pasts and futures to illustrate the complexity of these issues and the heterogeneity of claims about priority and best practice. We argue that a series of policy failures (in peacekeeping, participation, national ownership and Council implementation) during the agenda's first 15 years continue to undercut its more ambitious claims in the present. We contend that the present state of affairs, in which a range of actors reflect on the agenda and seek to grasp the channels through which WPS might develop, is best understood as the nexus of several tensions in the agenda itself. From these multiple strands we identify a series of tendencies of the WPS-to-come. We do not attempt to resolve all the tensions we expose, or to determine the merits of the possible futures we explore. We do, however, offer concrete policy suggestions and reassert the importance of a reimagining and radical re-envisioning of global security, in ways that echo the earliest articulations of the WPS agenda.

Past(s) continuous

The provisions of the WPS agenda are often discussed in terms of 'pillars' deriving from the 'system-wide action plans' on WPS implementation: prevention; participation; protection; relief and recovery; and at times a normative pillar.⁶ The relationships *between* these pillars are themselves deserving of close attention, but we first consider measurable progress within them. Analysis reveals a mixed but generally disappointing record. Female participation in peacekeeping missions—a key indicator of how well the UN itself is expanding participation and integrating gender into security policy—has stagnated. Although certainly a major improvement on the mere 20 women who served as peacekeepers between 1957 and 1989, further progress since the passage of UNSCR 1325 has been glacial.⁷ While the number of female personnel included in UN missions overall has increased, their contribution remains minimal in peacekeeping, and minor in policing. Figure 1 summarizes the available data. It has taken almost a decade for the percentage of female peacekeeping troops to rise by just over 1 per cent. Although the creeping trend for peacekeepers remains upward, no sustained progress has been made on police contributions since 2010, since when the level of female participation has

⁴ See Roberta Guerrina and Katharine A. M. Wright, 'Gendering normative power Europe: lessons of the Women, Peace and Security agenda', *International Affairs* 92: 2, 2016, pp. 293–312 above.


⁵ See Jamie J. Hagen, 'Queering women, peace and security', *International Affairs* 92: 2, 2016, pp. 313–32 above.

⁶ The 'pillars' of the WPS agenda are discussed in more detail in the introduction to this collection: see Kirby and Shepherd, 'Reintroducing women, peace and security', pp. 249–54 above.

⁷ The figure of 20 women is taken from Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, 'Female peacekeepers and gender balancing: token gestures or informed policymaking?', *International Interactions* 39: 4, 2013, p. 462.

hovered either side of 10 per cent. Given Ban Ki-moon's campaign to achieve 10 per cent female participation in peacekeeping and 20 per cent in police assistance by 2014, the conclusion can only be that gender force balancing has stalled.⁸

Figure 1: Female troops and police in all UN peacekeeping missions, August 2006 to September 2015 (%)



Source: Data drawn from monthly UN peacekeeping gender statistics, available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/gender.shtml>. Until February 2009 only data for military personnel are available, disaggregated as military observers, staff and contingent troops: the figures given here are for contingent troops only. From November 2009 onwards the military category is split into experts and troops: again, the figures given here are for troops. The figures for police from November 2009 onwards are the combined totals for police and formed police units.

Changes in deployment levels, however, do not tell us anything about *where* female peacekeepers are sent, or *what kind* of activities are entrusted to them. Indeed, focusing only on participation targets without addressing the concrete dynamics of gendered power helps to reinforce essentialist ideas about women's pacific nature or their capacities for consensual problem-solving.⁹ The mere presence of women on any given mission is not as important as what positions they hold, how their presence alters gender practices in situ, whether a gender perspective (itself not synonymous with 'women') is integral to mission activities, and how these elements interact with the wider context of conflict and its resolution.

⁸ Karim and Beardsley, 'Female peacekeepers and gender balancing', p. 466. It may be that national moves to open combat positions to female service members, and recruitment drives targeted at women, will eventually have an impact on UN peacekeeping forces in this regard.

⁹ A similar point is raised by Eirin Mobeck, 'Gender, women and security sector reform', *International Peacekeeping* 17: 2, 2010, pp. 285-7.

While it is generally expected that a higher proportion of female peacekeepers will improve relations between peacekeepers and civilians, reduce levels of sexual violence and abuse, and advance the cause of peacebuilding, female peacekeepers can of course also contribute to mission failure and to cultures of impunity, and may themselves engage in exploitation.¹⁰

This qualification goes directly to the distinction between *gender balancing*—increasing the number of women in a given role, in a way that approaches parity—and *gender mainstreaming*—integrating a gender perspective into the activities of an organization, thereby institutionalizing an understanding of the myriad ways in which gender matters.¹¹ Research has shown that women are much more likely to be deployed to observer or political missions than to the situations of significant conflict that are arguably most in need of gender expertise.¹² At the peak of its activity in 2014, the MONUSCO mission, deployed to what has sometimes been termed the ‘rape capital of the world’, the Democratic Republic of Congo, could field only 492 female soldiers out of a total troop deployment of 19,567, a level *lower* than the average across all peacekeeping missions, and only 158 female police officers, slightly above the mission average.¹³ This poor performance is particularly striking given that the Department for Peacekeeping Operations is seen as relatively advanced in its dedication to Resolution 1325.¹⁴

Beyond gender balancing within UN forces, women’s participation in peace agreements is also higher than it was before the WPS agenda was inaugurated, and yet remains disappointing given initial ambitions. A 2012 review found that women comprise under 10 per cent of peace negotiators and under 4 per cent of signatories to peace agreements.¹⁵ From 2005 onwards, there was a notable increase in the number of peace agreements dealing with multiple aspects of gender security and participation, but there remains a tendency for parties not to integrate gender across post-conflict negotiations.¹⁶ The 2015 global study on the implementation of Resolution 1325 found that the proportion of peace agreements since 2000 making reference to women was 27 per cent, more than double the level over the period 1990–2000.¹⁷ Given the WPS stress on women as both makers and beneficiaries of peace, this trend towards inclusion is clearly welcome. Yet, as Radhika Coomaraswamy and her colleagues observed: ‘The present programmes put forward by the international community tend to be extremely narrow: just to bring a female body to the table.’¹⁸

¹⁰ This point was recognized by at least some of the architects of Resolution 1325. See Judith Hicks Stiehm, ‘Women, peacekeeping and peacemaking: gender balance and mainstreaming’, *International Peacekeeping* 8: 2, 2001, pp. 39–48.

¹¹ Mona-Lena Krook and Jacqui True, ‘Rethinking the life cycles of international norms: the United Nations and the global promotion of gender equality’, *European Journal of International Relations* 18: 1, 2012, pp. 118–22.

¹² Karim and Beardsley, ‘Female peacekeepers and gender balancing’, pp. 469–85.

¹³ These figures are for the month of August 2014. See UN peacekeeping gender statistics as cited in figure 1 above.

¹⁴ Tryggstad, ‘Trick or treat?’, p. 551.

¹⁵ UN Women, *Women’s participation in peace negotiations: connections between presence and influence*, 2012, <http://www.unwomen.org/~en/media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/en/o3AWomenPeaceNeg.pdf>.

¹⁶ Kara Ellerby, ‘(En)gendered security? The complexities of women’s inclusion in peace processes’, *International Interactions* 39: 4, 2013, pp. 451–2.

¹⁷ Coomaraswamy et al., *Preventing conflict*, p. 44.

¹⁸ Coomaraswamy et al., *Preventing conflict*, p. 40.

Table 1: Chronology of National Action Plan development, 2005–15

<i>Year</i>	<i>Countries releasing NAPs</i>
2005	Denmark
2006	Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom
2007	Austria, Côte d'Ivoire, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands
2008	Finland, Iceland, Uganda, Denmark (updated)
2009	Belgium, Chile, Guinea, Liberia, Portugal, Rwanda, Sweden (second)
2010	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Democratic Republic of Congo, Estonia, France, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Italy, Philippines, Serbia, Slovenia, Sierra Leone, Switzerland (revised)
2011	Burundi, Croatia, Georgia, Ireland, Lithuania, Nepal, United States, Norway (second)
2012	Australia, Burundi, Germany, Macedonia, Mali, Senegal, Austria (revised), Finland (second), Netherlands (elaboration), Sweden (extended), United Kingdom (revised)
2013	Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Belgium (second), Bosnia and Herzegovina (second), Iceland (second), Switzerland (third)
2014	Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, Republic of Korea, Gambia, Denmark (updated), Italy (second), Portugal (second), United Kingdom (third)
2015	Afghanistan, Japan, Kenya, New Zealand, Chile (second), France (second), Ireland (second), Norway (third)

Note: Dates are for the year in which the NAP was formally launched, as specified on the plans themselves. In many cases, the plan takes effect in the next calendar year (e.g. the German NAP was released in December 2012 but covers the period 2013–16). Subsequent plans are marked as 'revised', 'second', etc. according to the description given on the plan itself.

Source: Produced using data from PeaceWomen and the Institute for Inclusive Security National Action Plan Resource Center, updated to include New Zealand's recent NAP. Source materials available at <https://actionplans.inclusivesecurity.org/>.

The continuing success of the WPS agenda in policy documents and further resolutions (which we examine below) is not matched by translation into various 'fields' of practice. We might then recognize 'participation-for-peace' as a norm that is widespread, but principally 'on paper', and thus ineffective.¹⁹ This state of affairs is also reflected in the relatively slow and limited development of national action plans (NAPs) on women, peace and security. While we discuss NAPs further below, it is worth noting at this point that the rate of NAP development

¹⁹ Susan Willett, 'Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: assessing the impact on Women, Peace and Security', *International Peacekeeping* 17: 2, 2010, pp. 142–58, at p. 150; see also Christine Bell and Catherine O'Rourke, 'Peace agreements or pieces of paper? The impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on peace processes and their agreements', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 59: 4, 2010, pp. 941–80; UN Women, *Women's participation in peace negotiations*.

by member states in the UN has slowed since 2010, as shown in table 1. There was a marked increase in NAP development from 2009 to 2011, around the ten-year anniversary of the passage of UNSCR 1325, but since then progress has been disappointing, with some UN member states displaying out-and-out resistance: China and Russia, permanent members of the Security Council and thus authors, in some sense, of UNSCR 1325 itself, have not yet developed NAPs, while other states—many of them major contributors to peacekeeping and political missions, such as India, Bangladesh and Jordan—also lag behind. Plans have also been slow to set concrete standards. For example, it was only in the 2014 NAP that the UK government elaborated benchmarks for progress.²⁰ In some cases, NAP adoption is overtly instrumental: Australia, for example, developed its NAP at the same time as it made a bid for an elected seat on the Security Council (a bid which was successful, Australia serving a term of office in 2013–14) and New Zealand launched its NAP to coincide with the 2015 High-level Review of UNSCR 1325 implementation, with its own seat secure for the 2015–16 term.

A final measure of the operationalization of the WPS agenda is the extent to which WPS provisions and principles feature in other Security Council resolutions. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) runs a project in parallel to the work undertaken by the NGO Working Group that monitors references to the WPS resolutions in all Council output. From our analysis of the data that it has gathered, it is evident that WPS principles are inconsistently applied by the Council, despite the small victories such as those noted above. There have been 36 UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to the situation in Iraq since 2000, for example, and only six of these, or 17 per cent, contain language related to the WPS agenda. Most critically, of those six resolutions, not a single one contains WPS language in the operative paragraphs. The inclusion of WPS language in the preamble is far less significant than its inclusion in operative paragraphs; the preambles to each Security Council resolution are much less contested by UN member states than the operative paragraphs as the text contained in the preamble does not require concrete implementation by states. By contrast, the 24 resolutions concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo all contain WPS language, 92 per cent of them demanding action related to the WPS agenda in the operative paragraphs (WPS language was confined to the preamble in only two of the resolutions). WPS integration has thus been limited even in the Security Council, the institution responsible for the original policy architecture. With UNSCR 2242, the Council is now committed to integrating WPS pillars across all country situations, which promises much greater consistency, although with no guarantee that this will translate into improved practice.²¹

Our analysis of the pasts and futures of the WPS agenda highlights the inconsistent development of WPS provisions and principles across a number of sectors.

²⁰ See UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *United Kingdom national action plan on women, peace and security, 2014–2017* (London, 2014).

²¹ See United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/RES/2422, Oct. 2015.

In the next section of the article we outline the continuing tensions in the WPS agenda that may, in part, account for this inconsistency.

Present tenses

Diverse measures can track ‘success’ in incremental terms, but to better grasp the underlying struggles over the meaning of WPS, we turn to tensions in principle and purpose. The first of these tensions relates to the organization of the WPS policy architecture and practice into four core ‘pillars’, and the subsequent narrowing of the agenda around one of these. The second tension relates to the construction of political authority in the WPS resolutions themselves, and the related assumptions that permeate Security Council deliberations more broadly, such that the agenda in a formal sense can be used to perpetuate a degree of state-centrism in implementation, a move which is at odds with the driving impetus from civil society that brought the WPS agenda into being in the late 1990s. We take each of these tensions in turn, and offer some new directions to pursue within, and new connections to draw across, various forums of state practice, advocacy and international governance to enliven the next decade of WPS politics and practice.

‘Protection’ versus ‘participation’

Various iterations of UN secretary-general reports on WPS have organized the agenda in a number of ways. The first ‘system-wide action plan’ for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, outlined in the 2005 report,²² identified twelve areas for action. By the second iteration of the system-wide action plan,²³ the twelve areas were consolidated into five thematic areas, which became known as the ‘pillars’ of the WPS agenda: prevention; participation; protection; relief and recovery; and normative. As deliberation continued about how best to support the implementation of the foundational resolution—and the subsequent resolutions that had by then been passed—the ‘normative’ pillar was deemed to ‘cut across’ the four remaining pillars, and in his 2010 report the Secretary-General outlined general indicators to assist with and track implementation across the four thematic areas that remained.²⁴

In the discussions of implementation, all pillars are usually given approximately equal coverage: the 2010 Secretary-General’s report, for example, outlined 26 ‘general indicators’ which are more or less evenly distributed across the four pillars (between five and seven indicators under each pillar). State-led NAPs governing the implementation of the WPS agenda universally offer strategies for state action across all thematic areas (some NAPs still include the normative dimension as a separate action area but all address the pillars of prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery).²⁵ In the WPS policy architecture, however, there has

²² UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security*, S/2005/636, 10 Oct. 2005.

²³ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security*, S/2007/567, 12 Sept. 2007.

²⁴ UNSC, *Women and peace and security: report of the Secretary-General*, S/2010/498, 28 Sept. 2010.

²⁵ Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik and Aisling Swaine, ‘Women in peace and security through United Nations

been a narrowing of the agenda around the issue of prevention of, and protection from, violence. The formal institutional framework of the WPS agenda, as discussed elsewhere in this special issue,²⁶ consists of eight Security Council resolutions: UNSCR 1325 (2000); UNSCR 1820 (2008); UNSCR 1888 (2009); UNSCR 1889 (2009); UNSCR 1960 (2010); UNSCR 2106 (2013); and UNSCR 2122 (2013); and UNSCR 2242 (2015).²⁷ If UNSCR 1325 is excluded as the foundational resolution from which all pillars of the WPS agenda derive, then in quantitative terms alone there is a stronger focus on violence prevention and protection issues than on women's participation in peace and security governance. Only Resolutions 1889 and 2122 focus primarily on participation issues, while four of the remaining WPS resolutions address violence prevention and protection (Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106). UNSCR 2242 is relatively balanced, with coverage given to issues across all pillars of the agenda. Where country reports to the Security Council incorporate WPS concerns, however, these are again skewed towards discussion of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).²⁸

The political implications of this narrowing are ambiguous. On the one hand, there is an obvious need for robust policy responses to the widespread problem of CRSV and for initiatives to prevent such violence from occurring.²⁹ On the other hand, a narrowing of the WPS agenda to the exclusion or diminution of participation issues risks losing the critical significance of articulating women as agents of change in conflict and post-conflict environments, and as both rights-bearers and rights-protectors in peace and security governance.³⁰ A restricted (or, to put it more generously, precise) focus on conflict-related sexualized violence also precludes recognition of the 'continuum of violence'³¹ that characterizes the experience of many individuals whose lives are marked not only by the 'extraordinary' violence of 'rape as a weapon of war',³² but also by the everyday forms of violence that occur everywhere and may be more prevalent in inequitable and unstable societal environments. Both scholars and practitioners have been vocal

Security Resolution 1325: literature review, content analysis of national action plans, and implementation', George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs Global Gender Program Working Paper, 2014, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~igis/assets/docs/working_papers/igis_wp13_ggp_wp09.pdf.

²⁶ Kirby and Shepherd, 'Reintroducing women, peace and security'.

²⁷ For details, see table 1 in Kirby and Shepherd, 'Reintroducing women, peace and security', p. 251 above.

²⁸ UN Women, *Tracking implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)*, Oct. 2012, p. 6, <http://www.unwomen.org/~media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/en/02ATrackingImplementationofSecurityCouncilRe.pdf>.

²⁹ Paul Kirby, 'Ending sexual violence in conflict: the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative and its critics', *International Affairs* 91: 3, May 2015, pp. 457–72.

³⁰ Jana Krause, 'Revisiting protection from conflict-related sexual violence: actors, victims, and power', in Louise Olsson and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, eds, *Gender, peace and security: implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325* (London: Routledge, 2015).

³¹ This configuration is associated most closely with the work of Cynthia Cockburn, based on her profoundly influential essay, 'The continuum of violence: a gender perspective on war and peace', in Winona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman, eds, *Sites of violence: gender and conflict zones* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).

³² For a problematization of this construction, see Doris Buss, 'Rethinking "rape as a weapon of war"', *Feminist Legal Studies* 17: 2, 2009, pp. 145–63; Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, *Sexual violence as a weapon of war? Perceptions, prescriptions, problems in the Congo and beyond* (London: Zed, 2013); Paul Kirby, 'How is rape a weapon of war? Feminist International Relations, modes of critical explanation and the study of wartime sexual violence', *European Journal of International Relations* 19: 4, 2013, pp. 797–821.

in their critiques of the reduction of the WPS agenda to a single-issue focus on sexualized violence, to the extent that the legacy of UNSCR 1325 has been characterized as embodying a chronic protection–representation dilemma.³³

In order to find ways past the oppositional politics of ‘protection versus participation’, we have identified two approaches that could usefully inform the future of the WPS agenda. The first of these is relatively straightforward, and is already being applied to an extent within the formal institutional framework of the WPS resolutions (it is also a strategy that has long informed advocacy in this arena). This approach involves making the links between sexualized violence and participation to reveal the ways in which sexualized and gender-based violence frequently inhibits women’s meaningful participation in formal and informal politics. In short, such an approach recognizes that women are unlikely to be able to participate effectively in peace and security governance if their immediate security environment is compromised by the prevalence of sexualized and gender-based violence.³⁴ Future resolutions in the WPS framework might usefully include not only explicit recognition of this fact, which is already occurring to a degree, but strategies to combat such insecurity in implementation, both in contexts where the UN has a leadership presence and in the NAPs that govern state action. While the threat and reality of sexual violence, directed disproportionately towards women in conflict zones, are likely to inhibit women’s participation in public life, it does not follow, of course, that women’s exclusion is explained primarily or in all cases by a high level of CRSV. Nevertheless, at the level of policy linkage, this is one way in which the antagonism between ‘participation’ and ‘protection’ might be lessened.

The second approach goes beyond the simple recognition that the two issue areas are connected to propose a deeper, cross-institutional enmeshing of the parallel pillars of the WPS agenda in the process of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. This approach takes its lead from work being done by UN Women in the sphere of reparations and development, and connects protection from and prevention of violence to participation at multiple levels and across the various processes involved in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction:

In particular, with regard to peace processes, the enforcement of legal instruments, such as UN Security Council resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960, could secure immediate assistance for victims of sexual violence; ensure women’s full participation in all peace-related processes, including those related to justice; promote the longer-term goals of

³³ Heidi Hudson, ‘A double-edged sword of peace? Reflections on the tension between representation and protection in gendering liberal peacebuilding’, *International Peacekeeping* 19: 4, 2012, pp. 443–60. See also Sara Meger, ‘The problematic evolution of UN resolutions on women, peace and security’, *e-IR*, 1 Nov. 2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/11/01/the-problematic-evolution-of-un-resolutions-on-women-peace-and-security/>; Sarah Taylor, ‘Women, peace, and politics at the UN Security Council’, *IPI Global Observatory*, 17 July 2013, <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/07/women-peace-and-politics-at-the-un-security-council/>; Hannah Wright, ‘Beijing, 1325 and beyond: taking women, peace and security back to its roots’, *Saferworld*, 31 Oct. 2014, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/comment/151-beijing-1325-and-beyond-taking-women-peace-and-security-back-to-its-roots>.

³⁴ Arguments in support of such an approach are presented in e.g. Gina Heathcote, ‘Naming and shaming: human rights accountability in Security Council Resolution 1960 (2010) on women, peace and security’, *Journal of Human Rights Practice* 4: 1, 2012, pp. 82–105; Jacqui True, *The political economy of violence against women* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Krause, ‘Revisiting protection from conflict-related sexual violence’.

reparations by providing legal structures to combat impunity; and secure sector and broader reforms that would work towards guarantees of non-repetition. Peace processes could also define budgetary goals and recommendations for truth-seeking bodies and reparations programmes.³⁵

This is evidence of the recognition of the multiple and complex intersections of the WPS agenda with considerations ranging across the spheres of economics, justice, security and formal politics.

As Christine Chinkin and Hilary Charlesworth note,³⁶ the complex processes of post-conflict reconstructions and peacebuilding require coordination across a range of institutions and the reformation of many of those same institutions: civil service, judicial, political and security sector institutions are all involved in and affected by state-building practices. Recognizing that the provisions and principles of the WPS agenda cut across all of these institutions is a way to foster a broadening, rather than a narrowing, of the agenda while acknowledging the connections that exist between its various elements. The issue of reparations, for example, brings together all pillars of the WPS agenda.³⁷

Reparations are measures taken by the state to make good the various harms incurred during conflict. In the WPS resolutions, reparations are first mentioned in UNSCR 1889, where they are linked to sexual violence, the Council urging the inclusion of sexual violence issues from the outset of peace processes ... in particular the areas of pre-ceasefires, humanitarian access and human rights agreements, ceasefires and ceasefire monitoring, DDR [disarmament, demobilization and reintegration] and SSR [security sector reform] arrangements, vetting of armed and security forces, *reparations* and recovery/development.³⁸

The integration of all elements of the WPS agenda in post-conflict recovery is important: issues related to sexual and gender-based violence are more likely to be recognized during peace processes and subsequent institution-building if women are present and able to make a meaningful contribution to the negotiation and planning of peace agreements.³⁹ UNSCR 2242 recommends 'reparation for victims as appropriate', placing strongest emphasis on ending impunity and incorporating CRSV as a trigger for the Council's sanctions mechanisms.

³⁵ UN Women, 'Reparations, development and gender', in *Women, Peace and Security Sourcebook*, 2012, <http://www.unwomen.org/~media/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2012/10/06A-Development-Gender.pdf>.

³⁶ Christine Chinkin and Hilary Charlesworth, 'Building women into peace: the international legal framework', *Third World Quarterly* 27: 5, 2006, pp. 937–57.

³⁷ To date, the literature on this topic is limited. Christine Bell and Catherine O'Rourke provide a superb feminist theorization of transitional justice in 'Does feminism need a theory of transitional justice? An introductory essay', *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1: 1, 2007, pp. 23–44. Notable examples of good feminist analysis of reparations include Katherine M. Franke, 'Gendered subjects of transitional justice', *Columbia Journal of Gender and Law* 15: 3, 2006, pp. 813–28; Niamh Reilly, 'Seeking gender justice in post-conflict transitions: towards a transformative women's human rights approach', *International Journal of Law in Context* 3: 2, 2007, pp. 155–72; Ruth Rubio-Marín and Pablo de Greiff, 'Women and reparations', *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1: 3, 2007, pp. 318–37; Sahla Aroussi, "'Women, peace and security': addressing accountability for wartime sexual violence", *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 13: 4, 2011, pp. 576–93.

³⁸ UNSCR 1889, OP17, emphasis added.

³⁹ Bell and O'Rourke, 'Peace agreements or pieces of paper?'

Our proposal regarding reparations entails a more substantive integration than that just discussed, since it relates to all components of the WPS agenda. Sexualized and gender-based violence must be recognized as a crime for which reparations may be due; and women's full participation in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, as well as security sector and judicial reform, can go some way towards facilitating both reparations and non-recurrence. This observation is reinforced by the fact that the 'global indicators' tracking the implementation of UNSCR 1325 that are developed in the 2010 UN Secretary-General's report include both the 'number and percentage of transitional justice mechanisms called for by peace processes that include provisions to address the rights and participation of women and girls in their mandates' and the 'number and percentage of women and girls receiving benefits through reparation programmes, and types of benefits received'.⁴⁰

Ultimately, the WPS agenda will need to ensure that all pillars are given equal emphasis if the resolutions are to avoid reproducing a construction of female subjectivity that constitutes women as inherently vulnerable and in need of protection. The narrowing of the WPS agenda to a sole focus on the prevention of violence and the protection of women from violence risks diminishing the importance of the elements of the agenda that create meaningful opportunities for women's political and social empowerment through their participation in peace and security governance. Of course, the ways in which these opportunities are created at the local, national and international levels are of primacy concern, and it is to these that we now turn.

State-centrism in the WPS agenda

Given that the UN Security Council is a decision-making body within the framework of an international organization, and that its members are thus member *states* of the UN, it is hardly surprising that the WPS agenda, a product of this environment, has been criticized for its state-centrism.⁴¹ Although involving civil society in some ways, the consolidation and implementation of WPS principles at national and international levels have become increasingly focused on state responsibility and action. This is most visible in the development of NAPs and the very limited ways in which many of these plans engage with or draw on women's leadership in civil society organizations. Focused and widespread development of NAPs was triggered by a 2004 presidential statement in which the President of the UN Security Council '[welcomed] the efforts of Member States in implementing resolution 1325 (2000) at the national level, including the development of national action plans, and [encouraged] Member States to continue to pursue such implementation'.⁴² Ironically, that much-quoted paragraph actually opens

⁴⁰ UNSC, *Women and peace and security: report of the Secretary-General*, 2010, p. 48.

⁴¹ Cohn et al., 'Women, peace and security'; Laura J. Shepherd, 'Power and authority in the production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325', *International Studies Quarterly* 52: 2, 2008, pp. 383–404; Sabine Hirschauer, *The securitization of rape: women, war and sexual violence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 8–9.

⁴² UNSC, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', S/PRST/2004/40, Oct. 2004, p. 3. Action plans

with an acknowledgement of the valuable work undertaken in the WPS sphere by women's organizations and applauds member states for collaborating with civil society to implement the provisions of UNSCR 1325.

In the years since that statement, however, the WPS agenda has tended to be drawn into the apparatus of the state. One study from 2014 reports that only about a third of NAPs specify civil society involvement in their planning and drafting, while about 45 per cent mention some form of non-specific civil society involvement.⁴³ This is a dismal record, given the foundations of the agenda in women's civil society organizations and the transnational feminist activism that created the opportunity for the passage of the first WPS resolution.⁴⁴ The consequences of excluding civil society organizations from the NAP development process include a separation of WPS principles from the lived experiences of individuals within the state in question, a lack of grounded understanding of community needs related to WPS provisions, and a lack of recognition of forms of community knowledge in the development of the plans. This can lead to the perception of NAPs as elitist or irrelevant to the lives of the population, and at worst may permit the increasing militarization of the WPS agenda as its principles are reduced to the inclusion of women in state police and armed forces.⁴⁵

Of course, it may be objected that much of the pressure of the WPS agenda is directed at states since they have considerable power over political institutions and considerable resources to deploy across all agenda pillars. There are, however, two alternative models of engagement with the WPS policy agenda that we wish to highlight briefly: regional action plans (RAPs) and localization programmes. Natalie Hudson notes that, as many conflicts do not respect national territorial boundaries, there is a clear rationale for regional collaboration on implementation.⁴⁶ There are currently seven RAPs in effect.⁴⁷ The design and implementation of RAPs seem to offer greater opportunities for women's leadership in peace

were first mentioned by the Council in 2002, but the first NAP was published by the Danish government in 2005, after the 2004 presidential statement, which means that the latter is usually identified as the trigger for the NAP regime.

⁴³ Miller et al., 'Women in peace and security', pp. 26–8.

⁴⁴ Felicity Hill, Mikele Aboitiz and Sara Poehlman-Doumbouya, 'Nongovernmental organizations' role in the buildup and implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 28: 4, 2003, pp. 1255–69; Laura J. Shepherd, *Gender, violence and security: discourse as practice* (London: Zed, 2008); Natalie F. Hudson, *Gender, human security and the UN: security language as a political framework for women* (London: Routledge, 2009).

⁴⁵ Isabella Geuskens, 'Engendering peace? The militarized implementation of the women, peace and security agenda', *Sustainable Security*, 30 July 2014, <http://sustainablesecurity.org/2014/07/30/reflections-on-militarized-women-peace-and-security/>.

⁴⁶ Natalie F. Hudson, 'National and regional implementation of Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security: background paper for global review meeting', 2013, <http://www.genderjustice.org.za/101906-global-technical-review-meeting-building-accountability-for-implementation-of-security-council-resolutions-on-women-peace-and-security/file.html>.

⁴⁷ RAPs have been developed by the following entities: African Union (2009); European Union (2008); International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (2004); NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (2007); Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2004); Pacific Region (2012); South African Development Community (2009). Not all of these are explicitly entitled 'regional action plans', but all reference UNSCR 1325 and seek to implement the core provisions of this resolution (five of the plans themselves are available on the PeaceWomen website at http://www.peacewomen.org/search-results?search_api_views_fulltext=raps).

and security governance than is afforded in NAPs. In 2013, the UN Secretary-General commended the fact that 24 per cent of leadership positions in regional conflict-prevention organizations were held by women, with this figure rising to 37 per cent at headquarters level.⁴⁸ The 2014 report notes an upward trend for this indicator, with the proportion of women in leadership positions in regional organizations rising to 32 per cent.⁴⁹

Further, the meaningful participation of women and civil society organizations can be facilitated through the 'localization programmes' promoted by the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders. Localization programmes, a development cited in the UN Secretary-General's report in 2012 as a positive example of UNSCR 1325 implementation strategies,⁵⁰ decentralize the implementation of the WPS agenda, drawing in subnational organizations such as local authorities and traditional leaders to ensure that WPS-related activities are 'owned and carried out at the local level'.⁵¹ Although localization programmes seem to experience challenges related to rapid turnover of local officials, and the same issues related to political will and funding that affect national and regional action plans, the local ownership of the guidelines enhances their efficacy as a WPS implementation tool. The findings from reviews of the localization programmes in Colombia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Uganda suggest that this is a meaningful and effective strategy for increasing awareness and support of, and adherence to, WPS principles at the local level.

As we have noted above, alongside NAPs, alternative models of WPS implementation exist. We are not arguing that these should be pursued at the expense of the state-led development of NAPs—and, crucially, the allocation of adequate state funding to WPS activities—but rather urging that full recognition be given to a variety of ways in which WPS commitments can be met in local, national and international contexts. In this way, the possible futures of the WPS agenda can enable multiple forms of engagement and involve multiple actors, including the individuals on the ground in conflict and post-conflict environments whose situation the WPS agenda aims to ameliorate.

Future (im)perfect

We turn now to the future(s) of the WPS agenda, currently the subject of debate across the themes addressed above, and including new and emergent directions—some might say compromises or dilutions—for UNSCR 1325. Looking back on 15 years of the agenda, and ahead to its continuation and imbrication with other strands of global policy (such as the post-2015 development agenda), opens up the question of the institutions and frameworks which will enable and limit future

⁴⁸ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security*, S/2013/525, 4 Sept. 2013, para. 28.

⁴⁹ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security*, S/2014/693, 23 Sept. 2014, para. 30.

⁵⁰ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security*, S/2012/7323, 2 Oct. 2012, para. 7.

⁵¹ Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, 'Implementing locally, inspiring globally: localizing UNSCR 1325 in Colombia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Uganda', 2013, p. 5, <http://www.gnwp.org/resource/implementing-locally-inspiring-globally-localizing-unscr-1325-colombia-nepal-philippines>.

practice.⁵² Here we identify just three of those possible futures: the so-called ‘Men, Peace and Security’ agenda; the rise of feminist foreign policy; and the remaking of ‘security’ itself as a category. The first suggests a shift in the *content* of the WPS agenda, the second a pluralization in its principal *actors*, and the last an interpretation of its historic *purpose*.

The Men, Peace and Security (MPS) agenda is most often sketched as an enhancement of UNSCR 1325. Its advocates see in it not a rejection of the ‘woman question’ but rather a possible complementarity through recognizing ‘the other side of gender’.⁵³ If WPS advocacy and action have put women on the international agenda as participants in politics, as well as those who are so often harmed by gender norms, the inclusion of men—and specifically the recognition of their experiences as *gendered*—has been offered as a way to both achieve and extend the original WPS agenda. This engagement with ‘the other side’ can be observed within the UN, in the wider policy community, and in civil society initiatives that have grown from national-level engagement to an increasingly international agenda. For example, UN Women (created in 2010 to unify the UN’s work on women’s advancement) launched a major campaign in 2014, #HeForShe, as a project to engage men in gender equality, by ‘bring[ing] together one half of humanity in support of the other half’.⁵⁴ A year earlier, the World Bank had led funding for a multi-agency symposium on men as ‘agents of change’.⁵⁵ Zainab Bangura, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict, has also been at the forefront of integrating men’s experiences of gender violence into consideration of this topic, assisted by the recent advocacy of the UK government.⁵⁶ At the same time, human rights NGOs such as Promundo (a gender justice NGO founded in Brazil), Sonke Gender Justice (a South Africa-based group working with men and boys for gender equality) and the Refugee Law Project (a forced migrant advocacy organization from Uganda whose work has grown to cover gender and sexuality issues) have made the case for expanding policy so that gender is no longer ‘a synonym for women’.⁵⁷

The view of men as partners in ending violence against women, a major element in MPS, in fact has a longer heritage than contemporary discussions

⁵² For an account of why the conceptual frameworks adopted at the level of UN headquarters matter and how they affect outcomes, see Séverine Autesserre, *The trouble with the Congo: local violence and the failure of international peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and, for a more optimistic view, Thomas G. Weiss, ‘How United Nations ideas change history’, *Review of International Studies* 36: S1, 2010, pp. 3–23.

⁵³ Joseph Vess, Gary Barker, Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini and Alexa Hassink, *The other side of gender: men as critical agents of change*, United States Institute of Peace Special Report, Dec. 2013, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR_340.pdf.

⁵⁴ See <http://www.heforshe.org/>.

⁵⁵ United States Institute of Peace, ‘Men, peace and security symposium: agents of change’, Washington DC, 28–30 Oct. 2013, <http://www.usip.org/events/men-peace-and-security-symposium-agents-of-change>.

⁵⁶ See Office of the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, ‘Report of workshop on sexual violence against men and boys in conflict situations’, 2013, <http://www.slideshare.net/osrsgsvc/report-of-workshop-on-sexual-violence-against-men-and-boys-final>. On the UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative and its focus on men and boys, see Kirby, ‘Ending sexual violence in conflict’, pp. 468–71.

⁵⁷ The phrase is Terrell Carver’s. See his *Gender is not a synonym for women* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

might suggest. The original Beijing Declaration—a crucial precursor to UNSCR 1325—made mention of educating boys to prevent sexual violence, sensitizing men to the effects of violence in the family, and training in gender-egalitarian conflict resolution.⁵⁸ The Beijing + 5 summit later recommended that men and boys ‘be actively involved and encouraged in all efforts’ to implement its recommendations.⁵⁹ The stress on alliances between women’s groups and men continues to the present in the agreed conclusions of the UN Commission on the Status of Women.⁶⁰ What is new is the explicit expansion of WPS policies and issues to include men and masculinities in a more substantive sense, as agents more than allies, as survivors of gender violence themselves, and as equal participants, in complex solidarity, towards equality.

While a greater emphasis on men’s contribution to changing gender norms is broadly compatible with what has come before, the emerging MPS agenda has also put much greater emphasis on violence *experienced by* men due to their masculine identity, or what the Refugee Law Project calls ‘gender against men’.⁶¹ Stereotypical views promote behaviours (and expectations of behaviour) that render men vulnerable in certain contexts. One widespread manifestation is the notion of men as ‘just warriors’, encouraging militarism and war by framing men as legitimate agents of violence, and thus pushing men to embody that ideal.⁶² In terms of civilian victimization, homophobic prejudice is commonly cited as an explanation for the targeting of men for sexual violence, either because perpetrators are deliberately targeting gay, trans*⁶³ or queer men, or because they believe that the rape of men is a way to ‘feminize’ the enemy.⁶⁴ The capacity for gender norms to work in ways that directly harm men, or brutalize them in the process of making warriors, is no surprise to those involved in decades of research and thinking on this theme.⁶⁵ But increased acceptance of such realities, and debate about the true

⁵⁸ *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action / Beijing +5 Political Declaration and Outcome*, 1995 and 2000, pp. 52, 83, 96, http://www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/pfa_e_final_web.pdf.

⁵⁹ *Beijing +5 Political Declaration and Outcome*, p. 234.

⁶⁰ See e.g. the references to ‘active involvement of men and boys ... in challenging gender stereotypes’, in Commission on the Status of Women, *Report of the forty-fifth session, E/2001/21-E/CN.6/2001/14*, p. 13, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/e2001-27.pdf>, and to men as ‘strategic partners and allies’ in ‘Agreed conclusions on the elimination and prevention of all forms of violence against women and girls’, E/2013/27, p. 12, [http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw57/CSW57_Agreed_Conclusions_\(CSW_report_excerpt\).pdf](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw57/CSW57_Agreed_Conclusions_(CSW_report_excerpt).pdf); the whole set of agreed conclusions in Commission on the Status of Women, ‘The role of men and boys in achieving gender equality: agreed conclusions’, March 2004, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw48/ac-men-auv.pdf>; and the reference to subtler understandings of masculinity as complementary to women’s empowerment in Commission on the Status of Women, 59th session, press release, ‘Men, boys essential partners in challenging gender roles, promoting equality, women’s commission hears as experts share innovative strategies’, 16 March 2015, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/wom2031.doc.htm>.

⁶¹ Refugee Law Project, *Gender against men*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJSl99HQYXc>.

⁶² See Jean Bethke Elshstain, *Women and war* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

⁶³ We use the * to indicate the multiplicity of trans* identities (including, but not limited to, transgender, transsexual, transvestite) without imposing closure on the possible identity-referents; Susan Stryker, Paisley Currah and Lisa Jean Moore use a hyphen for the same reason, arguing that ‘it marks the difference between the implied nominalism of “trans” and the explicit relationality of “trans-”, which remains open-ended and resists premature foreclosure by attachment to any single suffix’: Susan Stryker, Paisley Currah and Lisa Jean Moore, ‘Introduction: trans-, trans, or transgender?’, *Women’s Studies Quarterly*, 36: 3, 2008, pp. 11–22, at p. 11.

⁶⁴ See, most cogently, Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Male/male rape and the “taint” of homosexuality’, *Human Rights Quarterly* 27: 4, 2005, pp. 1274–306; also Hagen, ‘Queering women, peace and security’, pp. 313–32 above.

⁶⁵ See e.g. R. Charli Carpenter, “‘Women and children first’: gender, norms, and humanitarian evacuation

scale and meaning of violence against men, has in the last years translated into rising policy visibility.⁶⁶ While often recognizing the inequalities and violences experienced by women in patriarchy, this agenda puts increasing stress on taking a 'gender-neutral' approach.

From the perspective of the WPS agenda, this turn towards men and boys has the potential to become a site of some contention. Attention to men and boys is perceived by a significant number of women's organizations as fundamentally at odds with the VAW (violence against women and girls) policies elaborated for humanitarian assistance and development aid in recent decades. The Commission on the Status of Women was aware of the danger early, arguing that it was 'important that resources for gender equality initiatives for men and boys do not compromise equal opportunities and resources for women and girls'.⁶⁷ Despite some acknowledgement of the violence directed at men, there was little effort in such documents to properly specify how men are *harmed by*, not just beneficiaries of, patriarchal gender norms. The emerging discussion of men is thus caught between the possibility of a more comprehensive (and hence effective) WPS agenda on the one hand, and an internecine struggle over resources and identity (diluting the 'true' WPS agenda) on the other.

Alongside the expanding content of the WPS agenda, there is a growing diversity of actors who will take up that agenda, either in fidelity to its spirit or for their own ends. As we have already noted, UNSCR 1325 and its successor resolutions have enabled a state-centric mode of implementation. While open to reform through RAPs and localization initiatives, this is unlikely to change much, so long as the Security Council and its edicts remain the main fulcrum for change. However, states and alliances of states are already taking up WPS themes outside the UN architecture, separately from their NAP commitments. Among states known to be friendly to the WPS agenda, which may face resistance in multilateral settings from more conservative states, an opportunity arises to further the agenda through unilateral initiative. The institutionalization of UNSCR 1325 in this way amounts to 'feminist foreign policy',⁶⁸ a term today most closely associated with Margot Wallström, the current Foreign Minister of Sweden and former SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict.⁶⁹ In pressing for concerns over both gender

in the Balkans, 1991–95', *International Organization* 57: 4, 2003, pp. 661–94; Adam Jones, 'Straight as a rule: heteronormativity, gendercide, and the noncombatant male', *Men and Masculinities* 8: 4, 2006, pp. 451–69; Laura Stemple, 'Male rape and human rights', *Hastings Law Journal* 60: 3, 2009, pp. 606–46; Laura J. Shepherd, 'Women, armed conflict and language: gender, violence and discourse', *International Review of the Red Cross* 92: 877, 2010, pp. 143–59; Vess et al., *The other side of gender*, pp. 3–4.

⁶⁶ See e.g. the multiple references to men and boys as victims of violence in UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Summit report: the global summit to end sexual violence in conflict, London 2014*, Dec. 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/summit-report-the-global-summit-to-end-sexual-violence-in-conflict-june-2014>. See also the arguments levelled against some feminist activism in Chris Dolan, 'Has patriarchy been stealing the feminists' clothes? Conflict-related sexual violence and UN Security Council resolutions', *IDS Bulletin* 45: 1, 2014, pp. 80–4.

⁶⁷ Commission on the Status of Women, 'The role of men and boys', p. 2.

⁶⁸ See also Guerrina and Wright, 'Gendering normative power Europe'.

⁶⁹ Margot Wallström, 'Speech at the seminar about #femdefenders', 28 Nov. 2014, <http://www.government.se/speeches/2014/11/speech-by-the-minister-for-foreign-affairs-margot-wallstrom-at-the-seminar-about-femdefenders-arranged-by-kvinna-till-kvinna/>. See also Jenny Nordberg, 'Who's afraid of a feminist foreign policy?', *New Yorker*, 15 April 2015, <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/swedens-feminist-foreign-minister>.

inequality and human rights to trump geopolitics (in one case cancelling arms deals with Saudi Arabia), Wallström has reignited a sense that feminist commitments are in some basic way incompatible with 'business as usual', thus reigniting for some the spirit of a radical WPS.⁷⁰

The emergence of feminist foreign policy is a question of both balancing and mainstreaming. As more women enter senior diplomatic posts, it is imagined that 'the gender perspective' will inevitably become more central to state practices. In response to new (female/feminist) personnel, as well as the accumulated pressures of the WPS agenda, states will also supposedly be pushed to consider the gendered dynamics of every action they undertake. The underlying assumption that women will automatically practise diplomacy in a way that is feminist, or even gender-sensitive, needs to be approached with caution; the historical record does not unproblematically support the idea that women are inherently peacemakers.⁷¹

Nevertheless, the example of Sweden, and of other prominent female and feminist decision-makers—including among others Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, Chilean President and former UN Women director Michelle Bachelet, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde, outgoing Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, US National Security Advisor Susan Rice, and US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton—sets the stage for a mainstreaming of core ideas about women's participation, their protection and the prevention of gender violence that will increase the purchase of ideals also found in UNSCR 1325. But foreign policy might also integrate WPS concerns in a narrower sense, putting the tools of participation and the gender perspective to work in advancing conventional security ends. Efforts to do so are at an early stage, but clear in the work of organizations such as NATO, whose documents stress the potential utility of the gender perspective for commanders, rather than as a restriction on military force or an obligation to society at large. While UNSCR 1325 recognizes the necessity for gender training for all deployed personnel, its implementation outside the UN system is also clearly and increasingly a case of using gender knowledge as a military intelligence resource.⁷²

Although the highest-level review of UNSCR 1325 in NATO concluded that most commanders were unaware of the WPS directive and its particulars, it also maintained that 'in Afghanistan efforts at the tactical level would not be possible if gender roles and gender relations are not taken into account'.⁷³ A 'gender perspective' is therefore seen as 'a tool to increase operational effectiveness', which drives

⁷⁰ See e.g. the support expressed by the Secretary-General of the WILPF, Madeleine Rees, 'This is what a feminist foreign policy looks like', *OpenDemocracy*, 23 March 2015, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/madeleine-rees/this-is-what-feminist-foreign-policy-looks-like>.

⁷¹ See, however, the useful summary of research on the positive impact of women in peace negotiations presented in Coomaraswamy et al., *Preventing conflict*, pp. 41–6.

⁷² See NATO, 'Bi-strategic command directive 40-1: integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender perspective into the NATO command structure', Aug. 2012, pp. 6–8, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_04/20150414_20120808_NU_Bi-SCD_40-11.pdf.

⁷³ Helene Lackenbauer and Richard Langlais, eds, *Review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO-led operations and missions*, 2013, pp. 4, 5, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131021_131023-UNSCR1325-review-final.pdf.

the organization's move towards gender mainstreaming.⁷⁴ While the role of women in militaries has long been subject to debate, interest in harnessing the *difference* of women has more recently gained traction with the idea of female engagement teams (FETs)—dedicated units supporting counter-insurgency operations, thought to provide alternative sources of intelligence through engagement with 'local' women who are otherwise distrustful of western military forces in Afghanistan.⁷⁵ The idea of FETs will of course be familiar to NATO analysts, who are understandably keen to enlist all available resources for operational effectiveness, including gender balancing. Indeed, NATO has a significantly better record on gender balancing than UN peacekeeping operations, with women comprising nearly 11 per cent of NATO armed forces.⁷⁶ This is gender mainstreaming understood less as challenging androcentric policy than as recognizing women as an asset for operations and for 'public diplomacy'—the reputation of the organization in the world.

Finally, there remain pressures on the WPS agenda to embrace a future that revives the most radical elements of its past. As a result of their relative success *within* the UN, WPS advocates tend to focus ever more on progress through the finer points of policy. Alongside the wider institutionalization of gender concerns resulting from feminist activism, this approach to a future WPS might be termed the 'femocrat' strategy: there is now a pathway to influence by pursuing incremental change within established national and international bureaucracies.⁷⁷ The relationship between such 'internal' action and the 'external' pressures brought to bear by civil society and social movement activism is a matter of longstanding debate, and the coming years are likely to see a heightening of argument about proper feminist strategy, given the relative lack of progress for the femocrat gambit outlined above. In response, critics will continue to stress the relevance of a more fundamental feminist critique of the state system.

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), established in 1915 in direct response to the outbreak of the First World War, is an organization at the heart of the WPS agenda. It pioneered arguments about women's participation in international peace inherited by UNSCR 1325, and is today a close partner and monitor of WPS policies through its PeaceWomen programme.⁷⁸ But WILPF never held that a gender perspective meant attention

⁷⁴ NATO, 'Bi-strategic command directive 40-1', p. 3.

⁷⁵ See Laleh Khalili, 'Gendered practices of counterinsurgency', *Review of International Studies* 37: 4, 2011, pp. 1471–91; Keally McBride and Annick T. R. Wibben, 'The gendering of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan', *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 3: 2, 2012, pp. 199–215; Synne Laastad Dyvik, 'Women as "practitioners" and "targets": gender and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan', *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 16: 3, 2014, pp. 410–29.

⁷⁶ The NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, *UNSCR 1325 reload: findings and recommendations*, June 2015, p. 26, http://www.nato.int/issues/nogp/meeting-records/2015/UNSCR1325-Reload_Report.pdf. See also Anita Schjøset, 'Data on women's participation in NATO forces and operations', *International Interactions* 39: 4, 2013, pp. 575–611.

⁷⁷ For some discussion at the domestic level, see Louise Chappell, 'The "femocrat" strategy: expanding the repertoire of feminist activists', *Parliamentary Affairs* 55: 1, 2002, pp. 85–98.

⁷⁸ For more on the history of WILPF, see Catia Cecilia Confortini, *Intelligent compassion: feminist critical methodology in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). See also the discussion of WILPF in Kirby and Shepherd, 'Reintroducing women, peace and security', pp. 249–54 above.

only to a set of specific 'women's issues', such as the victimization of women and girls in conflict, although that was a major part of its concern. On the contrary, several generations of activists set themselves against not only gender violence, but also militarism, white supremacy, global capitalism and the state system itself. The contemporary WILPF platform retains such policy prescriptions as 'total worldwide disarmament'.⁷⁹ On this account, a properly 'feminist' perspective on peace and security requires a fundamental redefinition of the very idea of peace and security, and of the actors competent to bring it about.⁸⁰

And yet these claims are today muted, and barely hinted at in contemporary WPS discourse. This is to be expected, given the state-centrism and bureaucratic frameworks outlined above, but it makes the revival of a radical WPS practically impossible. One consequence is the narrowing of WPS aims. For example, the stated aim of 'prevention' can be read in two distinct ways. It may refer to short-term, conflict-focused work, such as policies to prevent outbreaks of sexual violence in refugee camps through gender-sensitive logistics (a common example being the placement of latrines to avoid long journeys for unaccompanied women at night). These are the practical guidelines amenable to UN bureaucracies and humanitarian professionals. But there is also 'prevention' in the sense of sustained social change to undo the conditions that produce violent conflict in the first place. The ambition here is on an entirely different scale, requiring transformative mobilization at the global level (which could reasonably be expected to produce resistance and deep conflict in turn), reorienting major arms economies and moving beyond the schemas of the nation-state. It has indeed been noted that the meaning of 'prevention' in the WPS agenda has steadily shifted from a general opposition to war to a limited focus on civilian victimization and war crimes, and even to an accommodation with military operations where deemed sufficiently cognizant of 'human security'.⁸¹

This particular version of mainstreaming has of course helped bring in precisely those actors condemned in the radical analysis—military leaders, foreign ministers, global corporations that might sponsor UN Women campaigns—but it has also meant that the most easily visible future is one in which ever greater attention is given to resource distribution through state contributions, the partnership of civil society groups and states, and the professionalization and institutionalization of women in global security and justice policy.⁸² Although ambitious in their scope, and therefore underspecified in policy terms as well as subject to considerable political dispute, the more radical versions of WPS are truer to civil society motivations in pushing for UNSCR 1325 in the first place. They thus set in some ways the more realistic programme for achieving those aims *as originally envisioned*. A more compromised programme has been crucial to the progress

⁷⁹ WILPF, *WILPF manifesto 2015* (Geneva), p. 2, <http://www.wilpfinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/WILPF-2015-Manifesto.pdf>.

⁸⁰ For example, dismantling NATO remains a WILPF demand: see *WILPF manifesto 2015*, p. 11.

⁸¹ Ellerby, '(En)gendered security?', p. 439.

⁸² These are indeed some of the objectives set out in the 'Civil society open letter in advance of the 15th anniversary of SCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security', 20 April 2015, http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-CSO_OpenLetter_15thAnniversary1325.pdf.

of WPS to date, and yet that progress can only be measured against an agenda for peace and security which demands transformations beyond the power of the internal strategy. The paradox is constitutive and cannot be overcome. It can only be navigated, imperfectly.

Punctuating WPS

We have provided a brief overview of the implementation of various WPS provisions across a number of sectors. We hesitate to label this exploration an evaluation of the 'efficacy' of the WPS agenda, not only because the WPS principles are diverse and wide-ranging, which makes substantive evaluation difficult in the confines of a single article, but also because moves to uphold these principles may have had a positive impact on the lives of women who seek to engage with peace and security governance mechanisms, which itself is demonstrative of efficacy.⁸³ Nonetheless, we have indicated some key successes and shortcomings, as well as elaborating on two of the key tensions we see as characteristic of the current WPS agenda and its operationalization in contemporary politics, alongside three emerging futures among the open possibilities of a WPS-to-come.

In each of the possible futures we outline above, a tension exists between the advancement of the WPS agenda and its dilution, with the prospects for each heavily dependent on underlying conceptions of what gender equality means, and how it can be made manifest. The futures embody the tensions we identify in our analysis, and bring other tensions into being. In the case of 'Men, Peace and Security', the challenge is to reconcile elements of complementarity with those of contention. For the diffusion of WPS across a new range of policy actors, the opportunities of pluralization are matched by the risk of themes instrumentalized for purposes perhaps dramatically at odds with the overall WPS vision. And for the historic ambition of a radical WPS, there appears the gulf between a fundamental (even a fundamentalist) critique of global order and the ability to concretely hold states accountable for the commitments they made in Resolution 1325 and its successors.

In each case, the ability of WPS to advance the status of women globally, to achieve peace and to recreate security depends on the ability of a range of actors (here expanding, there shrinking) to work both within and beyond the bounds of politics as usual. It was ever thus. In the ebb and flow of policy and funding, and within the bureaucracies of global governance, the horizon for change may often appear to be the daily practice of world affairs. The conceptual framing of WPS as a fundamental challenge to contemporary global order will be equally important. And it is that standard, over the next 15 years and in the decades beyond, by which the Women, Peace and Security agenda will have to be judged.

⁸³ Readers in search of a more expansive and systematic evaluation are directed to Coomaraswamy et al., *Preventing conflict*, on which we have drawn at numerous points above.